
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A World Unknown
Fall 2021

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GLOBAL INSIGHT

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A Journal of Critical Human Science and Culture

Volume 2

Fall 2021

Global Insight: A Journal of Critical Human Science and Culture is now accepting submissions for Fall 2022. Contributors must be undergraduate students from any college at The University of Texas at Arlington. Submissions will be subject to double-blind peer review. The journal will be available to a wide, international audience in an online platform via academic hosts and vendors as well as a limited print run.

Global Insight aims at firing the imagination of up-and-coming scholars by providing a venue for critical thinking and independent research. Our endeavor is to cultivate the capacity of undergraduate students for subtle and nuanced reasoning as well as nurture a passion for ideas and an appreciation for the social, political, cultural, linguistic, ethical, environmental, and historical dimensions of important issues facing our global society today. Contributors should use liberal arts approaches such as inquiry, dialogue, and analysis to address the issues of politics and culture, science and technology, or related fields. Topics may range from industrialization and urbanization to agriculture and energy; health and health risks to international relations and foreign policy; international trade, finance, capitalism, globalization, and migration; or public issues such as race, class, gender, and labor, etc. Topics should be explored within their respective global contexts.

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From the Editor

Welcome to A World Unknown

2021 has been a momentous year. It began with the attack on the United States Capitol along with the second impeachment of former President Trump. Protests and riots were seen around the world amid the outbreak of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Coronavirus deaths continued to rise internationally leaving permanent holes in families and communities. #BlackLivesMatter protesters continued to march in response to the injustices across the nation.

However, it wasn't all death and despair. President Joe Biden was inaugurated into office and signed the American Rescue Plan. It consisted of a $1.9 trillion coronavirus relief package created to assist the United States' recovery from the distressing economic and health effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, Kamala Harris became the first female vice president as well as the first African American and first Asian American to hold that office.

In addition, we saw a brief return to normalcy. The creation and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, whether by Pfizer, Moderna, Johnson & Johnson, or others produced around the globe, aided parts of the world in reopening. However, the new Delta variant has since then swept across the nation, leading to a surge in cases and COVID-19 hospitalizations.

NASA's Ingenuity Mars Helicopter became the first aircraft in history to make a powered, controlled flight on another planet. Juneteenth, a day to commemorate the emancipation of enslaved people in the US, became a national holiday, and justice was served as former police officer Derek Chauvin was sentenced to 22 ½ years for the murder of George Floyd.

With the future on the horizon, it's important we as a society come together to eliminate the injustices and inequalities around the world. We have the opportunity to do so each and every day, so it's imperative we take initiative. That's why this second issue of *Global Insight* couldn't be more timely than now.

As we slowly and steadily return to our regular lives, one can't help but wonder: what's next? Each day is a mystery that brings unexpected events, surprising twists and turns, and new challenges. Consequently, we're referring to this period as A World Unknown.

Our authors' topics cover a wide gamut from politics to the arts. They raise awareness on important issues that deserve greater attention in the global dialogue.

I commend each author on an exceptional job while working through difficult times and urge you, as you continue through life, to apply your skills and energy toward the betterment of the world and to influence communities across the globe.

To conclude, I would like to thank the incredible UTA faculty and staff whose hard work and determination were the impetus that made this publication achievable:

Associate University Librarian for Scholarly Communications Kelly Visnak; Digital Publishing & Repository Librarian Yumi Ohira; Publishing Specialist Brittany Griffiths; Editor-in-Chief Lonny Harrison; Executive Editor Yubraj Aryal; Copy Editor Josh Mitchell; and the pool of peer reviewers, graduate students at UTA, who reviewed the authors' work and offered their valuable feedback. Thank you, lastly, to our readers for giving us a reason to share this *Global Insight*.

— Phillip Childs, Assistant Editor

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Foreword

Elizabeth Kilkenny

During my time at the University of Texas at Arlington, I chose to delve into Russian language and cultural studies as part of my International Business degree. I began with two semesters of intensive Russian language, but eventually branched out into Russian Literature, Business Writing, and Translation courses, among others. After less than a year studying Russian, I chose to embark upon a volunteer trip with Allies in Youth Development—a nonprofit organization that my former Russian professor, Tatiana Ivanovna, was affiliated with. Around this time, I was also awarded the Charles T. McDowell Center for Critical Languages' Betty and Roger Ruch Study Abroad Scholarship, which helped to enable this culturally enriching excursion along with my own private fundraising. I will be forever grateful to the Ruch family, Dr. Harrison, and former McDowell Center director Dr. Mark Cichock for that catalyzing support.

I had never even been on a plane before, and I flew Houston to Moscow direct, alone, on an over 12-hour flight. Then I took a night train to St. Petersburg and stayed with vetted hosts from CouchSurfing.org for a few days before meeting up with my volunteer group back in Moscow. From there we brought supplies to and worked with kids at orphanages and halfway homes in the Talovaya region and Voronezh. This experience was completely foreign to me in nearly every way, and it absolutely shaped and prepared me to be able to handle the culture shock of living in Europe more easily later down the line.

