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A Journal of Critical Human Science and Culture



The New Global

Fall 2020

McDowell Center

GLOBAL INSIGHT

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A Journal of Critical Human Science and Culture

Volume 1

Fall 2020

Global Insight: A Journal of Critical Human Science and Culture is now accepting submissions for Fall 2021. Contributors must be undergraduate students from any college at The University of Texas at Arlington. Submissions will be subject to double-blind peer review. The journal will be available to a wide, international audience in an online platform via academic hosts and vendors as well as a limited print run.

Global Insight aims at firing the imagination of up-and-coming scholars by providing a venue for critical thinking and independent research. Our endeavor is to cultivate the capacity of undergraduate students for subtle and nuanced reasoning as well as nurture a passion for ideas and an appreciation for the social, political, cultural, linguistic, ethical, environmental, and historical dimensions of important issues facing our global society today. Contributors should use liberal arts approaches such as inquiry, dialogue, and analysis to address the issues of politics and culture, science and technology, or related fields. Topics may range from industrialization and urbanization to agriculture and energy; health and health risks to international relations and foreign policy; international trade, finance, capitalism, globalization, and migration; or public issues such as race, class, gender, and labor, etc. Topics should be explored within their respective global contexts.

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Contents

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From the Editor

Welcome to the New Global

2020 has been a year of seismic shifts in our global perspective(s). It began with a world health crisis unseen in generations, as the coronavirus pandemic led to enormous economic, social, and political disruptions. The year continued with a long overdue reckoning with inequality and racial oppression. #BlackLivesMatter revealed the extent of systemic racism in our institutions and culture. If these signals weren't enough to remind us how fragile we are as a human community, storms, wildfires, rising sea levels, and other evidence of climate change have proceeded apace.

These tidal events are forcing us to think and act in different ways. They have already changed the ways we work, study, and travel. Some are calling this period the Great Adaptation and refer to the new normal. We're calling it the New Global.

But it's not all doom and gloom. While cultural norms are changing, the New Global has a silver lining. Alongside human tragedy we're seeing surprising innovation. Industries transform as people work and study from home. Less commuter traffic has led to significant improvements in air quality. The multi-pronged crises have exposed inequalities and racial injustice and revealed the flaws in our health care systems and other critical infrastructure. If we choose to see them, there are opportunities here to overcome these and related concerns like poverty and human rights abuses around the world. The global challenges we share help us see that we are all interconnected. Calling attention to every form of injustice and inequality can help us become wiser and more caring with respect to one another, and in relation to our earth and all its living beings and precious resources.

We have a rare opportunity this very moment to realign our priorities and examine where we are as individuals and in the life of our planet—and where we want to be. Like an enormous global reset, this is a time to reinvent and reimagine.

That's why this inaugural issue of *Global Insight* couldn't be timelier or better aligned with the new world we're facing.

The idea of a publication series for the Charles T. McDowell Center for Critical Languages and Area Studies was the ambition of the Center's first director, Dr. Mark Cichock. On behalf of the College of Liberal Arts at The University of Texas at Arlington, Dr. Cichock built the Center on the legacy of an extraordinary individual, Dr. Charles T. McDowell, whose vision

of global engagement was way before his time. Dr. McDowell founded the Center for Soviet and East European Studies in 1968 to provide resources for UTA students to study the region. For many years he led student groups to the USSR which, given that it was behind the Iron Curtain at the time, closed off to the West, was no easy feat. Today, the McDowell Center offers generous scholarships for students studying abroad in locations around the world, as well as grants supporting international faculty research. In Fall 2020 the Center was renamed the Charles T. McDowell Center for Global Studies and launched a Global Studies Minor and Certificate Program, the first of its kind at UTA. In each of these initiatives, we are extraordinarily privileged to carry on the work of a true pioneer. Read more about Dr. McDowell and the mission, programs, and activities of the Center here: http://www.uta.edu/mcdowellcenter/.

Global Insight is a landmark that has been years in the making. Its purpose is to amplify the McDowell Center's vision to provide meaningful opportunities for student advancement in global contexts. That is why we are extremely proud to showcase the work of the seven authors in this inaugural issue.

Our featured author, Elizabeth Oren, was the first UTA grad to earn the distinction of McDowell Scholar. Her article on the Islamic State's cyber warfare tactics is the result of extensive research and analysis, written while she worked for the NATO Center of Excellence-Defence Against Terrorism and NATO SCHOOL. We are honored to publish this work and to launch *Global Insight* with a Foreword by Ms. Oren.

Each of the remaining authors started their respective essays as UTA undergraduates in the 2019–2020 academic year before the COVID-19 pandemic changed everyone's lives. They completed and revised their work while quarantined at home as we all adapted to the change—when phrases like "flatten the curve" and "superspreader event" became part of our everyday lexicon—an experience which undoubtedly reinforced in their minds the meanings of the New Global.

Their work covers a spectrum that encompasses politics, society, and the arts. Topics range from international relations, to health and infrastructure, to literature and film, with approaches from gender and women's studies, disability studies, and nuanced philosophical and psychological perspectives.

I congratulate each of our authors on their outstanding work. With your insight and creativity, you have claimed your place in the global dialogue. As you continue to research, travel, write, and become leaders in your respective fields, let your work be a testament to the fact that when you discover your place in the global narrative, you increase your potential to impact communities across the world.

Finally, I would like to thank the extraordinary UTA faculty and staff whose great energy and enthusiasm were the driving force that made this publication possible:

Associate University Librarian for Scholarly Communications Kelly Visnak; Digital Publishing & Repository Librarian Yumi Ohira; Publishing Specialist Brittany Griffiths; Student Assistant Rachael Carver; Executive Editor Yubraj Aryal; Communications and Marketing Assistant Linsey Retcofsky; Copy Editor Josh Paul Mitchell; and the pool of peer reviewers, graduate students at UTA, who reviewed the authors' work and offered their valuable feedback.

Thank you, lastly, to our readers for giving us a reason to share this *Global Insight*.

— Lonny Harrison, Editor-in-Chief

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Foreword

Elizabeth Oren

Between the years of 2013 and 2014, The Charles T. McDowell Center for Critical Languages and Area Studies, UT Arlington Scholarship fund, and the Betty and Roger Ruch Study Abroad Scholarship enabled my cultural and linguistic research in Turkey. The Ruch family and my professors, Dr. Mark Cichock, Dr. Pete Smith, and Dr. Lonny Harrison placed great trust in me to maximize the opportunity to travel and learn overseas, and the experience influences me to this day. As a student and researcher, it is vital to have tangible experiences to gain perspective on the world outside of our own.

By 2014 the International Community faced an unprecedented task in both scope and scale: to counter radicalization globally while recovering land overtaken by terrorist organizations and dismantling the networks that supported it. While working between NATO Center of Excellence-Defence Against Terrorism and NATO SCHOOL, I wrote a series of recommendations in 2014 for a report entitled *Islamic State's Asymmetric Information Campaign*, and it was circulated through the NATO community in 2015. Reflected in this report is an overview of the analytical tradecraft I created, Cyber Humanics®, to better understand and analyze complex human interaction and technology through open source research. This report was based on a collection of my cultural and linguistic research that over time evolved into the operationally oriented piece, "The Human Domain of Cyber" in its present form.

While working overseas in Turkey and Germany, I relied on what I learned from researching abroad, and the stellar course instruction and mentorship from my professors at UT Arlington. The Charles T. McDowell Center is further demonstrating commitment to the professional development of its students while honoring Professor McDowell's spirit and unswerving belief in the value of study and work abroad. *Global Insight* affords students a unique opportunity to express creativity and fresh perspectives on critical area studies, culture, and human connection to global issues. It is a privilege to publish this report in *Global Insight*'s inaugural issue.

— Elizabeth Oren, July 28th, 2020

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The Human Domain of Cyber: Islamic State's Asymmetric Information Campaign

Elizabeth Oren

The purpose of this report is to broaden the impact of military and legal measures against Islamic State and global affiliates through a counter information campaign in the Human Domain[1] of Cyber. The Human Domain of Cyber is defined as the human domain in the operational environment and the intersection with technology. This report utilizes Cyber Humanics® advanced tradecraft to create recommendations for NATO Member and Partner nations on countering Islamic State's online asymmetric recruitment of foreigners on social media. Cyber Humanics® is the advanced tradecraft and methodology to holistically study and analyze contemporary media, data technology, and the human element in the digital sphere. All recommendations are based on social media analysis of Islamic State's multi-dimensional online recruitment materials in Russian, Turkish, French, and English examined on two levels: (1) the organizational level, referencing materials officially published by the Islamic State; and (2) the individual level, analyzing unofficial content from public Islamic State supporter social media accounts.

1. Votel (General), Joseph. "Operating in the Human Domain." USSOCOM Publication, 3 Aug. 2015.

Introduction

The crux of the fight against Islamic State (IS)[2] is recruitment attrition by means of decreasing ideological support for IS's cause. Even though US, UAE, SA, and Syrian Government airstrikes aimed at IS strongholds and financial resources,[3] suspension of pro-IS social media accounts,[4] and travel bans to Syria can collectively reduce IS capacities and fighters, these tactics do not actually counteract influential cultural and ideological motivations. This is why IS support and propaganda dissemination still continues outside of official IS channels as demonstrated by the identity exposure of *ShamiWitness*, who turned out to be an executive in India favoring IS on Twitter.[5] With this in mind, this report: (1) defines IS recruitment attrition and explains why it is crucial for NATO Member and Partner state security, (2) links pertinence to future and potential NATO capacity and security building missions, (3) demonstrates why IS recruitment is asymmetric, and (4) offers tailored recommendations for IS recruitment attrition.

The IS recruitment process is asymmetric in that it occurs within local communities and online virtual spaces capitalizing on ideological, financial, and situational motivations. Online IS recruitment includes official *Al-Hayat*[6] publicity and unofficial supporter generated content that promotes IS objectives, advertises joining or establishing IS communities, and influences individuals to kinetically augment IS combatant forces. The encompassing nature of online IS recruitment is why recruitment attrition operations should encompass actual and potential recruitment pools including foreign jihad fighters, supporters, and empathizers living abroad or domestically.

The focus of this report is online recruitment that expands the IS foreign fighter and non-combatant community. Online IS recruitment targets Muslim communities outside of Syria and Iraq to increase hijrah[7] to IS territories and/or to promote IS modeled insurgencies in other Muslim states. This is why IS's recruitment strategy advertises to a broad Muslim audience for universal community building [Figure 1] then tactically shifts to localized messaging.

Figure 1: Communal IS propaganda meme

The Alliance has a specific stake in IS recruitment attrition because this trend impacts global security, and NATO member state domestic security. Thousands of NATO Member and Partner nationals have joined

2. Islamic State (IS) represents ISIS, ISIL, and Da'ish; the usage of the term "state" does not signify official statehood.
3. Pirinççi, Ferhat, Oytun Orhan and Bilgay Duman. "US Strategy Against ISIS and Its Potential Implications for Iraq & Syria." ORSAM, Sep. 2014, http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/enUploads/Article/Files/2014924_rapor191ing.pdf. Accessed Sep. 2014.
4. Borison, Rebecca. "Twitter Suspended An ISIS-Affiliated Account That Called For The Assassination of Twitter Employees." *Business Insider*, 9 Sep. 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/twitter-suspended-isis-affiliated-account-that-called-for-its-assassination-2014-9. Accessed 9 Sep. 2014.
5. "@shamiwitness: India arrests man over pro-Islamic State tweets." *BBC Asia*, 13 Dec. 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30461455. Accessed 13 Dec. 2014.
6. Al-Hayat content is marked by a seal released by IS publicity.
7. Historically, Prophet Muhammad's migration from Mecca to Medina; implied immigration to the Islamic State.

IS's war campaigns contributing to international conflict, and instability in Syria and Iraq.[8] Generally, IS foreign fighters and non-combatant recruits move for the duration, destroying passports and identification papers.[9] However, domestic threats still exist for NATO member states from IS devotees who could be directed, or independently motivated as witnessed by the 2014 Jewish Museum attack in Brussels by former IS foreign fighter Mehdi Nemmouche.[10]

Equally, the IS community is a danger to NATO missions in Afghanistan as evidenced by the November 2014 Taliban and IS Afghan affiliate attacks on Shorabak.[11] In Libya, the IS affiliate Majlis Shura Shabab al-Islam in conjunction with Ansar al-Sharia thrusted the city of Darnah into an IS modeled caliphate in April 2014.[12] Even though there is not a NATO security and capacity building mission currently grounded in Libya, any policy change will mean facing IS foreign fighters in Libya. Armed, global IS movements put any Muslim state, or region with grave internal security weaknesses at high risk for an IS based insurgency.

Despite the tactical effectiveness of the 2014 international coalition airstrikes on IS financial and military assets,[13] tomorrow's new combatants can still replace those killed yesterday. Additionally, IS jihad fighters who are unsuccessful at traveling to Syria are creating global spillover and battlefield substitution much like would-be Emirate Caucasus fighters deflecting to combatant bands in Syria,[14] and Afghan Taliban retreating into Pakistan.[15] Also, IS encourages jihad fighters to push forward in Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco to augment IS affiliates [Figure 2].

Figure 2: IS Caliph al-Baghdadi's address to IS affiliates in Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco (2014)

As we look to the future of hybrid warfare, the element missing from the 2014 international coalition airstrikes against IS is an equally effective asymmetric information campaign addressing ideological motivations for supporting IS. Pulled from an anti-IS American social media account [Figure 3] illustrates the deficit in Western perception of all the asymmetric warfare tactics utilized by IS. The arsenal of IS bands are no match for the awesome firepower

8. "Islamic State crisis: '3,000 European jihadists join fight." *BBC*, 26 Sep. 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29372494. Accessed 26 Sep. 2014.
9. Based on IS foreign fighter and foreign non-combatants testimonies.
10. Rouiller, Jean-Paul. "From MM (for Mohamed Merah) to MN (Mehdi Nemmouche) or the Foreign Fighters Shifting Paradigm." NATO COE-DAT Terrorism Experts Conference, 2014, Turkey. Conference Presentation.
11. "Afghan Troops 'Drive Out' Taliban From Key Southern Base." *RFERL Afghanistan*, 15 Dec. 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/helmand-attack-afghanistan-shorabak-camp-bastion/26714774.html. Accessed 15 Dec. 2014.
12. Zelin, Aaron Y. "The Islamic State's First Colony in Libya". *The Washington Institute*, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-islamic-states-first-colony-in-libya. Accessed 10 Oct. 2014.
13. Pirinççi, Ferhat, Oytun Orhan and Bilgay Duman. "US Strategy Against ISIS and Its Potential Implications for Iraq & Syria." ORSAM, Sep. 2014, http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/enUploads/Article/Files/2014924_rapor191ing.pdf. Accessed Sep. 2014.
14. Statement based on media analysis of Russian-speaking jihad fighters in Syria, research on Chechen Government anti-terror policies, and the movement of North Caucasian jihad fighter trends from 2010-2014.
15. "Learn from Yesterday, Gain for Tomorrow NATO's Counter-Terrorism Experience in Afghanistan." Lessons Learned Workshop, NATO COE-DAT, 18 Nov. 2014, Ankara, Turkey.

aboard an aircraft carrier, but despite the extraordinary capabilities of NATO member and partner states the same conflicts are not being engaged.