After my time at UTA, I pivoted to technology work for a couple of years before being offered a full Erasmus Mundus Scholarship for my International Master in Security, Intelligence, and Strategic Studies, with a concentration in Security and Technology—a degree jointly awarded by the University of Glasgow in Scotland, Dublin City University in Ireland, and Univerzita Karlova (Charles University) in Czechia. Despite my 180° flip to working in tech, my love for international studies was still alive and well, and this degree helped me to marry both passions. During my period of study in Ireland, I was afforded the opportunity to take a course entitled Russia and the Former Soviet Space, led by Professor Donnacha Ó Beacháin. My paper, "Russian Disinformation – The Technological Force Multiplier," as presented in this issue of *Global Insight*, was originally written for this course in 2018.

In today's world, disinformation is a bigger problem than ever before. Disinformation strategies of the past have been updated to work with modern techniques and technologies, and it is easier to reach a target audience as well. Where previously disinformation tended to be crafted more carefully and specifically into the 'Big Lie' style campaigns, such as the campaign that spread the rumor that AIDS is a man-made virus, the most common modern disinformation archetype has instead shifted to a 'firehose of falsehood' model of disinformation. In this new paradigm, rather than crafting a single major lie, the perpetrator intends to sow as much confusion and

discord as possible in the target demographics. The Internet is one of the largest enablers for this new model of disinformation, as this scale of information warfare could not be possible without it. Technological growth has led to easier and faster disinformation campaigns. Even something as positive as the right to free speech in democratic countries contributes to the ability for malicious actors to have a platform. Consequently, my article is an analysis of the evolution of Soviet to modern Russian government disinformation strategies and tactics.

I am honored to publish "Russian Disinformation – The Technological Force Multiplier" in the second issue of *Global Insight*, and recommend looking at the wonderful pieces in the inaugural issue as well. I am delighted to see how The McDowell Center has grown since my time at UTA, and I know this journal will be a wonderful creative outlet for students to present critical global perspectives.

— Elizabeth Kilkenny, July 31st, 2021

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Russian Disinformation – The Technological Force Multiplier

Elizabeth Kilkenny

Part one of this article is a Literature Review assessing the state of the collected works of arguments surrounding the comparison and contrasting of older Soviet and contemporary Russian disinformation campaigns. There were two main overarching ideas that kept reemerging: either there is no practical difference or technological change is the only real difference, and even then, some believe it is just a natural evolution of these systems of disinformation. Other less frequent ideas surrounding this analysis are also highlighted as potentially important variables. After reviewing these previous works, the second part of this piece delves deeper into the topic by laying out examples of disinformation campaigns of the recent and distant pasts. The Literature Review and resulting analysis will ultimately show a correlation between the growth of technology and the speed of changes in the tactics used for Russian disinformation, as well as consistency between the goals of the Russian government today and the Soviet regime.

Keywords: Russia, disinformation, information warfare, propaganda, troll farms, security

Literature Review

Introduction

The objective of this literature review is to assess the collected works surrounding older Soviet and contemporary Russian disinformation campaigns, while looking for trends in the differences and similarities that have emerged over time. The two main ideas that have arisen are that there is no difference at a practical level because the regime's goals of spying on, influencing, or punishing other actors have not changed, and that emergent technology acts as a catalyst and enables the campaigns to be enacted to greater effect. Other, less frequent ideas surrounding this comparison between Soviet and Russian disinformation have also been included as they are potentially important variables that could be significantly impacting the development and growth of disinformation today: for example psychology, free speech, the rules of war changing, or the increase in massive amounts of data being created every day.

Practically No Difference

Some writers hold the opinion that the Russian disinformation tactics of today are the same at a practical level as the Soviet tactics of the past. According to Qiu, the "fake news" that Russia has been churning out in modern times is effectively no different than the propaganda techniques of the past. For example, take the case of the Soviet rumor that the government of the United States created AIDS in 1983. The main purpose of that campaign was to sow uncertainty around the intentions of the United States by using the fear of a new disease as inspiration. Those who believe that there are no practical differences between the campaigns over the years essentially say that the modern Russian rumor mills may employ different means, but their end goals are roughly equal. This position is often taken from a consequentialist point of view – with that mindset the ends are the important part of the equation, not the means. Qiu also emphasizes the roles of incrementalism and uncertainty involved in the success of Russian disinformation campaigns. The Russian government has had many years and lots of practice against various adversaries to get to the level of skill that has emerged in the modern, ever more interconnected world.

In parallel, Popescu (1) addresses the similarities between the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the more recent Russian incident in Crimea, claiming that "on a technical level, many of the actions undertaken by the Soviets back then are strikingly similar to the ones Russia employed in Crimea last year." In both cases the government used agents in ambiguous or disguised uniforms to their advantage, while spreading the lie that the agents were a local revolutionary effort. In the more recent Crimea incident, this began with disinformation spreading via staging for positive support before the invasion. The staging was done by an organization that hacked smart TVs in Crimea and directed them to a supposed "rebel" TV broadcast, to give off the impression that it was an organic takeover (Kubecka). Although decades have passed and regimes have come and gone, the same playbook that was used by the Soviet government in Afghanistan still seems to be influencing Russian tactics, with the main differences emerging as a consequence of technological advances.