IS and supporters actually utilize the international coalition airstrikes to embolden IS recruitment by posting images of dead non-combatants and infrastructure damage, which is marketed as a direct war against Islam [Figure 4]. This type of broad global recruitment of Muslims is primarily taking place in a world of framed reality on free social media. Within this online world lies a great potential for NATO nations to reduce the number of individuals kinetically augmenting IS and affiliates, and to decrease broad support for IS's activities. In order to engage this aspect of IS's war campaign, social media analysis needs to be paramount in information gathering. Then, this gained information can be used towards the counter narrative against IS, and counter information operations.

It is vital to recognize that the IS recruitment process is multi-dimensional and adaptive [Figure 5] meaning that counter information operations must be flexible. When IS supporter social media accounts and websites are removed or suspended these accounts reappear under new user names gaining followers quickly, and content is redirected to new platforms.[16] Currently, many official recruiters are under locked accounts, and many public pro-IS accounts are not officially linked to IS. However, the public content actually resonates with the target audience who consequently widen the popularity of these accounts.

IS recruitment mirrors the asymmetric warfare tactics of IS in that the process is complex, adaptive, and comprises a myriad of actors and methods. An evolving specialized information campaign based on cultural intelligence and analysis can extend the impact of military and legal measures for global IS recruitment attrition. The following recommendations are tailored to ideological and cultural motivations for joining IS, and are intended for online implementation.

Figure 3: Anti-IS meme contrasting firepower capacity (2014)

Figure 4: Pro-IS account attributing the damage in an Aleppo province market to coalition airstrikes (2014)

Figure 5: IS WhatsApp ban. Individuals who have valuable information for IS operations are being instructed via this anti-WhatsApp meme to not use the app (2014)

16. Assessment based on monitoring of IS supporter social media accounts in real-time.

Recommendations

1.1 Without defining Islam, define Islamic State as an illegitimate vigilante caliphate in order to fixate a key counter narrative.

1.2 Without polarizing Sunnis, label Islamic State neo-khawarij[17*] who make takfir[18*] on Muslims for recruitment attrition, and to increase the division between Islamic State and other jihadi combatant groups.

1.3 Directly counter the opinion held by Islamic State empathizers and supporters who believe: (1) there is a war against Islam and (2) Muslims are only free in IS's caliphate, in order to reduce global support for Islamic State.

1.4 Derive counter content from cultural intelligence analysis of Islamic State recruitment materials and the pop culture of jihad fighters.

1.5 Define distinct motivations for joining and supporting Islamic State and target accordingly in order to achieve attrition among the different Islamic State recruitment pools.

1.6 Localize all counter Islamic State content in order to effectively reach the global multilingual Islamic State target audience.

1.7 Compose counter content from the viewpoint of Islamic State empathizers and vulnerable audiences in order to connect with the target audience.

1.8 Format counter content that resonates with the human aspect of the Islamic State community.

1.9 Format counter materials specific to female motivations for joining and supporting Islamic State in order to reduce the number of children raised to augment Islamic State forces.

1.10 Design counter materials aimed at the global Islamic State virtual community in order to deter Islamic State militant movements outside of Syria and Iraq.

1.11 Design counter materials for the generational culture of Islamic State jihad fighters and supporters so that the target audience is entertained by the messages.

1.12 Counter Islamic State online recruitment methods in real time in order to reduce the impact of trending comments, false news, and conspiracy theories.

1.13 Monopolize on Islamic State's quick information dissemination and pro-Islamic State social media users who divulge valuable information.

1.14 Utilize social media accounts to subtly erode credibility of major Islamic State recruiters and proponents on social media.

17. Historically, khawarij or kharijites deviated from the teachings of the Prophet and rebelled against the Caliphate.
18. Being a takfiri or making takfir occurs when a Muslim accuses another Muslim of apostasy.

Recommendations

1.1 Without defining Islam, define Islamic State as an illegitimate vigilante caliphate in order to fixate a key counter narrative.

By defining IS as an illegitimate vigilante caliphate, the narrative places IS in a corner because it encompasses IS's own words in a negative label. Additionally, it will push IS to change its approach in order to survive politically and socially. The vigilante term is fitting because IS declares to avenge Shia oppression against Sunnis, and IS declares to establish order and justice in a brash and forceful manner.[19] IS does actually implement some Islamic law [Figure 6 & 7] but labeling IS as an illegitimate caliphate with evidence from Islamic law can verify illegitimacy to the target audience.

Figure 6: IS courthouse in Syria

Figure 7: IS billboard "God's law not man's law" in Syria (2014)

1.2 Without polarizing Sunnis, label Islamic State neo-khawarij who make takfir on Muslims for recruitment attrition, and to increase the division between Islamic State and other jihadi combatant groups.

The term neo-khawarij brands IS as a modern version of notorious Muslim radical rebels advertising under the flag of Tahwid. IS members are Sunnis, but many Sunni opponents consider IS as khawarij and takfiris [Figure 8]. Khawarij is religiously pertinent, translatable to all Muslim cultures, and negative. This term also decreases broad Sunni Muslim support without polarizing Sunnis.

Additionally, IS accuses non-IS Muslims as being apostates, which is making takfir. The takfir approach forces Muslims to support or fight IS. This creates a confrontation between IS and jihadi combatant bands in Syria [Figure 9], the North Caucasus, al-Qai'da, and Jabhat al-Nursa.

Figure 8: Islamic online sermon about the danger of khawarij (2014)



Figure 9: Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar making a case against an IS leader

19. Al-Abdeh, Malik. "The Transition of Groups from Terrorism in Insurgency and the Case of Population Support of Syria." NATO COE-DAT Terrorism Experts Conference, 2014, Turkey. Conference Presentation.

1.3 Directly counter the opinion held by Islamic State empathizers and supporters who believe: (1) there is a war against Islam and (2) Muslims are only free in IS's caliphate, in order to reduce global support for Islamic State.

These two beliefs held by IS and other global jihadi combatant organizations/bands is the pith of foreign fighter recruitment and IS supporters [Figure 10]. Additionally, many foreign jihad fighters augment various bands with the intent to help Syrians, defend Muslims, and live under Shari'ah. This is important because some Muslims believe that they are only free and true Muslims if living under Shari'ah; actual discrimination and persecution of Sunni Muslims is used as evidence to support this belief. Since IS has made concrete progress for a caliphate, IS is able to endorse that Sunnis can only live freely and comfortably as Muslims in IS's caliphate [Figure 11].

Figure 10: IS fighter commentary on social media

Figure 11: IS meme promoting liberty from judgment for Muslims(2014)

1.4 Derive counter content from cultural intelligence analysis of Islamic State recruitment materials and the pop culture of jihad fighters.

IS and other jihad fighter groups have a particular pop culture that requires understanding and appreciating in order to produce effective counter information. Individuals who are labeled as terrorists by governments are often viewed and honored as mujahideen by individuals [Figure 12]. This sentiment is also found in many Muslim communities regardless of support for militant activity, and creates a significant social wedge for counter terrorism and counter insurgency.[20] This is one example of how cultural intelligence can enhance how we address international security challenges.



Figure 12: Online poll asking viewers to rank Omer Shishani's band of IS as a) Terrorists 1,042 b) Wahhabis 509 or c) Mujahideen 7,954

20. Feyyaz, Muhammad. "Voids, Limitations and Their Implications in National Counter-Narrative for CT – A Case of Pakistan." NATO COE-DAT Terrorism Experts Conference, 2014, Turkey. Conference Presentation.

1.5 Define distinct motivations for joining and supporting Islamic State and target accordingly in order to achieve attrition among the different Islamic State recruitment pools.

Even though most foreign jihad fighters are motivated to defend and help Muslims, and to live under Shari'ah, not all jihad fighters actually support IS. This is why IS recruitment materials are purposefully tailored to each target audience culture, using testimonials from IS fighters who offer a high degree of legitimacy to sway other jihad fighters with similar backgrounds. The IS fighter in [Figure 13] explains why he consecutively left Emirate Caucasus, and Jabhat al-Nursa. However, this represents only a certain pool, while others augment IS forces for different reasons and each reason needs a particular message.



Figure 13: IS jihad fighter explaining why he left Emirate Caucasus and Jabhat al-Nursa. Russian language(2013)

1.6 Localize all counter Islamic State content in order to effectively reach the global multilingual Islamic State target audience.

As more IS content is localized in new languages, and online users promote the content, new target markets will be vulnerable, and IS foreign fighter and immigrant populations can increase and diversify. IS counter information needs to be localized content in order to reach the global target audience. Localization customizes advertising for language and culture in order to relate a product to a specific audience to increase sales, which is the process IS's publicity applies in order to increase foreign fighter recruitment rates [Figure 14]. Consider the major native language groups spoken by foreign fighters and IS supporters: Arabic, Russian, Turkish, French, and English. This is despite the fact that the majority of the world's Muslim population lives in South and Southeast Asia. The Wahabbi-takfir culture already exists in Indonesia,[21] indicating an ideological pool for IS recruitment. IS has not sufficiently targeted this potential pool with pro-IS materials; however, this is changing [Figure 15]. The IS foreign population

Figure 14: IS official recruitment video spoken in Russian with proper Arabic and English subtitles

Figure 15: Fall preview of an IS Al-Hayat publication with an Indonesian language page (2014)

21. Sariburaja, Kennimrod. Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah. 13, Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism, Oct. 2013, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

correlates highly to the amount of localized information available in the language groups, meaning more localized IS content expands the IS market. The counter information campaign needs to be translated and localized for all the actual and potential recruitment pools, which is a task that can be distributed to member and partner nations.

1.7 Compose counter content from the viewpoint of Islamic State empathizers and vulnerable audiences in order to connect with the target audience.

Framing counter content from the viewpoint of IS empathizers and vulnerable audiences is paramount to avoiding counterproductive content such as [Figure 16]. The meme is designed to persuade foreign Muslim women to not travel to IS for marriage because Muslim women are forced into marriage with potentially unattractive partner(s). This meme is counterproductive because it contradicts testimonials of foreign Muslim women living in IS, whose word is more legitimate to the target audience. These pro-IS women state that IS respects their full rights as Muslims, which includes the right to accept or refuse a marriage proposal. The meme also assumes how the female Muslim target audience defines an attractive partner, causing the meme to be criticized by pro-IS social media users. Counter content designed to prevent young women and men from joining IS should be based on reasons to which they will relate and counterarguments to which they will agree.



Figure 16: Anti-IS meme targeting unmarried foreign Muslim women(2014)

1.8 Format counter content that resonates with the human aspect of the Islamic State community.

IS recruitment is not only about jihad fighters: it is aimed at non-combatant roles for women, children, and men who can contribute to all aspects of a community. Additionally, the importance of marriage and family is paramount for IS, meaning counter content needs to reflect the family oriented reasons for supporting IS [Figure 17]. When men and women consider going to IS territories, at a basic level, they are looking for stability in order to live and raise families. If IS cannot convince

Figure 17: IS children's rally Syria(2014)

women that the cities are safe for children, then they will be reluctant to come, making men reluctant to live without their families or without the possibility of marriage.

1.9 Format counter materials specific to female motivations for joining and supporting Islamic State in order to reduce the number of children raised to augment Islamic State forces.

Foreign women join IS for various reasons, and many are conscious of the realities [Figure 18]. This means there are foreign Muslim women who perceive rights and privileges to living in IS territories. There are women hesitant to join IS, but have an obligation to follow their partners who have left to fight for IS. This means counter materials should be formatted for this diverse reality among the female population in IS. This is important because pro-IS women support the fighter population and raise the children who will become IS's future adult population.

Figure 18: Publicly posted image of a woman's role in an IS city in Syria.

1.10 Design counter materials aimed at the global Islamic State virtual community in order to deter Islamic State militant movements outside of Syria and Iraq.

IS's broad recruitment strategy includes motivating supporters abroad as seen in [Figure 19]. The online recruitment pool lives in a violent virtual world on social media, and physically inhabits another country of residence. The framed reality online mixed with opposing realism means that pockets of IS communities present across the globe are stuck in a precarious existence. This necessitates counter materials to contrast peaceful lifestyles versus violent militant action for domestic security. As in the case of Libya, IS support grew to the extent of mass rallies [Figure 20] and, without overlooking Libya's grave internal security issues, Majlis Shura Shabab al-Islam in conjunction with Ansar al-Sharia thrusted the city of Darnah into an IS caliphate in April 2014.

Figure 19: Female IS supporters in Indonesia.

Figure 20: Pro-IS rally in Darnah (2014)

1.11 Design counter materials for the generational culture of Islamic State jihad fighters and supporters so that the target audience is entertained by the messages.

Many foreign jihad fighters are aged 20-35, and come from NATO member states, meaning these individuals carry some cultural attributes relative to in-country residence. Several IS jihad fighters and supporters learned English from watching American movies and TV shows, and have a Western educational background. Many IS supporters and fighters have a sense of humor mirroring their generation indicating a manner in which we can communicate our message. IS supporter social media accounts entertain their followers as demonstrated in [Figure 21] which jokes how Muslims reacted to the establishment of the caliphate like the actor reacts to an alarm clock (smashing it). Instead of only employing serious counter content, humor can be an effectively disarming approach to target IS audiences.

Figure 21: IS support social media account joking with a gif of *Groundhog Day* with Bill Murray(2014)

1.12 Counter Islamic State online recruitment methods in real time in order to reduce the impact of trending comments, false news, and conspiracy theories.

IS recruiters and supporters quickly recognize opportunity with major global events in relation to IS's organizational needs. IS's social media campaign for Ferguson [Figure 22] represents how IS proliferates asymmetrically online. Within hours of the November protests in Ferguson, IS jihad fighters offered to liberate the city of Ferguson, and IS actually offered the protestors of Ferguson asylum in their controlled territories. Event tagging like this must be addressed in real time as part of an effective counter information program.

Figure 22: IS jihad fighters communicating to Ferguson protesters online (2014)

1.13 Monopolize on Islamic State's quick information dissemination and pro-Islamic State social media users who divulge valuable information.

IS jihad fighters provide news from the battlefield [Figure 23 & 24] with live action camera-phone shots before established medias have the chance. This gives IS information control, which is the ultimate edge allowing them to flood the media market firstly and quickly. The disadvantage is that the mass of young and irresponsible online users means that valuable information is unintentionally divulged and can be turned for recruitment attrition. Even though accounts and websites provide a platform for direct and indirect recruitment, the information gained from allowing these users to operate blindly gives us an opportunity for intelligence gathering to assist both military and legal measures.

Figure 23: Pro-IS Afghan affiliate Twitter account reporting on the attacks at Shorabak

Figure 24: Pro-IS Afghan affiliate Twitter account reporting in Turkish during the Shorabak attacks in November (2014)

1.14 Utilize social media accounts to subtly erode credibility of major Islamic State recruiters and proponents on social media.

The long-term plan needs to focus on decreasing follower support on an ideological basis, which means eroding credibility as followers define it. Even though there are benefits to account and website suspension, in some cases it is more beneficial to let certain accounts operate blindly in order to subtly erode their influence. Additionally, suspended IS recruiter accounts and websites reappear quickly in different forms [Figure 27], and gain hundreds of followers within a few days. Pro-IS social media users are operationally mutative in that they adapt to suspension by disguising the account, thus making them more difficult to find and track [Figure 26]. In this case the approach is critical, since pro-IS accounts easily identify and block suspicious activity [Figure 25].

Figure 25: IS supporter Twitter account reacting to trolls

Figure 26: IS supporter Twitter reacting deceptively to multiple suspensions, and adapting to hide the account

Figure 27: IS supporter Instagram account on the 5th try (2014)

Conclusion

The fact that IS can channel the anger, frustration, and confusion present in Muslim communities for direct support or impartiality for IS, is the most powerful psychological element of IS recruitment. The ideological popularity of ShamiWitness demonstrates this phenomenon: he actually gained support by framing Qur'an and Hadith knowledge with the persecution and oppression of Muslims, and the belief of a war against Islam. These beliefs bolster global Sunni Muslim community support for a caliphate to which IS took the lead on a local level.

IS's grass roots and local community building is another aspect of asymmetric information strategy, which is a related issue requiring different counter measures. IS members literally go door to door [Figure 28] to communicate with written and spoken messages. Countering IS community building within Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan with cultural intelligence is paramount, but involves realities necessitating a different type of counter information structure than social media.

Figure 28: IS jihad fighter distributing propaganda materials in Syria (2014)

Essentially, there is no one Muslim culture more vulnerable to IS recruitment because the quality and quantity of localized information directly influences the success of the information campaign, which is reflected in IS's major foreign language groups. With multi-lingual materials, IS recruits a lifestyle that siphons from the radical periphery of modern Wahabbism. This violent form of Wahabbi-takfir ideology transcends IS because it seeks to purge the Muslim community, which is why it should be approached as a global social crisis.

The Alliance has an important role in combating online recruitment to lower domestic security threats inside Alliance member states, and to assist NATO Partners' security dilemmas. With a long-term dedicated counter information campaign, global and domestic recruitment attrition is attainable. In a broader scope, similar information campaigns and advanced cultural analysis can be applied to any type of security challenge faced by NATO Member nations to assist in cyber warfare, counter terrorism, counter insurgency, and other developing security issues.

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The Disparity of Indigenous and Nonindigenous Groups in the Healthcare System of Mexico

May Nguyen

All around the world, indigenous groups experience a greater number of inequalities compared to their nonindigenous counterparts. This is apparent in Mexico, where indigenous groups face greater poverty, less access to social benefits, and less access to health services. The healthcare system of Mexico used to cater to the wealthier, nonindigenous population, ignoring the marginalized, disadvantaged indigenous population. There was a lack of federal attention and aid to the healthcare of indigenous groups. They experienced low-funded healthcare facilities which led to a shortage of human resources, medications, supplies, and infrastructure. This led to a lack of health services in indigenous communities. Fewer indigenous individuals had access to health coverage and benefits compared to nonindigenous individuals. Lastly, indigenous groups faced lower quality health services overall. However, Mexico has been working on decreasing the disparity gap. In 2003, the national program *Seguro Popular* was implemented to focus on providing universal health care. Mexico has also strengthened the National Register of Translators and Interpreters in indigenous languages, and several projects were created to aid in alleviating the disparity between indigenous and nonindigenous populations in relation to healthcare. An additional solution could be to incorporate more full-time, indigenous health promoters.

Keywords: indigenous, healthcare, Mexico, disparity

Introduction

Mexico visibly suffers from the problem of disparity between its indigenous and nonindigenous populations. Compared to nonindigenous groups, indigenous communities are disadvantaged when it comes to basic rights and access to services. This problem is most notable in the healthcare industry: a system which caters to nonindigenous groups while ignoring others. However, over the past two decades, Mexico has made significant progress in alleviating this disparity. In this paper, I will discuss the disparity in the healthcare system

of indigenous and nonindigenous groups in Mexico within the past two decades. I will then discuss the different ways Mexico has addressed the issue and what can be improved in the future.

The Disparity in Mexico

The largest indigenous population in the Americas resides in Mexico. There are over 16 million indigenous people in Mexico and over 27 million people who identify as indigenous, making up over 21% of the population (Berger). Despite this substantial number, the indigenous people of Mexico still face many disparities in the healthcare system.

The first evidence of inequity is in the lack of federal attention and aid for indigenous populations. In 2011, only 1.4% of total financial resources were allocated to fund healthcare related matters for indigenous populations, which represents only about 0.1% of the GDP (Leyva-Flores et al. 4). Due to the low funding and lack of attention, it is common to find health facilities located near indigenous communities to be lacking in resources, making it difficult to provide quality health services. There are multiple accounts of medication and supply shortages, lack of infrastructure, lack of interpreters, and a dearth of full-time staff (Pelcastre-Villafuerte et al. 614, 619, 622). Furthermore, there are an average of 2.3 accredited health clinics in nonindigenous villages and only 0.4 clinics on average in indigenous villages (Ashton 19–20). There are also 273 Federal Programs and Actions for Social Development, with 40% of the 273 targeting health care, but none of them benefit indigenous communities (Leyva-Flores et al. 4).

Low funding also means that fewer healthcare facilities are built near indigenous communities, forcing individuals to travel farther just to have access to health services. A 2011 survey found that indigenous individuals travel two-and-a-half hours longer than nonindigenous individuals on average, and it costs indigenous individuals about 20 pesos more to travel to and from healthcare facilities (Ashton 20). In 2010, 24.3% of the indigenous population were not covered under Mexico's health insurance program and therefore did not have access to health services (Pelcastre-Villafuerte et al. 611). Only 12.9% were covered by a subsidiary of an institution that provides for employed individuals and their families, which is significantly less than the 33.7% of nonindigenous individuals (Pelcastre-Villafuerte et al. 611). When comparing maternal health coverage between indigenous and nonindigenous women in Mexico throughout 2008 to 2015, there has been a constant disparity between the two groups with indigenous women always lagging behind. Less than 80% of indigenous women were covered, while about 90% of nonindigenous women were covered (Paulino et al. 62). When it came to prenatal care, contraceptive use, and postnatal care, indigenous women were constantly underserved (Paulino et al. 62). About 1 out of 4 indigenous women have no access to family planning (Servan-Mori et al. 2). Many individuals are also unable to access employer-related health benefits, such as medical care, because much of the population work informal jobs (Pelcastre-Villafuerte et al. 611).

As mentioned before, the quality of health services for indigenous groups is lower than the services offered to the general public. Upon arriving at a healthcare facility, the average wait time for an indigenous individual is about seven hours, which is over three hours longer than a nonindigenous individual (Ashton 20). Language and cultural barriers can also make

it difficult for healthcare providers to provide the best quality service to indigenous patients. Oftentimes, there is no provider or interpreter that speaks the same language and dialect as the patient, making it difficult to communicate about diseases, diagnoses, and treatments. Mexico requires by law that there be an interpreter if the indigenous patient is receiving national health care, but interpreters are not always provided. There are simply not enough interpreters available, so some medical visits carry on without an interpreter. Interpreters often only speak the most common indigenous languages, ignoring less common dialects and languages (Santos and Verdín Amaro 260). Thus, the language and cultural barriers make it difficult to thoroughly communicate in a way that will provide indigenous populations with the best possible quality of service.

Mexico's Solution

In 2003, a national program called *Seguro Popular* was created to reform Mexico's healthcare system, with the goal of achieving universal health coverage. The program specifically caters to indigenous and rural populations that do not have social security to guarantee equal access to health care (Ashton 3, 5). *Seguro Popular* is still active to this day and has been making progress. From 2006 to 2012, *Seguro Popular* was able to increase coverage for indigenous individuals from 14% to 61.9% (Leyva-Flores et al. 2). *Seguro Popular* is still working to decrease the gap for indigenous populations.

In the recent 2018 presidential elections, left candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador introduced a new political group that restructured the federal government in a way that seemingly provides more policies regarding support, recognition, and rights to the indigenous population. One of the changes involves the strengthening of the National Register of Translators and Interpreters in indigenous languages (Berger). This could help improve communication between indigenous peoples and healthcare providers, which could then help improve the quality of health services. Being able to communicate with indigenous individuals is necessary for providing the proper treatment. Also, being able to understand and incorporate the indigenous culture and traditions into the treatment plan can strengthen trust and build better connections between patients and healthcare providers.

Independent programs are being instituted to further help alleviate the disparity as well. An example of this is the construction of *Casa Materna*, which was built in Chiapas to act as a birthing house and to address the high maternal mortality rates. It incorporates traditional birth assistants as well as medically trained birth assistants. Indigenous women can give birth in the house with a traditional birth assistant, but if any issues arise, the nearby medically trained assistants are available as well (Tucker et al. 2). Thus, through these kinds of programs, more women will have access to basic maternity health services.

Conclusion

There are still many things to improve about Mexico's health system as regards indigenous communities. One improvement that still needs to be addressed is the flaw in human resources for indigenous populations. One solution could be to incorporate indigenous

health promoters as a health resource (Pelcastre-Villafuerte et al. 625–626). There is a lack of full-time health providers and interpreters. This lack of full-time health providers forces indigenous communities to wait longer than their nonindigenous counterparts to receive health services. A hospital never closes for business—neither should the smaller facilities near indigenous communities. Also, lack of interpreters makes communication very difficult, affecting the quality of healthcare. So, finding a way to incorporate health promoters that are bilingual and are trained in medicine could help provide better staffing, filling in when there are no allopathic providers, and help provide better communication with healers acting as interpreters.

When considering the numbers and the steps taken to improve the conditions for indigenous groups, sometimes we fail to see the prevalence of inequality and how disadvantaged they still are. There is still a lot of work to do to provide better care for indigenous peoples. If nothing is to be improved or done, indigenous groups will be left incredibly disadvantaged, and it will only continue being passed down from one generation to the next. It is very hard to escape the vicious cycle of inequality and lack of access to health services, so the end of disparity in access to healthcare starts with quality resources.

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The Baltic States' Relations with Russia

Carrington Matthews

The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have had cold relations with Russia since they were under the control of the tsarist Russian Empire. This paper examines the history behind the relationship between the Baltic states and the Soviet Union throughout the twentieth century and how the relationship grew colder in the post-Soviet era by examining a combination of scholarly journal articles and informative internet resources that detail recent events pertaining to the Baltic states and Russia. This investigation may shed light on the future of Baltic-Russian relations and help explain Russian intimidation in the Baltics. Today, the negative relationship between the Baltics and Russia is the result of discriminatory policies toward ethnic Russians residing in the Baltics and a series of territorial disputes and hostilities. The goal of the discriminatory policies is to promote a sense of "Baltic unity," or nationalism among ethnic Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, while discouraging the practice of Russian language and culture. However, these policies have polarized ethnic Baltic and ethnic Russian populations, leading to Russian aggression. The territorial disputes primarily pertain to Estonia, which lost a piece of land to Russia in the Soviet era, and the invasion of Crimea, which significantly impacted Estonian concerns about their own national security. Russia's desire for geopolitical security along with other issues related to ethnic politics and territorial disputes are some of the reasons that the Baltic states and Russia have such strained relations today, and why Russian intimidation can be expected to increase in the future.

Keywords: *raspad*, ethnic politics, territorial disputes, Russia, Baltic states

Introduction

One of the most monumental events in twentieth-century Russian politics was the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December of 1991. One of its direct results was that the satellite nations which formerly made up part of the Soviet Union were given independence

after being denied autonomous statehood for decades. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, known collectively as the Baltic States, were given their independence by the Soviet Union in the months before its dissolution, an event commonly referred to as the *raspad*. The Baltic states each joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) after the *raspad*, which symbolized the nations' allegiance to Western Europe while distancing them from Russian politics and culture. Today, Russia and the Baltic states have cold relations because of the Baltic states' efforts to become integrated, westernized European countries. The westernization of the Baltic states is a geopolitical loss for Russia, whose leaders want to maintain the buffer zone between Western Europe and Russia which they maintained for most of the twentieth century. In recent years, Russia has taken steps to keep the Baltic states within its sphere of influence in order to create a more intimate relationship between the countries. Russia's geopolitical concerns, the disenfranchisement of ethnic Russians in the Baltics, and Russian aggression pertaining to territorial disputes, are among the causes of icy relations between the countries over the past several years and indicate a pattern of Russian intimidation. In order to have a deeper understanding of recent Baltic-Russian relations, an exploration of the historical context must precede a closer analysis of ethnic politics, territorial disputes, and Baltic integration with the West.