Technological Change Is the Difference

The advent of new technologies has expanded the variety of tools at hand for spreading disinformation. According to Cull et al. (68), "the most dramatic shift in the information environment is the move to digital and online media." Technological change has revolutionized the availability and accessibility of new information, while also making it easier to propagate fictitious news. Paul and Matthews broach what they call the "firehose of falsehood" propaganda model that seems to have developed in Russia; the firehose model is propaganda that's rapid, high volume, multi-channel, continuous, responsive, and repetitive while undercutting perceptions of reality and contradicting itself sometimes. The key to this kind of propaganda is the modern technology that enables it; the internet and social media, and the ever-increasing power of hardware, all contribute to the changes in Russian tactics. Paul and Matthews also emphasize that this is built on Soviet Cold-War era thoughts and techniques. The intentions of the Russian government seem as if they have not changed much, while Russian government capabilities have expanded with technological advances over time. Russia has gotten good at adapting new technologies to its information manipulation goals worldwide.

In addition to this, there are some voices that argue Russia has simply continued down the same pathway that it started over a century ago, that this is the natural evolution of a system of disinformation - a gradual increase in the volume and sophistication of disinformation campaigns as technology improves at an ever more rapid rate. McClintock emphasizes the role technology has played in the evolution of Russian disinformation campaigns, but also concentrates on the stability they have shown in their goals: to spy, influence, or punish other actors. Similarly, MacFarquhar underscores that the planting of false stories is not new; rather, the Russian government has simply put more of a concentration on disinformation in its military doctrine, as it has only grown in its successes over the years.

Other Forces Impacting Contemporary Russian Disinformation

There are a handful of other thoughts on the nature of similarities and differences between contemporary Russian disinformation and that of Soviet times that emerge less frequently, such as the impacts of psychology, free speech, changes in the rules of war, or the increase in the sheer amount of data fueling the campaigns. Grimes broaches the idea that internet users themselves are partially to blame for increasing the ease of success for Russian disinformation campaigns today. He cites the statistic that "60% of us get our news primarily through social media" and also states "spreading propaganda requires only some webspace and an audience who are only too keen to like and share." This is tangentially related to the change in technology because social media is a part of the evolution of technological change that is altering the tools available for spreading disinformation; however, Grimes concentrates on the human psychological element of spreading and believing disinformational propaganda.

It is weird to think of free speech as a security risk, but it is an inherent vulnerability that enemies can also say whatever they want in an open forum with the intention of confusing and/or persuading the citizens of the target country. Free speech in the United States has always been an enabler for disinformation campaigns. Osnos et al. quote former KGB general Oleg Kalugin as saying, "Free societies are often split because people have their own views, and that's what former Soviet and current Russian intelligence tries to take advantage of." Many people still do not fact check news shared by those they trust on social media and end up in virtual echo chambers with all their social media confirming their preconceived notions. This definitely influences the disinformation campaigns run today, though it is not strong enough to make a big difference alone.

Another argument is that it is the evolving rules of war that make modern Russian disinformation efforts different from the past, while technology advances as it always has. Under Russian "New Generation Warfare" (what many in the West refer to as "hybrid warfare"), Allenby claims that "civilizational conflict"[1] is the change differentiating current Russian disinformation tactics from Soviet ones. Disinformation is a part of this idea of civilizational conflict. Allenby does concede that these tactics integrating "political action, concealed military activities at important leverage points, and sophisticated destabilization initiatives" are just more efficient and targeted versions of some of those used in the Soviet Union.

Allenby emphasizes a second shift of import as well: the increase in sheer quantity of data and information that we create now compared to what was ever possible before. This allowed the historical "Big Lie" style propaganda involving complete control of the media to shift to the more complex "manufactured real" of modern times (Allenby). The "manufactured real" manipulates the surrounding culture through all channels to distort reality for large groups in a mass-gaslighting manner, without needing complete media control. It becomes more about sowing uncertainty than upholding a massive falsehood. These ideas indicate that the paradigm surrounding Russian disinformation campaigns has inherently changed, rather than just the technology involved.

Finally, there are a few variables that Cull et al. think impact contemporary Russian disinformation campaigns, though with smaller impacts: the end of Cold War bipolarity, the existence of a "post-factual world," and a more diffuse propagandist network holding a more diverse set of goals (Cull et al.). The "post-factual world" is a reference to modern politicians (such as Putin or Trump) denying obvious facts with blatant lies, and yet still being believed by many. These factors arise less frequently in the literature surrounding the modern Russian disinformation circuit, but still have an impact on the conversation.

Conclusion

The equation defining the changes surrounding disinformation campaigns from Soviet to contemporary Russian times is complex - filled with many variables, like new technologies and ever more massive amounts of

1 Civilizational conflict: fighting between cultures instead of countries.

data, and only a few constants, such as the general goals of the disinformation campaigns. The overall goals of the campaigns stemming from Moscow have stayed relatively constant over the last century, although there has been an increase in diversified actors taking part in the planning and distribution of disinformation campaigns for personal gain rather than party influence. Some of the scholars from this review take a consequentialist view and find that the major differences between Soviet and Russian efforts are mostly within the means available and not in the end goals and intentions of the regimes, while still others believe that many Soviet tactics have simply been recycled with updated resources as technology grows in the continued evolution of hybrid and information warfare.