Historical Context

When examining recent foreign relations between Russia and the Baltic states, it is important to consider why the Baltic states are so strategically valuable to Russia, and therefore why Russia is committing aggressive acts towards the Baltic states in order to maintain its geopolitical security. History can provide this explanation. The Baltic states were geopolitically important to the Soviet Union. After World War II, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin wanted to create a "sphere of influence," or a geographic area surrounding Russia that was under Russia's control ("Soviet power"). Achievement of this foreign policy goal was immensely important for Russia because the country had been invaded several times over the past several centuries, most recently by Nazi leader Adolph Hitler in 1941 (Marshall 13). A sphere of influence would serve as a buffer zone between Russia and the capitalist Western European powers who were seen as a threat to the Soviet Union. The Baltic states, due to their geographic locations, provided a barrier between Russia and Western Europe, and they helped protect Russia from western invasions.

The Baltics were brought into the Soviet Union unwillingly, stripped of their independence in 1940 and forced to adopt a communist economy. Moreover, a policy of "Russification" was enacted, which meant that Russians were brought to break up the ethnic unity of the region, and Russian was adopted as the official language ("The History"). This led to even more animosity toward the Soviet Union, for the Baltics had only recently gained their independence in 1918 from Tsarist Russia, and before that were under control of Germany and Sweden ("History of Latvia"). The Baltic states had intentions to become westernized capitalist countries once they had their full independence from the Soviet Union. Considering that the national cultures of the Baltic states are more closely related to those of Western Europe than Eastern Europe and Russia, as well as the fact that the Baltic states suffered years of oppression under foreign governments, it is easy to understand why the Baltic states

wanted to pursue integration with Western Europe ("The History"). In the months leading up to the *raspad* in 1991, the Baltic states finally gained national sovereignty. They declared their independence at the end of 1990, which the Soviet government recognized on September 6, 1991 ("Restoration"). However, rebuilding from decades of Soviet control and integrating into Western Europe would prove to be challenging for the Baltic states.

Western Integration

With independence finally in their grasp, the Baltic states pursued closer relationships with powerful Western countries. They did this by joining NATO and the EU. Perhaps most symbolic in the Baltics' cutting of ties with Russia and indicative of their future icy relationship with Russia was their refusal to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an intergovernmental organization comprising all other former Soviet states ("Commonwealth"). This was all particularly alarming to Russia. Russia was losing its coveted sphere of influence that it wanted to maintain after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Westernized countries suddenly shared borders with Russia, posing a military, political, and economic threat to the country. The steps the Baltic states took towards closer relations with Western Europe ultimately strained their relations with Russia. These strained relations have led to a prominence of ethnic politics within the Baltics and territorial disputes with Russia; both of these have increased tensions between the nations.

While the Baltics have long wanted to integrate themselves into Western Europe, doing so has led to problems in sustaining their economy. Latvia's economy, for example, suffered very much during the Great Recession. In 2009, facing a growing unemployment rate and a crumbling economy, the Latvian government asked for 7.5 billion dollars to bail out the country (Lannin and Johansson). The suffering economy, combined with already strained ethnic relations, led to riots in the capital of Riga, where protestors threw bottles at parliament and looted stores (Lannin and Johansson). Additionally, the population of the Baltic states has continued to decrease for decades. This is because the Soviets exiled many in the twentieth century, and emigration from the Baltics to the United States, Canada, and the rest of Europe has increased. Many Baltic peoples moved to the United States and Canada after the *raspad* because once the Iron Curtain fell, travel restrictions to these countries were lifted as well. They also moved to other parts of Europe because as members of the EU, they had the ability to travel to any member country without a passport. For the Baltic states, a declining population meant less people available to contribute to the Baltic economies. There were no longer as many people to create businesses and buy goods. This also meant that the Baltic states were losing a significant amount of talent—in other words, people who had crucial specialized skills and potential were emigrating.

The economic troubles of the Baltic states are important to consider when examining Baltic-Russian relations, for such economic downturn gives Russia an opportunity to use the situation to its advantage. Because the economies of each Baltic state are so small and Russia's economy is much larger, Russia could try to pressure the Baltic states into economic dealings to aid the Baltic economies while helping its own country geopolitically. One way that Russia could do this is through its network of oil and natural gas pipelines. The Baltic states have historically relied on Russian gas since the Soviet era and continue to rely on it (Hoellerbauer).

Since Russia is the countries' primary provider of natural gas, Russia could raise the price of natural gas on the already fragile economies. Doing so could spell economic disaster for the Baltic states, who would lack the appropriate funds to pay for Russian gas. This puts Russia in a powerful position. Russia could keep the price of gas high and strain the Baltic economies, and then propose a form of economic or political agreement with the Baltics so that they do not lose access to the gas. Although the Baltics have taken steps towards integration with Western Europe, their economic positions leave the door open for Russia to maintain a certain degree of power over the Baltics. Economic troubles associated with western integration are only the beginning of the problems the Baltic states have been facing. Culturally, the Baltic states are still struggling to come to terms with their new, diverse national identities which came as a result of membership in the Soviet Union. This is best understood through examining the ethnic politics of the Baltic states today.

Ethnic Politics

Ethnic politics have become more prominent in the Baltic states in the past several decades. Following the *raspad*, there was a Russian diaspora. Ethnic Russians were working and living in other member countries of the Soviet Union, and vice versa. Russian leaders called for ethnic Russians to return to Russia to help reconstruct the failed Soviet economy; however, some Russians did not return and instead stayed in the former Soviet country that they were already in. Therefore, the Baltic states today have a high population of ethnic Russians living within their borders. Estonia and Latvia have the highest percentages of ethnic Russians, who account for roughly 25 percent of their populations; Lithuania, however, has a much lower population of ethnic Russians at only 5.8 percent, which is less than the number of ethnic Poles living in the country (The World Factbook).

Estonia and Latvia in particular have long histories of disenfranchising their Russian populations; this is one of the primary reasons for Russian aggression in the past couple of decades. Following the *raspad*, these two Baltic countries declared that only those who were Estonian or Latvian before joining the Soviet Union, including their direct descendants, were citizens (Aasland 57). This means that primarily ethnic Estonians and Latvians were counted as citizens while Russians were excluded. This citizenship policy was put in place in an effort to create a stronger sense of nationalism through the idea of Baltic unity, and because Estonia and Latvia were concerned that the Russian population within their borders would destroy the Baltic identity and culture (Thompson 113). Today, this policy still stands, and it is challenging for ethnic Russians to earn citizenship. The Baltic states are widely multilingual, with each country practicing its own native language and still maintaining a large population that speaks Russian; in fact, in Estonia and Latvia, the percentage of people who speak Russian is roughly 30 percent (The World Factbook). In order to gain citizenship in Estonia, Russophones would have to take an Estonian language exam that tested their knowledge of the Estonian language in order to become naturalized citizens ("Obtaining Estonian"). They would have to learn a whole new language in order to apply for citizenship and therefore earn their right to vote. Estonia and Latvia claim that the Russians of today are descendants of those Soviet Russians who settled during the time the Baltics were forcibly "occupied" by the Soviet Union. Therefore, those Russians are not truly citizens, for their ancestors are

occupiers (Thompson 111). Naturally, Russia reacted to this with hostility. Russians believe that the Baltics were never truly occupied, and that the language exam is unfair because it disenfranchises primarily ethnic Russians (Thompson 111, 112). Moreover, Russians already living in the Baltics feel that they are being discriminated against since they had been working hard to contribute to the economy of the Baltics under the rule of the Soviet Union (Aasland 60). The citizenship policy created so soon after the end of Soviet rule in the Baltics has served as the foundation for many other problems between the Baltics and Russia over the past several years. Predictably, disenfranchisement of ethnic Russians in the Baltics and Baltic citizenship policies have angered Russians. Taking away these rights demonstrates yet again that the Baltics are creating closer ties with Western Europe at the expense of their relations with Russia. Not only that, disenfranchisement of ethnic Russians means less Russian influence in the Baltic states.

The Baltic states have experienced internal strife between ethnic minorities because the population that identifies as ethnically Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian sees itself as Western, while the Russian population in each state sees itself as Eastern. Estonia has made the distinction between its Estonian and Russian populations by controlling territory that is ethnically Estonian and promoting the use of the Estonian language over the use of Russian (Aalto 69). Beyond encouraging the use of Estonian over Russian, Baltic governments have also pushed the idea of "Baltic unity" so as to build a stronger sense of nationalism among their peoples and further distance themselves from the Russian population within their borders (Veema 86).

A prime example of Estonian ethnic politics can be found in the region known as Narva. This region is in northeastern Estonia and has a population which is overwhelmingly made up of Russophones. In fact, only about 10 percent of the population of Narva is of the Setu group, which is culturally Estonian (Aalto 68). However, the Estonian government continues to try to spread its nationalist message to this region despite the low number of ethnic Estonians actually living there. Nationalist policies have had the opposite effect; rather than making the ethnic Russians feel welcome in Estonia, Russians feel like the government does not support them because of their ethnic roots (Veema 76, 77).

Ethnic politics in the Baltic states are perhaps best illustrated by the controversy surrounding the Bronze Soldier, a statue that was originally located just outside of the Estonian capital of Tallinn. It was erected by Soviets following the conclusion of World War II in order to commemorate soldiers who died in battle. However, this statue took the place of an Estonian statue that commemorated Estonia's independence, achieved in 1918 (Ehala 139, 140). The statue therefore is symbolic of the tension between ethnic Estonians and Russophones in the country. It became most symbolic of Soviet occupation in 2006, after two extreme Estonian protestors protested the Russophone celebration occurring at the statue; the Estonian media broadcasted this, which appealed to the emotions of ethnic Estonians and fueled hostilities towards Russophones (Ehala 145). Finally, in 2007, the Estonian Parliament voted to have the statue moved away from the center of the city to a cemetery, causing protests from Russophones. Riots occurred in Estonia, and in Russia a group of Russians tried to attack Estonian ambassador Marina Kaljurand, who was going to hold a press conference in the Estonian embassy in Moscow. As a result of this aggression, the Estonian embassy closed (McLaughlin). The Russian government reacted to this budding crisis as well by launching a cyber attack on Estonia in 2007 because of the Bronze Soldier incident; the cyber attacks

shut down government websites and compromised government servers (Herzog 78, 79). This incident demonstrates the extent to which Russia is determined to maintain its sphere of influence over the Baltics. Although Estonia and the Bronze Soldier have been outside of Russian control for decades, Russia endeavors to maintain a certain degree of influence there, as noted above, so as to protect itself geopolitically from Western Europe. From Russia's perspective, removing Russian monuments is another act that symbolizes the Baltics taking steps away from Russian culture and influence; however, the Russian reaction to the Bronze Soldier incident have made cold relations even icier.

Ethnic politics and bitter histories have led Latvia and Russia to seek justice through the court system. In Latvia, the case Kononov v. Latvia was significant because Soviet partisan Vasiliy Kononov was tried for war crimes that were allegedly committed during World War II (Mälksoo 102). The ethnic politics practiced in the Baltic states have led to responses from Russians, who have brought court cases against Latvia in the European Court of Human Rights. The Russian government claims that Latvia is oppressing and discriminating against ethnic Russians in Latvia, and this allegation seems to have some substance. For example, in the case Petropavlovskis v. Latvia, an ethnic Russian living in Latvia wanted to become a naturalized Latvian citizen, but was denied citizenship status because of his involvement in protests of the Latvian "Education Law," which required schools to be taught in the Latvian language; therefore, he believed he was being punished for protesting the law (Heri). This case is another example of how the Latvian government is exercising its power to maintain a sense of Baltic unity and discriminate against ethnic Russians. It is obvious that Baltic unity, however, comes at a price. While ethnic Baltic populations may in fact feel more united, the divide between these populations and ethnic Russians has grown, and is highlighted in the many territorial disputes between the Baltics and Russia.

Territorial Disputes

While each Baltic state has had political conflict with Russia over border issues, Estonia has had the most disputes, which stem from the 1920 Tartu Peace Agreement, signed when Estonia had its own independence and sovereignty (Stoicescu). While Estonia was part of the Soviet Union, the Soviet government changed the administrative line of the Pechory area in eastern Estonia and made the area part of the Pskov Oblast of Russia (Stoicescu). Once Estonia gained its independence again in 1990, the country wanted to maintain the border established by the Tartu Peace Treaty, giving Estonia back land that it legally possessed. However, the Russian government claimed that the treaty became void once Estonia joined the Soviet Union, so they were unwilling to return the land to Estonia (Kundu 62). Since then, there have been various attempts on the part of the Estonian government to regain this land, but there would not be much of a political advantage in doing so. While regaining the Pechory region would satisfy ethnic Estonians by getting back a piece of land they felt was rightfully and legally theirs for decades, the region now is almost entirely Russian. Less than one percent of the population actually speaks Estonian. Were Estonia to annex the Pechory region, it could lead to greater tensions between Estonians and Russians (Stoicescu).

The Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 made the Baltic States concerned that Russia could invade their countries next. The Russian government claimed to have occupied Crimea,

a part of Ukraine at the time, to protect its ethnic Russian population, as 60 percent of the population of Crimea is ethnically Russian (Marshall 25). However, gaining control of Crimea aided Russia geopolitically, and the geopolitical gain is the suspected reason that Russia actually invaded the region. Crimea is a peninsula that held a former Russian port in Sevastopol. It was one of the few warm water ports Russia had in its possession, for many of its other ports are cold water ports that freeze. Additionally, the port was in the Black Sea, giving Russia ease of access to this sea and the Mediterranean Sea beyond. Access to these bodies of water is important to Russia so that it could defend itself from outsiders in the case of a war (Marshall 23-25).

Russia's concern about the sovereignty of the Russian people in Crimea is similar to the concern Russia expresses about the treatment of ethnic Russians in the Baltics. Theoretically, Russia could use the same argument of protecting ethnically Russian peoples to justify an invasion of the Baltic states. In Estonia, the invasion of Crimea alarmed the government because Estonia has a region that is very similar to Crimea: Narva. As discussed above, Narva's population is almost entirely Russian and is geographically very close to Russia itself. Russophones living in the region have complained that the Estonian government does not take them into consideration when creating policy and that the government has restricted their rights (Upadhyay 161). Considering Narva's similarities to Crimea, Estonia has gone out of its way to increase military activity in the region, most notably through an independence parade put on by the Estonian military and NATO troops, which triggered Russian demonstrations of military force through ballistic missile deployments close to the Estonian-Russian border (Upadhyay 162).

Russia continues to try to exercise its power over the region through whatever means it can. It has used military tactics to intimidate Estonia and has also tried to exercise its soft power by extending its influence through the media in the Baltic states. Interestingly, a significant number of Lithuanians continue to rely on Russia for some of the nations' news, though the country is no longer part of the Soviet Union and lacks a large ethnically Russian population (Maliukevicius 150). Russian news media is also prevalent among Russophones in Estonia and Latvia, countries that have significant Russophone populations (Grigas 10). This could very well be an effort Russia is taking in order to exercise some form of control over the Baltic states through soft power.

Conclusion

Baltic-Russian relations are strained today because of Russia's concern for its geopolitical security. Ethnic politics and territorial disputes exacerbated pre-existing conflict between the nations and have led to years of Russian intimidation, which is unlikely to cease in the coming years. Although the Baltics have had strained relations with Russia for decades, it seems as though the Baltic governments are taking steps to reach out and build a stronger connection with their eastern neighbor. For example, Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid met with Vladimir Putin in 2019 to reopen the Estonian embassy in Moscow ("Gallery"). While on the surface this may seem like a simple act meant to bring the two countries together, it is quite possible given the identity divisions in Estonia and the situation in Crimea that the Estonian government wanted to create better ties to Russia to protect themselves from

future Russian aggression. Estonian policymakers could be taking this diplomatic step as a preventative measure rather than a genuine effort to become allies with Russia. Since Russian influence and intimidation towards the Baltic states will likely only increase, future Baltic-Russian relations will reflect the increasing importance of reconciliation between the powers. The relationship between the Baltic states and Russia will most likely continue to be a cold one, but Russian influence and intimidation may ultimately bring the countries closer than the Baltic states would like.

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Society's Role in Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*

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Although many critics argue that Leo Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina* was a critique on faith, morals, or love, each of these topics takes place against the backdrop of society, which ultimately forms Tolstoy's greatest concern in the novel. Society, and how Anna is shaped and affected by it, is the driving force throughout this story of individual fates. The fickle nature of society in the novel is demonstrated through Anna's emotionally honest actions throughout, as well as Vronsky's relation to them. Her death was ultimately detrimental to her message: even though Tolstoy made Anna a powerful protagonist, a 19th-century woman constantly striving toward her personal goals, Anna's argument of valuing honesty and action is muddled by her fate. However, if readers understand that it was the silent observer of society that caused Anna's death, the themes in Tolstoy's novel and the message he meant to convey with her death become clear. A real life, one honestly progressing along an imperfect path—as all natural lives—should never be something controlled by society.

Introduction

Russian high society during the 19th century was perceived by some artists and intelligentsia as caught up in vanity and lying for the sake of achieving order within the upper class. Leo Tolstoy clearly demonstrates throughout his novel *Anna Karenina* how these very qualities of society played a role in the protagonist's unjust and tragic fate. Although society saw adultery as common, Anna alone was punished for being emotionally honest by choosing Vronsky and publicly divorcing her husband. Tolstoy goes on to depict how the society around Anna was fickle in nature. Because those surrounding Anna operated within a closed system of conventional cultural norms, they grew discomforted by the uninhibited practices of Anna's life.

In the article "Russian Views of *Anna Karenina*, 1875–1878," A. V. Knowles states that *Anna Karenina*, "besides treating the wider problems of the purpose of life, the question of

love and marriage, the attitudes between a husband and wife, and of both to their children, and the effects of a breakdown of a marriage upon the parents, [had] something to say about contemporary problems—the place of women in society..." (Knowles 301). Knowles continues to argue how the depiction of Anna as one of the central protagonists was helpful to society's view on women during this time period, given Anna's pursuit of emotional honesty. According to Forrester's chapter in *Women in Nineteenth-Century Russia: Lives and Culture*, Russian society during the 19th century tended to approach women in one of two ways: they either treated women as conniving beings in pursuit of superficial goals and villainized them, or they treated women as unambitious creatures confined to small domestic societies and patronized them. However, Anna was a character of realistic depth and admirable nature; she possessed principled goals, and an unwavering empathy that made her character impactful throughout the novel. The effect of Tolstoy writing Anna as a central protagonist forced contemporary society to understand that women could and should be seen as individuals in their own right, with equal importance to their pursuits and goals.

While Tolstoy made the right decision in choosing Anna as one of the main protagonists in the novel, worthy of naming it after her, the decision to remove her from any fulfilling conclusion may have been more harmful. Society during the time was normalized to adultery, yet Tolstoy deprived Anna as a character from the satisfaction of achieving positive resolution. If Anna as a character reflected the mores of contemporary readers, then Tolstoy's message might be interpreted one of two ways; either society was wrong, or Anna was wrong. Because her character was killed in the end, critics question whether Anna's fate was justified if she was the one who succumbed to the pressure.

In "Scapegoating, Double-Plotting, and the Justice of *Anna Karenina*," Catherine Brown outlines the various answers to the question of whether Anna deserved her fate at the end of the novel. The article discusses the notion of Anna's role as a scapegoat to persecution in both the novel and the real world when it was published. In other words, Anna's sacrifice led to her condemnation in real and imaginary societies, even though adultery was as normal then as it is today. This then, Brown argues, proves the point that Tolstoy was making: if a woman chooses to defy societal expectations, society will take those individual actions as personal offenses and take every opportunity to condemn her in order to make themselves appear more important and virtuous.

Society's reply of judging Anna for her decisions indeed proves the point Tolstoy illustrated about the connection between the shallowness of Anna's fictional society and the superficiality of real life around the reader. In a way this breaks the barrier between the fictional work and the reader, but what Tolstoy is saying about Anna's fate is a point about society. By being so focused on perceptions, those individuals in society overlook their own inadequacies. According to Tolstoy, those who ignore their own flaws are inclined to condemn the flaws of others because it brings fulfillment. It is due to the comfort of repetition that society remains able to survive as a force against natural humanity.

This point about society is also made by Curt Whitcomb in "Treacherous 'Charm' in *Anna Karenina*." Whitcomb writes how members of society in *Anna Karenina* "become watchers rather than doers, and thus, unknowingly confuse the aesthetic practice of depicting with the unframeable process of living" (Whitcomb 214). He describes how Levin and Kitty, with their happy ending, achieved a resolution by not binding their sense of self to society's perceptions of who they were. Although they are shown to be active within society, Levin is self-described

as not fitting within any social class, which does not show itself to be a problem within the novel. However, it is Anna's preoccupation with her perception by others in society that changed her and prevented her story from achieving a sense of resolution. Ultimately, it is the silent observer of society that leads to Anna's unfortunate end.

The sense of the silent observer of society being the real culprit to humanity is something that connects again with Russia during this time period. Tolstoy was born in 1828, nine years before the poet Alexander Pushkin died in infamy and ridicule. Because Pushkin's work rose to fame so quickly, the public grew bored of him just as quickly. Tolstoy would have grown up hearing from other artists and writers about how Pushkin's infamy was due to society's problems, not his own. By the time *Anna Karenina* was published in 1877, Russia was experiencing a revolutionary movement in which new radicalism challenged society, causing civil unrest as the educated youth began taking action and advocating for change. Thus Tolstoy painted society as the driving force in this novel around which *Anna Karenina* is centered. Another researcher agrees with this point. In "Tolstoy and *Anna Karenina*," Clarence Manning argues, "Morality and happiness depend on society and we should be corrupt as society sanctions, no more" (Manning 509). Through the details given in the novel, Manning explains how Anna's fate broke the sanction of corruption that society allowed long before her demise. The point was that life itself should not be something so easily controlled by society.

Tolstoy did not live on a path that others easily understood. He came from a famous aristocratic family before becoming orphaned at nine, was excommunicated from the church and rejected tradition and convention. Tolstoy's rejection of norms is important to understanding *Anna Karenina* because the way in which Tolstoy maneuvered Anna through her rejection from society is indicative of the message he conveyed to readers. Tolstoy's message to the reader, his didactic moral that he showed through his realistic and deeply psychological portrayal of societies, is to understand the sincerity of a life lived along an imperfect path.

Due to Tolstoy's deep psychology embedded within the novel as well as his scrutiny as an artist, Gorodetzky notes, "*Anna Karenina* can claim a central place in the works of Tolstoy, not because it is greater than his other books, but because it displays Tolstoy both as an artist and as a thinker" (Gorodetzky 121). However, the questions are still raised by readers: "can this be reconciled with the portrait of a woman more pitiable than guilty?" (Gorodetzky 122). He illustrates the full life of the author while pondering the question of Anna's innocence in the matter of her death, or of whether her character deserves justice.

However, Anna is more than a portrait of a pitiable woman; she is a woman so natural to understand within the time period, that her character is accentuated by the realism of her soul. Anna's portrait is one of a woman who, after having initially flourished in the high society she believed would fulfill her, finds that her emotional honesty cannot allow her to maintain satisfaction with her situation. Yet it is because of that emotional honesty and value of love that Anna falls prey to society. Her emotional honesty and values are the reasons why her death is so unjustified.

On the topic of unjustified deaths in *Anna Karenina*, Gorodetzky also notes how Anna's character arc is measured and foreshadowed in the racehorse Frou-Frou. In the novel, Anna's lover Vronsky participates in horse racing, a pastime which he is proud of and does for sport. He rides a new horse, a mare named Frou-Frou who develops a quick affinity with Vronsky,

and together they participate in, and almost win, a race. However, due to a wrong move on Vronsky's part, Frou-Frou breaks her back and is put down shortly afterward. This devastates Vronsky, and sticks with him, but he moves on with life.

Frou-Frou and Vronsky's relationship can draw a direct parallel to Anna and Vronsky's relationship, but also the idea of horse racing itself and Frou-Frou's part in it is symbolic of society and Anna's part in it. A renowned horse racer, Vronsky holds an equally esteemed position in society. During the late 19th-century setting of *Anna Karenina*, horse racing is viewed by the aristocracy as exciting and therefore a part of society similar to modern sports. Vronsky's use of Frou-Frou during their time together was fast and exciting before causing harm to her; ultimately, Vronsky found himself unable to keep up with Frou-Frou's pace, and abandoned her once the audience and those nearby led him away from her. This imagery is parallel to Vronsky's actions prior to Anna's suicide, after which he is led to join the Slavic uprisings. Nevertheless, it is the death of Frou-Frou that causes Vronsky to recall how, "the memory of that race remained for long in his heart as the cruelest and bitterest memory of his life" (Tolstoy 200). The view of women as dispensable, and their deaths as unimportant, is not what Tolstoy is allowing with *Anna Karenina*. Because Frou-Frou's handler had instructed Vronsky to "let her choose as she pleases," and Vronsky accidentally held her back, causing her death, the reflection in Anna's story speaks to the importance of her death and society's responsibility for it. Even though she dies before the end of the work, the weight of Anna's presence is superimposed by the eponymous title of the novel.

Critics argue that the biggest themes in Tolstoy's novel are concepts such as love, faith, or perception, even agriculture. None of these are wrong. Each of those topics are addressed in Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*, and each one developed throughout the novel in such a way that it may be difficult to determine the most important theme conveyed by Tolstoy. Love is shown through Kitty and Levin, the other principal characters, with faith shown very clearly through Levin's spiritual question taking up the latter part of the novel. Perception is developed through Anna's character, both in how she perceives the world and how she is perceived by it. Likewise, agriculture can be seen as the biggest theme in the novel due to its extensive jargon and chapters which take place among the peasantry.

However, it is clear that each of these topics takes place against the backdrop of society. Each time a character is introduced in the novel, their titles come after a description of the society surrounding them. Each character grows, develops, and acts according to, and in spite of, societal expectations. Tolstoy illustrates the parallels of expectations, superficiality, and perceptions as they exist in society around the reader. By shining a light on the dire consequences of a fickle society, Tolstoy demonstrates the far-reaching hand that society has in one's fate. If Tolstoy had given Anna a positive outcome to the pursuit of her values in spite of societal expectations, he could have illustrated the true strength of emotional honesty and valuing love in one's life. Instead, the death of her character serves as a warning: if society continues to prioritize values of social order and conventional norms, the human values of love and honesty will perish. In *Anna Karenina*, Tolstoy clearly illustrates the role of society in Anna's demise; through this, he shows the value of individual fates, the consequences of defying expectations, and the ambivalent nature of society as a force to impose and uphold them.

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Truth Is a Potato: A Journey into Tolstoy's *Resurrection*

Ryan Adam

The over-intellectualization of the questions of Truth and Justice only muddy the challenge of living correctly and alienate us from actual, practicable answers, answers which have been here, Leo Tolstoy argues, for millennia. Tolstoy, through the character of Prince Nekhlyudov in *Resurrection*, opposes simplicity and hard-scrabble peasant wisdom to the labyrinths and mountains of intellectualism and state-sanctioned correctness. This article explores Tolstoy's ideas regarding the nature and substance of Truth, pursing them through the author's biography as well as the experiences of the Prince. It concludes that, for any flaws in his reasoning, his beliefs still offer a viable solution to the complex, minute, and numerous doubts which surround any debate in our modern, data-ridden world.

The evils of the world are monstrous as well as minute: the moment you point one out, reveal it standing there, distinctly horrible, you will see its edges bleed into the circumstances surrounding it and the obvious blackness of its substance blend irrevocably among the tints of regular life. A murder in broad daylight should leave no doubt, but the obviousness of that too may seep away on closer examination. So where do we locate the boundaries of guilt? Where, so to speak, on such a blended landscape, should we build a prison's walls? The devil's crimson tail is twisted up among the chains of circumstance, the causal links of which dangle into the invisible deep, so much so that if I steal something from you, how correct is it to say that I'm the criminal, only me, and never mind the miasma of influences I grew up in? These questions animate the thoughts and anxieties of Prince Nekhlyudov, the hero of Leo Tolstoy's late novel, *Resurrection*. For most of the novel he cannot find an answer to them or, at least, will not accept any answer which comes too easily. The problems of nineteenth-century Russia are both monstrous and minute, with its new and uncertain trials by jury, the idle vampirism of its gentry and the poverty of its peasants, and its notoriously paranoid and repressive regime. How can the solution be simple and clear and not shatter its delicate edges as it moves from problem to problem?