Fast technological development and the introduction of the internet have become major force multipliers for the velocity of disinformation distribution. Technological diversity and growth have had the largest individual impact on disinformation capabilities. Other notable variables are found in the psychological and sociological realms, such as in the shift in international relations from bipolarity to world power multi-polarity. Russia has continued to evolve tactics in line with what would be expected from Soviet times, and disinformation will only grow in power as technology grows.

Russian Disinformation: The Technological Force Multiplier

Introduction

The history surrounding the term "disinformation" can be seen by following the cases of formerly Soviet and contemporarily Russian "дезинформация."[2] This is a tactic of intentional manipulation of information for some (usually military or political) advantage. It has been around since the advent of human rivalry, though not as heavily used as an explicit approach or term until the most recent centuries. In modern times most media-based disinformation is just called "fake news" colloquially by the internet-based public.

The Russian government has a long history of manipulating traditional informational channels, such as newspapers, radio, and television. In more recent times this has expanded to include the cybersphere (the internet, private networks, social media, and other networked technologies). Disinformation affects populations psychologically through the manipulation of their worldview. If a government can influence the sentiment of the masses in others' states, those states are then increasingly controlled, and destabilization can take place with more ease. It should also be noted that the intentions and end goals to spy, influence, or punish other actors (McClintock) have remained largely unchanged, even while the means and capabilities have adapted to contemporary times. Complexity and risk grow when other hybrid warfare tactics are added to the equation (cyberwarfare, covert ops, economic pressure, etc.). In modern times, this information warfare is near borderless, difficult to attribute, and easier to enact.

Deception is a major challenge within politics, intelligence, and the media – a risk that could stem from within or without a state, from independent actors, a team, or an entire government. The continued freedom of speech and the press in places like the United States are both a liberty and a vulnerability. This freedom makes it much easier for foreign powers to infiltrate liberal states' public media, and thus influence public thoughts in places with such freedoms. For disinformation to be successful, there must be a potential for protest in the targeted populace. It is rare for a campaign to find success without some level of pre-existing turmoil in the targeted area to capitalize on – a fire cannot start without something for a spark to burn. Some illuminating cases will be brought forth to compare and contrast Soviet and Russian disinformation campaigns and their goals and techniques. This will ultimately show a correlation between the growth of technology and the speed of changes

2 (Transliterated) dezinformatsiya: disinformation.

in the tactics used for Russian disinformation, as well as consistency in the goals of the Russian government today with the Soviet regime.

Soviet Dezinformatsiya

Disinformation was at the core of Soviet era "active measures" – political warfare involving everything from forgeries and media manipulation to assassinations. Active measures were the predecessor to modern Russian hybrid warfare. One Cold War-era example of an active measure is the 1964 Operation Neptune. This was a successful Czechoslovakian intelligence attempt to discredit West Germany at the time by placing stolen documents that implicated then current West German politicians as Nazi collaborators inside an artificially aged chest in a lake to make them look like they had been hidden during World War II (Asiedu). According to Pond, the purpose of this event was to discredit West Germany and feed into anti-German sentiments, and to campaign for an extension of the period in which German Nazi war crimes could be prosecuted.

Czechoslovakian intelligence got a bit of what they wanted on all accounts, but their greatest success was the removal of a statute of limitations on Nazi war crimes. Still, they were not successful in implicating the West German government at the time as the newest iterations of Nazis (Pond). This is a good example of the level of technology the Czechoslovakian government utilized at the time (physical fabrication of the chests, and physically stolen documents), which is quite different from the modern day often internet-based Russian campaigns. Fabrication nowadays is more often of a digital means than physical. This is not to say that physical fabrication does not happen – physical forgeries are certainly still a real occurrence and risk.

Another disinformation campaign emerged in 1980 during the Cold War: forged documents claiming that the U.S. supported apartheid in South Africa and was persecuting Black Americans (Waller). As in many other instances of disinformation, this forgery was released in a non-Soviet newspaper, by someone involved in a Soviet front group. In this case it was a San Franciscan newspaper with a publisher who was a part of the World Peace Council, a well-known Soviet front (Waller). There is a certain level of consistency in the tactics used in Soviet disinformation campaigns; when the Soviets found that something worked, they stuck to it. This also creates a pattern that makes it easier to identify a trail of actions as potentially to have been Soviet, even if true attribution may never be possible. Barring intentionally misleading 'false flag' operations, one must look at who the attack would benefit to see the most likely culprits.

A popular disinformation campaign trend was established when Soviet authorities realized how sensitive the American public was to the use of biological weaponry. During the Vietnam War, they released a forged document illuminating the "existence" of American biological weapons caches; this time the false information was released to the *Free Press Journal* in Bombay (Boghardt). This trend of biological war-themed disinformation was developed further when the Soviet government decided to capitalize on the emergence of AIDS around the world.

One of the most infamous Soviet disinformation campaigns said that AIDS was a human-made disease, and specifically targeted the U.S. as the creator. The seeds for Operation INFEKTION were sown in 1983, though it did not reach peak rumor virility until 1987 (Boghardt; Grimes). According to Grimes, "The dissemination followed a well-established pattern: the story would appear in a publication from outside the USSR, and was then presented in Soviet media as the investigative work of others." This disinformation operation claimed that AIDS was created by the American secret intelligence unit – the CIA (Boghardt; MacFarquhar; Grimes). It was a Soviet effort meant to take advantage of existing biases against the U.S. and to make people more untrusting towards the U.S. government and its policies. Grimes (2017) states that even after the director of the SVR in 1992 admitted that it had been a Soviet campaign, some people still believe the lie. This is a lie that has cost lives due to the development of a mindset called "AIDS denialism" linked to mistrust of the government which has cost hundreds of thousands of preventable deaths (Grimes). This is a great example of a piece of disinformation taking on a

life of its own. It still is indirectly endangering lives through those who now believe AIDS is man-made, no matter who they think created it. This piece of "Big Lie" propaganda has a legacy that still costs lives today.

Thankfully, not every Soviet campaign was successful. According to both Niemann and Grimes, one failed campaign was an attempt to keep Ronald Reagan from being reelected President of the United States. This was done by attempting to infiltrate the headquarters for both major American political parties, trying to make the phrase "Reagan means war!" popular, and overall aiming to discredit President Reagan in the eyes of the American populace (Niemann). These attempts had little to no impact; Reagan won the election by a landslide. The American people were not fooled in this case – the positive sentiments surrounding President Reagan were too great. It was a lesson to the Soviets to be careful expending time and energy on a campaign if the cards are stacked too highly against them. This was before the internet made dissemination of these poisonous ideas so much easier – human limitations restricted the velocity of disinformation, and time wasted on a failed campaign was more costly.

As can already be seen, even before the advent of the internet the Russian government was hard at work refining many of the strategies and tactics that are still used in the modern world. Soviet disinformation campaigns are the roots of the modern operations that we see come out of Russia today. These more modern campaigns have improved iteratively in many ways, while still maintaining some consistency across goals, tactics, and targets. The shift from the Soviet regime to the modern Russian one in the 90s came at a pivotal time where the possibilities of the internet were only beginning to be explored.

Modern Cyber-Information War

Despite a bold promise to halt disinformation campaigns aimed at the United States after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia continued full force (Osnos et al.). In 1998, the Russian government was discovered spying on the United States government using cyber-means (McClintock). This was a typical attempt to gain sensitive information in line with past spying operations, just in the digital realm rather than the physical. This indicated the Russian government's arsenal for non-violent hybrid warfare consists of more than technical attacks – it also intertwines information and psychological war. In a society that has been becoming increasingly illiberal and undemocratic, these tactics are bound to continue. Authoritarian states have no issues lying to their own people, so of course they will lie to those they see as enemies without hesitation.

The first well known instance of a state-on-state massive cyberattack was in Estonia during the spring of 2007 (McGuinness). The Estonian government removed a World War II memorial that had been placed in Soviet times; this caused an uproar in Russia. Semi-uncoordinated hackers, mostly originating in Russia, began to attack the websites of important Estonian institutions. Coinciding with this, Russian news falsely reported that both the statue and some nearby Soviet graves were to be destroyed, to further incense the protestors. Some speculation circulated about the origins of the attack being the Russian state, but due to the nature of most cyberattacks, attribution is a problem (McGuinness). It was not a particularly sophisticated group attack. It consisted mostly of basic copy and paste "script kiddie"[3] efforts and widespread use of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)[4] attacks (Osnos et al.). This attack turned out to be more of a cyber riot when compared to the state-sponsored cyberattacks seen more recently, but it was a major turning point in the known ways that Russia and other governmental actors were using technological advances to their advantage in the area of information warfare.

In the next year, Russia concentrated its gaze towards the Georgians. The attack arose because of a disputed territory in South Ossetia; the Russian forces combined a physical attack with a cyber assault (Osnos et al.). This is

3 "Script kiddies" are people who can use other people's written exploits, but do not truly understand the inner workings of what they are using, nor to they write their own scripts.

4 For DDoS attacks an attacker uses a typically large group of computers (which can include nontraditional Internet of Things items like 'smart' house appliances) to overload the systems of a target.

the first recorded instance of a dual traditional and informational/cyberattack. Technology has been growing at an increased rate, and the Russians took advantage of it. Osnos et al. claim that while "Russia prevailed militarily, its narrative was overshadowed by the Georgian one from the first minutes of the campaign." They technically won militarily, but lost ideologically. They did not manage to get a good enough percentage of the world to believe their disinformation in this case. This shows how quickly Russian disinformation teams were adapting at this time, and the difference that a year made in their tactics.