This paper will explore the notion of Truth as something simple and historically reduced to its clearest potency, as well as the qualities of this Truth and its formation both in *Resurrection*

and Tolstoy's own life. To do this I will draw on several scholarly sources in addition to two of the writer's own works: *Resurrection*, and his spiritual autobiography, *A Confession*.

How did Tolstoy find his holy distillate to be able to put it in the hands of his avatar, Prince Nekhlyudov? Looking at the author's youth, it might seem less than inevitable that he would ever undertake, let alone *succeed*, at such a quest. When he first entered Petersburg's literary circle, for instance, and began knocking around with novelist Ivan Turgenev and the poet Afanasy Fet, he leagued himself on the side of pure rather than utilitarian art (Layton 220–21). He did not mean to fix the world with his fiction, as Nikolai Chernyshevsky did: art justified and sustained itself, unlike a tool or a rifle, which can only accept and transmit justification. The Tolstoy of the century's end would hold the opposite idea. You only have to look at the titles of some of his later stories to appreciate the completeness of his change: "How Much Land Does a Man Need?" and "Evil Allures, But God Endures," to name just two. Prince Nekhlyudov too begins his spiritual journey from the fortified precincts of deep egotism, though without the justification of being a great artist. He is a dilettante of a painter, who can no longer stand to look at his own unpromising paintings (*Resurrection* 15). He lives his life for himself: lazily, uselessly pursuing in idleness the gratification of "his healthy strong animal I," not his "spiritual I" (*Resurrection* 47). Like Tolstoy, he will finally resurrect himself and organize his life in pursuit of the latter. Drowning in questions, having paced his hotel room in Siberia half the night, Nekhlyudov will finally give up and throw open a copy of the Gospels at random. And incredibly—there it is! the solution to it all! the correct way to live, already long-known: discovered, distilled, and recorded centuries ago in *five rules*, which have never yet been improved upon. "But surely," the Prince thinks naturally enough, "it cannot be so simple" (*Resurrection* 459). The question remains: what led to this sudden epiphany which caused such a profound change for both the writer and his character in this novel?

Tolstoy in his middle life, having already written two of the strongest contenders for Greatest Novel of the Century, became suddenly and enormously depressed. He wasn't simply *blue*. He gave up hunting, no small thing for Tolstoy, in order to avoid finding himself alone in the woods with his rifle and the easy solution it offered (*Confession* 19). But these black fires scourged and cleansed him and turned him inward to religion; he came out the other side more spirit than body, enlightened and reborn, ready, as Susan Layton puts it, to "mount an anarchistic attack on the Russian state and the Orthodox Church" (222).

Tolstoy showed more mercy on his Prince Nekhlyudov than he received himself in his own crisis. The Prince never plummets to the depths and can always trust himself with a rifle, alone in the woods, but his rebirth brings its own variety of pain. His aristocrat's insularity, that of a well-fed fetus cozy in its womb, bursts apart and expels him abruptly, unannounced, the day he serves on the jury of a murder trial. One of the defendants is Katiusha Maslova, a prostitute. He had seduced her decades ago, when she had been his aunts' ward. As a juror at her trial, he plays a part in a stupid technicality—a symptom of Russia's fastidious bureaucracy in combination with its new, shaky-kneed jury trials—with the result that she is declared "not guilty of the poisoning, yet . . . condemned to penal servitude" (*Resurrection* 88). Nekhlyudov is horrified and racked with guilt. His own resurrection begins, and his "spiritual *I*" rips itself free of his ego, leading him to make immediate, grand, Tolstoyan changes to his life. He gives his ample land, for one thing, to the peasants living on it (*Resurrection* 239).

Reborn, or resurrected, the living soul may begin to sort the questions of life into their real relations. A premonition of its simplicity seems to guide the search for Truth. Tolstoy,

throughout his novel, sorts matters into clear oppositions, dividing them to either side of the brilliant fissure which proceeds from the correct division of the animal/spiritual *I*. The actual relations between oppositions arise. The coddled gentry stand in contrast to the prisons while, more abstractly, "falsehood lords it over truth, force over . . . justice, the base over the lofty," as Sergei A. Nikolsky puts it, defining Prince Nekhlyudov's new understanding (36). Once he comes to see these real relationships he can begin to address their causes. This sorting does not erase shades of difference but rather views them from a heavenly vantage, shrinking differences, for the sake of management, until broad similarities arise. Thus force, falsehood, and the aristocracy, composed of a million various atoms, become mountains. Now Prince Nekhlyudov and Tolstoy, and we as readers, can perceive how these mountains crush goodness and truth beneath them as they do peasants and prisoners.

Truth, for Tolstoy, has a location. It's in the Bible: written out like a prescription, which is where Prince Nekhlyudov finally finds it—or manages to see it. But before that final scene of the novel, when the Prince opens his Bible, Tolstoy actually offers him time and again that same truth. He puts it in the mouths of peasants who, as Tolstoy believed, "are closer to the truth than intellectuals" (Caws 58). Intellectuals argue and doubt, and a powerful mind can sack any ancient citadel of belief. The thinkers of Tolstoy's day found complex breaches into his own doctrine of nonresistance. Their arguments, as Maria Gelfond maintains convincingly, hold up as well as Tolstoy's own (56). Intellectually, anyway, a doubt can always be raised, but the Truth, once it is revealed, clings to the soul below the level of words and intellect. It might be better to say that it clings to the soil, the withdrawing from which, across centuries, to the idle drawing rooms and aristocratic clubs, to the tobacco-reeking debates of philosophers' papers, "is the root of the evil" (Wenzer 444). In the jury room at the prostitute Maslova's trial, one old man, a worker, refuses to debate the question of guilt and innocence, explaining, "We are not saints ourselves" (*Resurrection* 81). Prince Nekhlyudov meets another peasant later, an old nameless wanderer, while crossing on a ferry in Siberia. "There are many faiths," he tells the Prince, "but the spirit is one . . . [The Tsar] is his own Tsar, and I am my own Tsar" (*Resurrection* 435–36). For Tolstoy, Truth appears not in the drawing room or even the study but turns up, like potatoes, in the soily hands of the peasants.

So what is that simple truth which, like dirty potatoes, appears more often among peasants than philosophers; the truth which Tolstoy earned by a nearly suicidal gestation, reborn into it, and which he transmits to Prince Nekhlyudov in that final scene, mentioned above; the truth which the two peasants adhere to and, though he is as yet blind and deaf, display to the Prince, having learned it not from philosophers or even the Church, but from the voice of their blood, as it were? Tolstoy puts it into five laws, drawing them from the Sermon on the Mount, as follows: "*The first law* was that man should not kill . . . *The second law* was that man should not commit adultery . . . *The third law* was that man should never bind himself by oath . . . *The fourth law* was that man [should turn the other cheek] . . . *The fifth law* was that man . . . should love [his enemies]" (*Resurrection* 460). Can the Truth, as Prince Nekhlyudov asks, really be so simple?

I mentioned above that Tolstoy's ideas cannot escape the intricate invasions of the intellect. It was not his intention to find Truth through reason which, Tolstoy writes, tends to be "sheer indulgence . . . [and] there was no meaning to be found there" (*Confession* 66). Nonetheless, he does mount a defense against many of his critics. Against the criticism that force is occasionally expedient, he opposes the simple argument that, as no two people can

agree on the nature of evil, to use force to counter evil is to risk harming the innocent, to risk spreading evil (Gelfond 44). For Tolstoy, Truth, in itself and in defense of itself, evinces simplicity. Only falseness or the justification of the status quo require philosophical labyrinths.

The problems of the world may be legion as well as deeply interwoven into the fabric of life and history. The answers to them—truth, that is, as Tolstoy has it—are not required to be equally monstrous. As we have seen, simplicity itself is evinced by the clear dualities which divide the world before Nekhlyudov's disabused eyes, by the modest beliefs of the peasants raking up their potatoes, and by those five rules which save and comfort the Prince in his sleepless anxiety; simplicity itself stands in opposition to the problems of the world. That which lacks simplicity is suspect; that which reeks of the smoking room, of ladies' perfumes, and not of soil, is probably wrong. And therefore I believe Tolstoy's ideas as well as Prince Nekhlyudov's, should they fail to strike a chord with the reader in their substance, can still guide us by their form. The world has grown only more complex, and we no longer require the work of intellectuals to help us destroy any argument. We only have to go online. And so we might look to this notion that simplicity guides us to Truth and feel comforted. Data are not the point; we do not need elaborate arguments. That's all as worldly and temporary as pipe smoke. Moral Truth, on the other hand, comes to us without doubts, as frank and simple—and as hardy—as, yes, a potato.

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Understanding *The Petty Demon* Through the Perspective of Disability and Gender Theory

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Fyodor Sologub's tale of crazed sinfulness, *The Petty Demon*, has remained in the heart of Russian culture since its introduction in 1907, leaving what can best be described as an appreciated scar. The greatest Byronic tales utilize the acceptance of decadence to create complex characters that allow audiences to peer into the darker side of humanity, and often themselves, while still maintaining some emotional connection to the antihero. While the depravity displayed in *The Petty Demon* is often the most prominent feature, the contrasted relationships of the characters Lyudmila and Peredonov reveal key insights toward understanding of the novel's thematic and socioemotional framing of women and the mentally ill. These patterns are analyzed in the context of the novel and compared to those in other works of the Russian canon with the help of papers by Hustis, Mills, and Greene. Lyudmilla's few unsatisfactory and foreign excuses for her perversion fail to help her escape the sexist symbolism she embodies as a female character, resulting in her solidification as a gossiping temptress with little room for reader empathy or a separation from the basic stereotypes women were already saddled with. Peredonov's escalating madness is contrasted against her evils in a manner that accentuates her follies while failing to separate many of his cruel actions from his mental illness. The resulting feelings coalesce to project the characters' worst qualities upon the innocent and underprivileged through the vehicles of familiar archetypes, contributing to the perpetuation of harmful cultural perspectives on such groups.

Introduction

Sin is in. Once again, as during the anti-establishment, anti-realist, decadent era of the late 19th century, antiheroes are popular! Their evils are interesting and exciting, their backstories and flaws effectively pitiful and sympathetic, and their inevitable karmic punishments morally satisfying. Decadent audiences, both in the 19th century and today, enjoy the antiheroes

of *The Petty Demon* for each of these reasons, but the best Byronic tales are never simply decadent for decadence's sake; they use pain, pity, and punishment to spin together themes and characters of greater depth while the slightly opened moral vault of society still allows normally shamed traits and plot ideas to be enjoyed. This temporary release is what gave rise to the despicable acts of Peredonov and Lyudmila, the novel's thematic pair. While the unbridled decadence of Fyodor Sologub's *The Petty Demon* (1907) is often the main focus of readers and critics, the contrasted relationships of Lyudmila and Peredonov reveal deeper, more impactful truths about the nature of the novel's framing and its relevance to the societal view of women and the mentally ill. Studies by Judith Mill, Harriet Hustis, and Diane Greene demonstrate the thematic shifts between characters in the realms of decadence, symbolism, and disability and gender theory.

Every piece of the thematic web in *The Petty Demon* is strongly tied to Peredonov—the unbelievably pathetic, undeniably detestable, and unreasonably stupid teacher who quite easily causes the most suffering throughout the novel. Each of his actions appear to be made either entirely without regard for others or with the intent of causing misery, though much of his behavior simply causes more trouble for himself. We quickly begin to grasp his outlook and social standing from his introduction on the first page: "Peredonov, a teacher at the gymnasium, stood in a circle of his friends, gazing sullenly at them with small swollen eyes from behind gold framed spectacles." His figure is full of solemn irony, similar to the image presented in the preceding line: the pretty town was not actually full of amiability; rather, "it only seemed that way" (Sologub 1). His friends are hardly amiable, and the town is surprisingly unwelcoming.

Peredonov's fellows are cheery as he stands by miserably, not just bored but also clearly antagonistic towards these "friends." The conversation contains nothing that signifies a sense of abnormality, and this sour disposition continues as we read. It is displayed early on that his normal state of being, even when in the company of friends of the same hierarchical status, is one of contempt. Peredonov's close friend Rutilov chooses to shame him for believing Varya rather than suggesting caution or offering advice in private. Peredonov continuously widens the chasm between himself and the group, even flashing his "rotten-looking teeth" in an ugly grin as he seethes with anger.

Peredonov and his wife-to-be, Varya, treat each other despicably. Emotional abuse rages as Varya hatches a plan to deceive Peredonov into marriage while Peredonov threatens to marry other women, and actively courts them, all while both hurl devastating insults at each other. In our first introduction to Varya, Peredonov speaks of their friend Marta, teasing, "But she's prettier than you, . . . maybe I'll go ahead and marry her." Enraged, Varya becomes "red and trembling with malice" and threatens to harm Marta. The argument continues loudly until Peredonov spits in Varya's face (Sologub 45). With no respect given by either partner, Peredonov's home life is miserable: the two wretched souls compound their suffering together. He makes no allowance for charity in any area of life. These early examples can be extrapolated to his treatment of his students, like the persecuted, androgynous schoolboy Sasha, and to any others he thinks of as below himself.

Throughout the novel, we can see Peredonov's worsening mental state exacerbate his natural cruelty, and his thoughts and actions become increasingly erratic. Peredonov begins to see a creature referred to as a *nedotykomka*. It is never defined within the novel as real or imaginary, but the name is understood in Russian as referencing a type of mischievous spirit.

Peredonov, due to his own increasing madness or to the actual existence of the *nedotykomka*, begins to physically lash out against perceived threats in ways uncharacteristic of the simple dullard we find at the start of the novel. Sure, Peredonov is a constant victim of gossip, largely disliked by his peers, and his suspicions about Varya tricking him into marriage are founded; however, no one is secretly trying to harm him, nor does it seem that had ever been the case. He consistently fears that others are lying to or about him, even acting fake to his face in order to kill him. This theme has been subtly displayed since the very first scene when Volodin remarked that "it's possible to say anything" (Sologub 1). Hustis writes that the concept of hidden truth couples with Peredonov's existing paranoia and the introduction of the *nedotykomka*, since he had always suspected magical interference, as with the "counter-spell" he must cast to avoid Volodin's spell, or the charms he believes can lure him into others' homes. But now that something is actually materializing for him, he is presented with a much greater reason to fear deception. Peredonov's personal counter-spells soon stop working on the *nedotykomka* leaving him helpless and without knowledge of this antagonizing force. Is this an actual demon or spirit? Is it in his head? Is it the work of an enemy? No matter the answer, he believes he has good reason to worry, and this stress helps to push him over the brink, resulting in his escalating insanity and in the eventual murder of Rutilov.

While Peredonov's arc focuses mainly on his increasing madness, Lyudmilla displays an increasing willingness to give into her decadent inclinations. She is usually considered to be one half of the pair that stands in opposition to Peredonov because of her relationship with Sasha, their two storylines coinciding in escalation as the story progresses. However, there deserves to be a different set of pairings with these two aligned separately: Lyudmilla and Peredonov by the framing of their actions, and Sasha and Peredonov by their connection to reality. The symbolist and decadent nature of Sologub's work uses elements of the spiritual, mystical, and taboo to stretch beyond the normal bounds of the preceding naturalist writing to display this powerful web of connections (Rosenthal and Foley).

Lyudmilla stands in opposition to Peredonov not only as a woman but also in her ability to draw sympathy from others and in her mastery over language. She makes herself and her wishes known quite easily and is formally introduced during Rutilov's attempt to get Peredonov to marry one of his sisters. Lyudmilla is the oldest of the three and a master of gossip; in fact, when the sisters are made to tell Peredonov how they would please him as his wife, gossip is the boon she offers. Mills writes that Lyudmilla is held above others in this regard, being one of the few characters with the ability not only to ignore gossip, but to control it (Mills 6). On one hand, while Peredonov does circulate gossip, as with his manufacturing of Gudaevskij's socialism and his spreading of Sasha's supposed womanhood, he is undoubtedly a victim of it; he is described by Mills as a "corpse motivated by external forces that toy with him and then toss him aside" (Mills 18). Besides the obvious frustration, alienation, and paranoia that it causes him, it is the gossip of his friends, which he misunderstands entirely, that leads him to kill Volodin. In stark contrast to Peredonov's vulnerability to gossip, Lyudmilla operates freely and innocently in the public eye by framing others and keeping her image clean. When she and Sasha are caught and accused of their acts of transvestitism, Lyudmilla easily brushes the ordeal aside and continues to amplify her reputation of purity and control to protect Sasha's and her societal standing. She frames a crossdressing situation early on as a play and later portrays herself and her sisters as "cheerful girls with sharp tongues," simultaneously

displaying the reason that "the other geese around here have no liking for [them]" (Sologub 233, 253). Mills describes her actions well in relation to her influence on Sasha:

> Lyudmila's values are alternative ones even in the society portrayed. She initiates Sasha into her own brand of physical pleasure tinged with sadism and homosexuality in a relationship which would cause an uproar if the town were to discover it. Yet, Lyudmilla has her own way. The gossip that springs up around her does not interfere with her actions, and at the end of the novel she is free to continue her activity unhampered. (Mills 6)

Lyudmilla's mental state is also displayed in reverse to Peredonov's. While she is just as perverse and socially powerful at the end of the novel as at the beginning, her decadence and moral blight, or at least our perception of these, increase proportionately to Peredonov's. On one side, he reaches out because of his paranoia and stress, demonstrating a greater tendency to harm others and give in to superstitions and gossip. Meanwhile, Lyudmilla ramps up from tempting and teasing Sasha to seducing him, eventually corrupting him with her decadent schemes. Their situation is so questionable by the end of the novel that the consummation of the relationship, while never directly mentioned, is entirely possible or near in the future (Ehre). The difference between these two antiheroes is Peredonov's deteriorating mental condition—the man falls deeper into evil while the woman appears to simply delve into it. The distinction on gender made here is the crux of others' arguments as well as my own about Peredonov and Lyudmilla and the language used to represent them.

Gender is weaponized in *The Petty Demon*, and it is a division to which weaponized archetypes can be applied. In art, sympathy is granted more often to the gender in power, the gender of the writer, the gender of the intended audience, or to the gender more valued in the relevant artistic era (Greene). Men easily fill the first three of these categories when speaking of this novel, and Lyudmilla suffers even greater under this bias because of her talent with gossip. While this is her "gift" to Peredonov, gossip is often used to demonize women in literature. "The speech of idle women," as it is recognized by feminist critic Kristen Pond, is a framing of natural conversations by women as inherently devious or malicious, used by men to project both ill intent and lack of effort on women deemed to be frivolous or mischievous. Lyudmilla is not only as naturally dark and decadent as Peredonov, but she is also dangerous instead of dull, using her time to stir trouble in the manner stereotypical of demonized women. Her comparative lack of ability to garner sympathy has less to do with her actual deeds than the context in which they lie. Her full understanding of and glee with the situation amplifies her perceived guilt while Peredonov's increasing madness continuously detracts from his own. On all other stations they can be considered equals in evil, though the worst acts Peredonov commits before truly diving into insanity are his assisting the whipping of an innocent boy and cuckolding of the boy's father. However, the gender/pity gap stretches beyond these early contrasts, as elements of Symbolist art begin to bleed into the mix. Symbolists, as portrayed in some of their more famous art pieces and character obsessions, had a strong tendency to focus on the vices of their human muses. Whether they were being led into sin or perpetuating evil *themselves*, women in particular were models for the display of distasteful aesthetics: strong lust and lasciviousness, insatiable envy, and, as is prominent in Lyudmilla, the particular aesthetics of whom cross over even more into

decadent art, a desire to escape the boundaries of society and common morals. This last archetypal feature is likely due to the growing emphasis on unrestricted emotion during the Symbolist/Decadent era, a trend that led to representations that displayed a lack of control over or significant remorse for actions when the motivations were emotionally "pure" or sincere from the figure's perspective, allowing sexual habits of unnatural or immoral varieties to be portrayed. Lyudmilla's essential nature was positioned opposite Peredonov's as one completely undeserving of mercy because of the application of such characteristics.

Although Lyudmilla does not fit into some of the more famous roles for the discarding and disparagement of otherwise neutral female villains, like the "madwoman in the attic," she does display excessive perversion and a fondness for gossip and scheming, traits popular among symbolists and decadents for portraying the immorality of women. However, these characteristics are more specifically demonized in non-decadent eras because of the increased celebration, or simple acceptance, of normally immoral behaviors. Nevertheless, the elements of sexual temptation, amorality, and abject evil involved in famous symbolistic characters like Pornocrates [Figure 1] and Salome [Figure 2] are structures that enhance negative bias against them rather than create sympathy, these being the same tools used to construct Lyudmilla. She offers some thought about what led her to the point of her perverse state of living; but the short ponderings on her past do not grant any foundation for sympathy. The same cannot be said about Peredonov.

Figure 1:
Rops, Félicien.
Pornocrates. 1878,
Musée provincial Félicien Rops,
Namur



Figure 2:
Gustave Moreau,
Salomé dansant devant Hérode.
1876, Musée Gustave-Moreau,
Paris

The main trait given to Peredonov, besides his decadent ill-intent, is suffering. Whether it spawns from his stupidity, paranoia, or poor relationships, readers are continuously given reason to pity our male antihero. The demon manifests itself for him and no other, driving him to do things out of his natural character; indeed, his greatest crimes could be considered entirely the result of "outside forces." Hustis reminds us that if it were a demon messing with his mind, he would be largely innocent. More likely, though, had he become clinically insane, we would consider him even less guilty, at least in a court of law. He does not start the fire simply out of spite or malice, but rather because "the fiery *nedotykomka*, leaping about the

chandeliers, laughed and relentlessly tried to inspire Peredonov with the idea that he ought to light a match and set this fiery, but captive *nedotykomka* loose," and "after having had its fill," it might then "leave Peredonov in peace" (Sologub 251). In the very end he is as good as mentally gone, the agony and madness described in a frighteningly vivid manner on the penultimate page:

> By now everything seemed like a delirium to him, senseless, disconnected, and surprising. He had a torturous headache. One notion kept repeating itself with persistence—the one about Volodin as an enemy. It alternated with oppressive fits in which he was assailed by the insistent idea that he had to kill Pavlushka before it was too late. (Sologub 258)

The purpose in contrasting Peredonov and Lyudmilla, one sick and the other a devil, is not necessarily to argue for the morality of either's actions but rather to analyze the methods used to frame particular groups against others with little recognition of their status in society. The woman here is positioned against the man as a pure incarnation of conniving mischief and sexual immorality of the worst nature. Within the context of the novel, or at least in the deeper critical contrast against Lyudmilla, Peredonov's innocence by mental illness can be seen as somewhat valid, but in the larger context of the novel's popular application to society, this factor is forgotten.

No matter the pity or excuses one gives him, it is certainly difficult to like Peredonov as a character—it should tell you something when a name takes on greater form, as "Peredonovism" has come to describe people that embody "greediness, egotism, pettiness, and lechery" (TIME 80). Sologub points the sights of Peredonovism toward his audience in the second edition, somewhat angering the Russian people, while scholar Andrew Field takes the theme and applies it to Sologub's other works. Field writes specifically on its influence as a thematic layer in *The Created Legend* in the character Prince Tankred, the haughty, superficial, and dark imitator. My paper brings the topic of the perception of evil to the surface in order to recognize that nearly every instance I have found of the study of Peredonov and Peredonovism leaves out any substantial consideration of schizophrenia. Forgoing this consideration in an academic paper would ignore the thematic changes and implications that come with the recognition of a character's disability.

The madness that Peredonov experiences can be interpreted in a variety of ways, but as Harry Snyder writes in "The Gogolian Echoes in Sologub's 'The Petty Demon': Are They Imitative of or Organic to Gogol's 'Dead Souls'?" his symptoms are similar to those of schizophrenia, a mental illness that can cause "disruptions in thought processes, perceptions, emotional responsiveness, and social interactions," and may include "psychotic symptoms such as hallucinations, delusions, and thought disorder (unusual ways of thinking), as well as reduced expression of emotions, reduced motivation to accomplish goals, difficulty in social relationships, motor impairment, and cognitive impairment" (NIMH par. 1-2). The condition also manifests in three stages: "prodromal (or beginning), acute (or active), and recovery (or residual)" (AIPC par. 4-8). This disability theory reading of the novel allows for a rather simplified interpretation of the narrative in which Peredonov moves from the more passive prodromal stage into the acute as his visions, or hallucinations, worsen and he experiences the psychotic break.

While we cannot be absolutely certain that Peredonov had schizophrenia, as the term originated in 1908 six years after the serial publishing, the lens of mental illness can help us understand his overall condition. Peredonov's paranoia, social dysfunction, depressive state, and poor executive function worsen throughout the novel, lending to the interpretation of his actions as a result of either suffering or a potential mental illness rather than mere supernatural intervention. Specifically, Milton Ehre writes that "above all he is emotionally dead" (Ehre). Ehre notes Sologub's use of "black melancholy" for humor and the descriptions of Peredonov as "'gloomy,' 'dull,' 'despondent,' 'indifferent,' 'dreary,' and 'lonely.'" The point is finally driven home with the narrator's description of Peredonov's walk through the "bleak" weather, "depressing silence," on an "impotent and unclean earth," "alienated from the heavens." All the while he walks "wearied by vague fears," and, "as always he looked at the earth with dead eyes, like a demon, tormented in his dreary solitude by terror and anguish" (Sologub 208).

Snyder's analytical comparison of the thematic echoes of Gogol's *Dead Souls* in *The Petty Demon* also likens Peredonov's insanity to paranoid schizophrenia specifically. Snyder uses examples of his "permanently lodged" fears of gossip and unreasonable, obsessive, and superstitious actions around the *nedotykomka*, when suspecting spells from others, and when dealing with the three-cornered cap to display a contrast to Gogol's grotesque, dehumanized caricatures (Snyder 3). However, Peredonov and his traits are not successfully separated or understood in the eye of culture and overall literature critique—his story lives on as a tool for dehumanization without any regard for the more complex factors that influenced Peredonov and, more importantly, those that could be influencing individuals made out to be "Peredonovs" themselves. Whether or not his condition can be absolutely determined, he can be likened to those displaying similar traits.

As mentioned, "greediness, egotism, pettiness, and lechery" are the main qualities used to define the popular application of Peredonovism, but his escalating madness is the central focus of the novel (Snyder 4). Hence, the ever-increasing display of symptoms and eventual psychotic break are tied indefinitely to his character and to society's use of Peredonovism. Thus, the basic existence of Peredonovism as a means to frame people with a caricature that appears to fit the situations produces two negative effects in consideration of our modern understanding of disability theory and social psychology. First, because of the gradual synchronization of Peredonov's symptoms with his decadence and pettiness, those that suffer from similar symptoms or mental illnesses are at risk of being unnecessarily grouped into or compared to a category of effectively rotten people. Additionally, the social factors, past experiences, and mental conditions that can cause such personal traits to be observed may be ignored in favor of the easier option of aligning the person with a familiar construct (Mulvaney). Hustis agrees that while Peredonov is foul—even well before his psychotic break—and that neither his mental illness nor overall suffering can fully account for his wicked tendencies, the character is shrouded in such ambiguity within the novel that society has an easier time recklessly applying his negative traits to those that do not deserve them but are similar on other levels (Hustis). Surely, the theoretical moral conflict and literary disability analyses act to thoroughly deepen his character, but they should not be considered of equal value to the disadvantages that these characterizations cause for those that suffer when the greater part of readers do not consider such nuances. It is exactly these circumstances which have formed the new social model of disability. In contrast to "impairment," which is the

physical or mental effect itself, "disability" is defined by famous theorist Michael Oliver as "the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social organization that takes no or little account of people who have impairments," leading to exclusion from social activities. Sadly, Peredonov is only one man in a long lineage of characters that cast a poor light on the mentally ill community, with misrepresentations and overly vague distinctions between illness and immorality still being introduced in our entertainment today.

Do I believe there was ill intent behind Sologub's creation of Peredonov? This is more difficult to say, and the literature on *The Petty Demon* offers little help, but his own words on the inspiration for the characters and events in the novel highlight both a desire to portray real events from his time in provincial Russia and to frame certain persons or groups as "Peredonovs," leaving the evidence nearly split (*The Petty Demon* 2nd Edition). Additionally, it is more difficult to lay blame on writers of this age because of the lack of development of disability theory at the time; rather, the importance now is to analyze the effects and implications of these past works in order to create a more positive portrayal of the mental health community.