The emergence of state sponsored hacker collectives happened somewhere in the mid to late 2000s, with one that is thought to be Russian in origin holding prominence still today. Maldre shares a list of some Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) that are thought to be associated with Russia. One example of such a collective is APT28 (also known by Sofacy and a few other monikers). Cybersecurity analysts have been able pin down certain consistencies in the metadata and attributes surrounding some attacks that make them fit together in a larger picture. FireEye reported that there were regularities in the malware used, that the targeting of these groups was in line with those the Russian government might want to target (the United States, NATO, etc.), that there were Russian language markers in the malware code over a six-year period, and that the code was compiled consistently in Russian business hours. They assessed that the Russian government is the most likely backer of APT28. These findings were confirmed and expanded upon in a white paper by another security company, Bitdefender (Benchea et al.). A couple of examples of efforts attributed to APT28 are the 2015 hack of the German parliament and the 2016 hack of the U.S. Democratic National Committee (Daniels). This shows that the Russian government has maintained a concentrated effort on consistently still targeting the West, despite new tools being used.

Russia has also expended effort on further influencing the formerly Soviet countries whose intelligence teams used to be under Soviet control. These countries are particularly vulnerable to Russian disinformation due to their substantial Russian speaking populations, their physical proximity to Russia, and their historical relationship with the USSR (Radin). Countries like Estonia receive Russian propagandized media via Russian language traditional news sources and social media (Mardiste). These vulnerabilities were taken advantage of by Russia in Ukraine back in 2014 in the now infamous Crimean annexation. Initially, what is thought to be a Russian backed group hacked into smart TVs and forced them to a "rebel" TV channel, to give off the impression that it was a homegrown separatist movement (Kubecka). Then, Russia used unmarked forces (sometimes referred to as "little green men") for military actions in Crimea (Radin). By keeping the agents unmarked, Russia could pretend that it had no idea who they were. These instances have reasonably created anxiety in some of the states bordering Russia. In some cities bordering the mainland of Russia, like Daugavpils in Latvia, Russian speakers are a majority and there has been some concern that Russia will reuse the tactics from Crimea (Radin). The Baltics are a little bit more protected than Ukraine, though, due to their membership in NATO.

More recently, Russia was distinctly campaigning for a "leave" Brexit vote. Nimmo aggregated Kremlin funded media reports related to Brexit and analyzed the headlines, commentators, context, and language use for systemic bias pushing for the U.K. to go through with leaving the European Union. After breaking down reasons why this slant cannot be accidental, Nimmo determined that it was an intentional disinformation campaign to give more attention to those who were for Brexit. This is a direct tie to the desires of the Kremlin, as state funded media cannot deviate widely from the feelings of the Russian government without likely getting into trouble.

Also in 2016, the Russian plot against the American Democratic Party that was previously mentioned was one of the more successful disinformation campaigns believed to come from Russian influences. It impacted the highest elected office in the United States. According to Osnos et al. "the operation involved hacking Democrats' e-mails, publicizing the stolen contents through WikiLeaks, and manipulating social media to spread "fake news" and pro-Trump messages." Even if caught, they have not lost, as they will have shown how vulnerable the American system can be. Some of the support for this campaign came from Twitter bots and "troll farms."

Troll farms are one of the newer developments in the toolbox of contemporary Russian disinformation campaigners. These are businesses employing people to control online fake personas and botnets[5] to spread elaborate disinformation campaigns. Some have emerged connected to Russia, funded by people in close proximity to the Kremlin. These kinds of organizations were employed to spread "fake news" about Hillary Clinton in the 2016 U.S. election (Osnos et al.). Another interesting case involving the troll farms is from Louisiana: a forged accident on Twitter with pictures, a catchy hashtag, and video "evidence" when a chemical plant called Columbia Chemical supposedly had an explosive accident (Chen). This is not a basic hoax, however. The campaign was highly complex with many different involved Twitter accounts and even a fake Wikipedia page (Chen). It is likely that this campaign was an experiment for technique refinement, since there is no real long-term goal here other than causing fear, and comparable campaigns have come to pass since. According to Chen other similar campaigns emerged and were pushed by the same fake accounts. This is the level of complexity that is emerging in Russian cyber-disinformation campaigns.

Interestingly, Adrian Chen was also the target of a disinformation campaign by the group thought to be responsible for many of these campaigns – "the Agency." Chen was researching their efforts and they did not like this, of course. Also known as the "Internet Research Agency," they have since been the subject of an indictment by the U.S. government for election meddling (United States District Court for the District of Columbia). After Chen went to Saint Petersburg to interview a worker from the Agency, he was set up with pictures from their meeting and a narrative claiming that he was there to undermine the Kremlin for the CIA, NSA or some other American agency. Some of the attacks came from the same sets of Twitter accounts that were already being investigated (Chen). It can be a dangerous game trying to investigate the actions of those who churn out lies for a living.

The Russian government has adopted new technology for its ends as that technology emerges. If it is a piece of technology that can be exploited to further a disinformation campaign, it will be. Some of the strongest catalysts that have come out of modern technology are the internet in general, social media, and machine learning programming capabilities; these all culminate in the troll farms and deep fakes of today. Additionally, it does not help that audiences are often not critical of the news being shared by their trusted networks, while social media is only minimally fact checked before these things are shared.

Conclusion

One of the biggest differences between Soviet and modern Russian disinformation campaigns is that nowadays the internet and other technological breakthroughs have become force multipliers for the potential damage that a disinformation campaign can enact. As Grimes put it:

Today, spreading misinformation is orders of magnitude easier than it was in the 1980s, and in an era when 60% of us get our news primarily through social media, spreading propaganda requires only some webspace and an audience who are only too keen to like and share.

Technology is also a tool for crafting better disinformation. With programs for photo, video, and audio editing becoming ever more advanced, lies are becoming easier to "prove" with digital forgeries. Additionally, Russian agents have had time to hone basic theoretical objectives stemming from Soviet times.

You can see a distinct change in the kind of lies that have emerged over time as well. Big, basic rumors have given way for Paul and Matthews's (2016) "firehose of falsehood" system, overloading people's newsfeeds with questionable fake news. This makes it more confusing for the average person to sift through the lies and discern the real information. Russian deceptions are thought to have pulled some of the strings in such major state votes

5 Networks of (often maliciously compromised) computers controlled remotely.

as the 2016 American presidential election and the United Kingdom's Brexit vote with social media manipulation. Overall, the depth and breadth of disinformation campaigning has increased and as information technology continues to evolve, so too will disinformation tactics, techniques, and procedures.

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The Remains of *Castas* in Latin America

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Casta paintings are a collection of works that were predominantly produced in colonial Mexico. These paintings are a representation of the different classifications of race between Spaniards, Blacks, and Indigenous people. The paintings emphasize clothing and setting as a way to distinguish social and economic standings in regard to race. Casta paintings are more than racial documentation; they are a guide to understanding how ideas and beliefs on race came to be in Latin America. This article explores the origins of casta paintings and their long-lasting impact in Latin America. Casta paintings are investigated in books, academic journals, essays, and lectures. Principle sources include scholarship by Ilona Katzew and Magali Marie Carrera. A major focus is how casta paintings came to be and how the ideas that went into their formation are still present in Latin America.

Keywords: casta paintings, race, lineage, collection, socio-economic

A woman of dark complexion and a man of lighter complexion stand together as they acknowledge their child but not each other. The woman, man, and child all posed for what appears to be a family portrait are each labeled according to their racial lineage. The classification of race in Latin America is called the casta system, and it has been an ongoing issue that started in 16th-century Colonial Spanish America. We get a glimpse of Spanish colonialism through casta paintings: a collection of works produced primarily in 18th-century colonial Mexico. The casta system was used to determine a person's socioeconomic ranking based on their blood lineage. Those closest to Spanish descent were considered higher up in society (see fig. 1). Casta paintings, however, are not an accurate depiction of individuals' racial lineage. These paintings are representations of interracial marriages and the classification of race between Spaniards, Blacks, and Indigenous people. As Ilona Katzew, author of *Casta Painting: Images of Race in Eighteenth-Century Mexico*, mentions, colonial art was not produced to "disseminate" but to "authenticate" what Europeans saw in Latin America (63). These paintings, however, were produced for several reasons, such as to establish distinguishing socio-economic features concerning race and to fulfill some of Europe's curiosity about the New World. When we look at Latin America's present attitude toward race, we see traces of the beliefs first portrayed in casta paintings, which leads me to further discuss the origins of Casta paintings and their lasting effects.

1. Spaniard and Indian produce a *Mestizo* (mixed)	9. *Lobo* and Indian produce a *Zambaigo*
2. *Mestizo* and Spaniard produce a *Castizo*	10. *Zambaigo* and Indian produce a *Cambujo*
3. *Castizo* and Spaniard proudce a Spaniard	11. *Cambujo* and *Mulato* produce an *Albarazdo* (white spotted)
4. Spaniard and Black produce *Mulato* (Latin for mule)	12. *Albarazado* and *Mulato* produce a *Barcino*
5. Spaniard and *Mulato* produce a *Morisco* (of Moorish decent)	13. *Barcino* and *Mulato* produce a *Coyote*
6. *Morisco* and Spaniard produce an Albino	14. *Coyote* and Indian produce a *Chamiso*
7. Spaniard and Albino produce a *Torna Atrás* (a step back)	15. *Chamiso* and *Mestizo* produce a *Coyote Mestizo*
8. Indian and Torna Atrás produce a *Lobo* (wolf)	16. *Coyote Mestizo* and *Mulato* produce an *ahí te estás* (you stay there)

Figure 1. A list of some of the different casta categories with translations of some of the terms (Carrera, *Pinturas de Casta*).

There are over 2,000 known casta paintings that emphasize a social and racial hierarchy among individuals of New Spain. We must take into consideration that casta paintings rose to popularity in the early to mid-18th century – almost two centuries after the casta system had begun. This time gap should help us understand that casta paintings are often polished representations of the casta system and European ideologies. While local artists were the ones who created these paintings, they were highly influenced by Spanish ideologies. This is because many of the well-known artists fit under the higher ranks of the casta system. Given that the paintings are based on subjective racial views, we cannot be certain that they authenticate the reality of what it was to live under the casta system. We may not be getting the full picture, so we can only assume life in the casta system was similar to what is shown in the paintings. As Katzew explains, "Europeans' fascination with non-European culture" is what brought Spaniards to the Americas (Katzew 63). Casta paintings reflect Spaniards' concern with "racial purity" (Katzew 67), which might not seem as evident in the first few paintings created that showed the colonies' wealth. As Black and Indigenous people began to adopt Spanish culture, however, we see people taking pride in being of closer Spanish descent. This pride becomes noticeably clear in casta paintings when we take a look at a complete series (roughly 12-16 separate paintings) that emphasizes the wealth brought on by the blood cleansing. The paintings that contain individuals with more Spanish blood are often posed more gracefully while surrounded by wealth. Considering that casta paintings reflect Spanish ideologies brought on by the Enlightenment and European interest in foreign cultures, it can be difficult to analyze these paintings solely based on their purpose. We also have to analyze the content and context to understand how they shaped Latin

America's ideologies.