Decadence is predicated on the idea of decline. As the movement gradually developed, the once degrading labels of decay and vulgarity originally ascribed to it became part of the ethos of Decadent artists. Corruption, a form of this decline, is a prominent theme in many of Sologub's works. Most often, he utilizes corruption as a mechanism to display a loss of innocence in children, whether it occurred before the story, during its course because of an "evil" adult, or simply as a result of unfortunate circumstances. Children are often considered to be naturally pure, so they are good models for displaying a sense of Decadent loss: Sasha, for example, is the lost child of *The Petty Demon*, his corruption occasioned by Lyudmilla. This role casts her as a source of corruption rather than as a clear victim. Peredonov, while not losing any innocence, displays a more general sense of corruption, inwardly more so than outwardly, as his mental state hastily deteriorates. Peredonov and Lyudmilla occupy opposite ends of the spectrum, even in the realm where moral decay and distastefulness are celebrated. Audiences' respect for the Decadent Period's unbridled portrayals of vulgarity allowed these characters' perversions, egos, and cruel personalities to take center stage in a time of social boredom and angst; this has resulted in two despicable personalities whose present legacies continue to influence the perception of certain social groups, despite their separation as victimizer and victimized.

Peredonov and Lyudmilla's decadent actions earned them fame and thematic partnership in the late 19th century, but their location within the larger context of *The Petty Demon* and usefulness to society as figures of literary interest bring along a great deal of baggage in the 21st century. Lyudmilla's deterministic and paganistic excuses for her seduction of the young Sasha do little to help her escape the sexist symbolism she embodies as a female character, leaving her as a foul, mischievous temptress to the detriment of women attempting to escape these stereotypes. Peredonov's projection against her works in the inverse manner, with his potential excuses, general suffering, and mental illness, together coalescing to impose his worst qualities upon the innocent and already disadvantaged. Gender and Disability Theory can and will continue to be used to highlight the flaws and foibles of such characters so that complex, interesting, and varied narratives can be written long into the future, aiding the members of our society that are still fighting for equality and acceptance.

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The Progression of the Soviet Heroine in Film

Julie Vu

Heroines in Soviet films adapted to conform to changing political and social views throughout the twentieth century. Oksana Bulgakova's observation of the metamorphoses of Soviet heroines marks the decline and peaks of complexity in their characters through each progressing year. There are two major historical periods which precipitated the evolving portrayal of female protagonists in cinema: the Thaw and Glasnost. The films *The Cranes Are Flying* (1957) and *Little Vera* (1988) establish two specific breakthroughs: they set the precedent for independent, complex heroines who defy the communist condemnation of the "individualist" mindset while also portraying the feminist struggles of their decades.

The paradigm of the Soviet heroine in film evolved dramatically throughout the twentieth century. During this era, female protagonists took on new looks, new attitudes, and new relations to male characters. Films such as *The Cranes Are Flying*, released in 1957 during "the Thaw," and *Little Vera*, released during the height of "Glasnost" in 1988, are prime examples of female protagonists who reflected the struggles and successes of Soviet women with increasing depth and complexity. Once merely pretty faces for the silver screen and faithful supporters of their male counterparts, Soviet heroines grew to project a strong sense of individualism and reveal their private lives for all to see. They developed from shallow characters heavily intertwined with communist ideology to unique individuals that struggle but also manage to achieve their goals with the limited privileges they have.

The appearances, attitudes, and functions of the Soviet heroine in film constantly evolved to reflect new social contexts brought upon by politics of war and revolution. Oksana Bulgakova refers to the women of the 1910s film era as "Queens of the Screen," who are also known as femme fatales (Bulgakova 149). They usually have humble beginnings as they start out as working class citizens and, by a twist of fate, somehow fall into a bourgeois life of luxury at the cost of "suffering, illness, and death" (Bulgakova 150). Films of this era are considered pre-revolutionary, revolving around tales of "seduction and temptation" with some of the common tropes involving romantic affairs (Bulgakova 150). It is important to

note that women of this decade are not portrayed on screen as complex characters. Their lives entirely revolve around romantic affairs, and they are victims of their own vices. These female protagonists almost always suffer the same tragic ending often culminating in their deaths (Bulgakova 150). An example of this trope in film is the young countess from *Queen of Spades* (1916). The young countess is a noble woman that likes to gamble and in the end is killed by the protagonist of the film seemingly paying the ultimate price for her vices. Overall, the films of this decade served as warnings of the dangers that come with luxury and vice.

Faceless women of the masses wiped free of anything that set them apart as individuals, also known as "the Anti-Stars," would mark the Avant-garde era of the 1920s (Bulgakova 152). Dziga Vertov's *Man with a Movie Camera* (1929) exemplifies the lack of individuality in the films of the 1920s because it does not focus on a single character but rather the proletarian masses as a whole. Simple and beautiful women, free from any flaws, characterized the 1930s. The significance of film heroines is exceedingly reduced in the 1940s during the period of the Second World War, in which their roles are reduced to "dazzling blondes" in musical comedies and as young wives of soldiers who are expected to dutifully wait for the return of their husbands (Bulgakova 162). The exception for this trope would be Sergei Eisenstein's controversial film, *Ivan the Terrible* (1944), since the film is neither a musical comedy nor war film but rather a historical portrayal of one of Russia's infamous tsars. The tsarina does, however, conform to the 1940s heroine trope in that she is a virtuous and dutiful wife to the tsar for the entirety of the film and contains little to no complexity in her character. She possesses no flaws and her only aspiration is to support the tsar. The jump from the 1910s to the 1940s is significant in that individualism seems to be eradicated from film, and the role of women has been reduced to that of a one-dimensional supporting character. On-screen heroines had abandoned whatever essence of individualism and sensual allure they had in the 1910s. This trend, however, experienced a stunning reversal in the 1950s.

The 1957 film *The Cranes Are Flying* and its female protagonist Veronika marks the Soviet Union's transition into the era of the Thaw, which promised a series of progressive changes for women, film, and a new generation of disheartened citizens detrimentally affected by war. On March 6, 1953, Joseph Stalin's death set off a cataclysm of events ushering in a new era that would come to be known as the Thaw. Natasha Kolchevska defines the Thaw as "often mentioned in connection with Khrushchev's liberalization policies which was in itself a problematic and unstable phenomenon" (Kolchevska 114). However, some of Khrushchev's policies proved to be beneficial to women. For instance, women's education improved, their achievements were "increasingly recognized," some restrictive policies placed on women during Stalin's reign, including abortion, were lifted, and they were granted longer maternity leaves (Kolchevska 115). The "surge of interest in the status of women" was due to the loss of millions of men during the Second World War which skewed the country's demographics, resulting in a largely disproportionate population ratio of fifty-five women to forty-five men (Kolchevska 115). The loss of so many men meant that women had to play a crucial role as "major contributors to the country's reconstruction effort" while also meeting the demands of their homes and workplaces (Kolchevska 115). However, the improvement of women's circumstances were limited. Despite the reality that women had become the supportive backbone of Soviet society, "there [was] also a widespread tendency to denigrate them" (Kolchevska 115).

In *The Cranes Are Flying*, Veronika's rape and marriage to her rapist, Mark, is arguably

one of the most controversial topics of the film. Her situation either draws sympathy from the audience or condemnation. Nevertheless, the film managed to do something no other film before it had succeeded in doing. It shone a light on the trope of "the faithless fiancée" to reveal a hidden reality that many women experience but are too afraid to discuss for fear of scorn. *The Cranes Are Flying* shows Veronika as a victim deserving of sympathy while also conveying diverse reactions towards her rape. The most prevalent reaction is scorn from both men and women, which further alienates her in her plight. According to Josephine Woll, this judgement as well as the audience's judgement is a direct result of the film's "refusal" to judge her (Woll 74). Veronika represents a generation of silent women who are unrightfully judged because of their sexual assault, but she also represented the birth of a new kind of heroine that would define films of the 1950s and make way for more independent women of future decades. She is the paradoxical "unremarkable heroine." She is unremarkable in appearance with her ordinary demeanor but possesses a remarkable inner strength and selflessness despite her unfavorable circumstances. She has a bleak view of the world, similar to the dreary perspective of a returning soldier, and possesses a greater deal of complexity when compared to the paradigms of previous decades. Anthony Anemone elaborates on Veronika's complexity, saying, "Veronika [was] instantly recognized by millions of Soviet women who [needed] a better reason than the one provided by official communist ideology to continue to live after the catastrophic losses of the war" (Rojavin 16). Josephine Woll's opinion on Veronika also supports this. She "does not embody civic virtues" and is not a "beacon of fidelity" nor "simple, loving, and modest" as female heroines were in the past (Woll 74-75). Veronika is complex because, despite being surrounded by ideology, she is able to think for herself. She is not the ideal communist woman but rather a realistic portrayal of a woman devastated by war who also desperately holds onto her hope despite all that has happened to her. She aims to persevere with all the limitations of being a woman scorned. Veronika is also one of the first heroines who shines as an individual and maintains her private life. Anemone notes that "one of the most shocking aspects of the movie is that 'individualist' behavior that [had] routinely been condemned in Soviet culture as selfish and philistine is now presented as natural, obvious and absolutely modern" (Rojavin 15). It is evident that *The Cranes Are Flying* made significant breakthroughs, especially for Soviet citizens exhausted from surviving two World Wars. By putting the "emotional needs of the individual" before that of society's, the film also motivates the audience to acknowledge their own needs and heal (Rojavin 17). Veronika is heralded as a heroine who revolutionized film, and she paved the path for future heroines as well.

Vasili Pichul's *Little Vera* is an example of how Soviet film heroines evolved in the 1980s. Ever since *The Cranes Are Flying* set the individualist precedent for future films, each following decade continued to develop their heroines into more complicated characters. Heroines of the 1960s finally get to experience a "prolonged" childhood due to the stabilization of Soviet society (Bulgakova 169). Not only are they able to participate in recreational activities due to less restrictive rules, but they are unique in that they are allowed to "make mistakes" (Bulgakova 168). Another decade later, the heroines of the 1970s are commonly known as the "working women." They were born from the death of the Thaw—the same era that revolutionized heroines of cinema by granting them individuality—and entered a new era of literary prose, "the era of analysing changes which had or had not happened" (Bulgakova 172). The heroines of the 1970s are much older and are often focused on building their

careers. Heroines of this decade faced the common conundrum of having to choose success over love. Audiences consider these heroines to be strong, but perhaps less happy than other, less successful female characters in film. Vera, of *Little Vera*, is a heroine of the 1980s who is born from both of these preceding decades. Like the heroines of the 1960s, she is a teenager, yet she is unaware of the meaning of success, differentiating her from the heroines of the 1970s. Vera represents a lost generation of adolescents that would come to define the Glasnost era of the 1980s.

The new open environment of the 1980s allowed for film to touch upon heavy societal issues such as domestic abuse, alcoholism, pop culture, sex, and teen angst. In the film, one of Vera's major inner conflicts is that she feels stuck. According to Andrew Horton, there are not a lot of "alternatives to the roles laid out for her" similar to many teens of her time (Horton 19). Neither the life of a housewife nor the pursuit of higher education interest Vera, which gives reason to her frustration towards life. She is lost, has no passion towards future goals or a career, and has an unstable relationship with her family and her lover. Horton points out that Vera's "conflict in roles and values" acts as friction between her and her parents (Horton 20). She often feels like she must choose between her roles as daughter and wife, as in the scene when the police interrogate her about how her fiancée Sergei was stabbed. If she confesses the truth, she betrays her father and corrupts her role as the dutiful daughter. If she lies, then she corrupts her role as a loyal bride to Sergei. Horton even argues that at times Vera must play the role of a wife to her father:

> Because of the distance her mother places between her husband and Vera, the daughter must also play the role of both wife and mother to her father. Thus while the father urges Vera to "cherish her youth," Vera is, in fact, the one who takes his complaints about his heart trouble seriously and who then undresses him and tucks him in bed early in the film. (Horton 20)

The result of this conflict shows a vast generational difference between the youth of the 80s and the generations that came before, evident by the film's overall apathetic mood and its astonishingly accurate reflection of the Soviet Union's new reality. In Pichul's own words, "[t]he film is an attempt to come close to the abyss of our life today. Actually our real life is even darker, and yet I remain an optimist. Making a film is an exercise in hope" (Horton 21). The death of Vera's father is a metaphorical message about the inevitability of change. Vera's father represents the older generation with their outdated values and their burdening issues. His alcoholism and outdated morals held her back, which is why his death is necessary in order for Vera, the youth, to grow and find purpose in her life. It can be said that *Little Vera* is revolutionary in that it shows how "far contemporary Soviet cinema has now been allowed to move from the false enthusiasms and wooden idealism of Socialist Realism in its most rigid form" (Horton 21). At this point in Soviet film, heroines were no longer expected to fit socialist ideals nor embody virtues but reflected the real world with all its flaws and truths.

Veronika of *The Cranes Are Flying* became the first complex female heroine in Soviet cinema by representing silent women traumatized by sexual assault. In a way, she is the first "real" woman of cinema and breaks free from the traditional paradigm formed by communist ideals. She is also the first heroine to have a personal life and a strong sense of individualism, and her inspiring story of love and hardship stirred much needed discussion and healing for a

generation of Soviets torn apart by war. Veronika paved the path for future heroines to grow and develop as unique individuals. Vera of *Little Vera* is a blend of the heroine tropes from both the 1960s and the 1980s. Misguided by the outdated values of her parents' older generation and unsure about the meaning of success, Vera represents many adolescents of the Glasnost era. Her strained relationships between herself and her parents and her lover resembles the generational gap between the older and new generation. Disagreements on the extent of filial piety and the value of education and careers result in a sense of lostness that will define the 1980s. *Little Vera*, when compared to the beginning of Soviet cinema, represents how far heroines had grown and changed in a way filmmakers of the 1910s never thought possible. From sinful femme fatales to faceless women of the masses, Soviet heroines managed to earn a sense of individuality and utilize their strength in order to fight for what they want. They were no longer bound to supporting roles of faithful wives but rose to become protagonists with agency and break free from the frigid molds of communist ideology. As a result, these heroines are able to inspire audiences and evoke sympathy without a mask of perfection.

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

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