In the 18th century Spain began the Bourbon Reforms, which were so called because of economic and political laws implemented by various Spanish kings that belonged to the House of Bourbon. This was "a period of reorganization of the Spanish government" (Katzew 111), which made life in the Spanish colonies more rigid. Drawing inspiration from enlightenment ideas of a centralized government, Spain began to further enforce laws that controlled castas' clothing, living spaces, job positions, etc. For instance, Spanish men and women began to wear French-inspired attire to set themselves apart from those of the lower castas. *Mestiza* (meaning mixed race with Spanish and Indian) women did not have the same resources as Spanish and Creole women to dress in the latest fashion, so they resorted to shawls to cover up (Yturbide and Gage 76). While the Bourbon Reforms dictated the style people in New Spain could wear, authors Yturbide and Gage explain that part of the reason women were so preoccupied with covering up or wearing French-inspired clothes was that in 1582 the royal audience proclaimed that no *Mestiza*, *Mulata*, or Black woman would dress like an Indian without receiving punishment (Yturbide and Gage 77). This means that even though *Mestizas, Mulatas*, or Black women may not have had the appropriate resources to dress like a Spanish woman, they were still expected to differentiate themselves from Indigenous women who were on the lower part of the casta system, so associating with them was discouraged among the other castas.

While many of the artists that produced casta paintings are unknown, we have works such as those of Andres de Isla that emphasize individuals' attire. Individuals such as the ones in the painting *De Español e India, Mestizo* (From *Spaniard and Indian*, *Mestizo*) are shown wearing very distinct clothing to emphasize their respective castas (see fig. 2). The Indian woman is shown wearing a *huipil*, a rectangular, loose blouse, highly adorned with embroidered patterns, while the Spaniard wears a French-inspired coat and wig. Interestingly enough, paintings such as Isla's primarily focused on people's race and clothing rather than the environment they lived in because the Bourbon reform had just begun to take place, so the idea of labor and productivity within all the castas was not highly enforced yet.

Figure 2. Andres de Isla, De Español e India, Mestizo (From Spaniard and Indian, Mestizo). Ca. 1774, oil on canvas 89 x 69 cm. Museo de America, Madrid. CER.es (http://ceres.mcu.es/pages/Main). Photographed by Joaquín OTERO ÚBEDA.

Aside from the Bourbon influences on clothing, Spain also strongly focused on jobs and education, which is displayed in casta paintings. Any behavior that could be described as laziness was disapproved by Spain as reformers encouraged "agriculture and manufacturing" (Katzew 112). People were forced into these types of jobs with Spain's reasoning that the colonies would never work properly if people did not become productive members of society. We can see this type of reasoning as we take a closer look at casta paintings such as *No. 13 De Tente en el Aire y Mulato, Albarrazado*, and *No. 15 De Barcino y Cambuja, Campa Mulato* by Andres de Islas (see figs. 3 & 4). In both paintings, we see individuals of the lower class working in fruit stands, which helps to emphasize Spain's need for productivity among castas of lower status. We also begin to see Spain's beliefs on education through Europe's opinion on wet nurses. Although wet nursing was popular in the 17th century, it was believed that a child's education was influenced from the moment of birth, which included breastfeeding. Since wet nurses were often non-Spaniard women, there was a fear rooted in discriminatory beliefs that wet nurses would pass on their bad traits to a child. "[B]reast milk was regarded as a super-concentrated form of the lactating woman's own humors" (Earle 442). It was believed that wet nursing would lead to the downfall of the government as even the Spanish children would behave like individuals from the lower Castas. Therefore, we do not really see paintings with wet nurses. Instead, we get a few paintings of mothers nursing their children even though this was not as common among upper-class women (see fig. 5) (*De Español y Morisca, Albino*).

Figure 3. Andres de Isla, No. 13. *De Tente en el Aire y Mulata, Albarrazado* (From Hold-Yourself-in-Mid-Air and Mulatta, *Albarrazado*), 1774, oil on canvas. 75 x 54 cm. Museo de America, Madrid. CER.es (*http://ceres.mcu.es/pages/Main*). Photographed by Joaquín OTERO ÚBEDA.

Figure 4. Andres de Isla, *No. 15. De Barcino y Cambuja, Campa Mulato* (From *Barcino* and *Cambuja, Campa Mulato*), 1774, oil on canvas. 75 x 54 cm. Museo de America, Madrid. CER.es (*http://ceres.mcu.es/pages/Main*). Photographed by Joaquín OTERO ÚBEDA.

Figure 5. Unknown artist, *De Español y Morisca, Albino* (Spaniard and *Morisca* Produce an Albino). Ca. 1775-1800, oil on canvas 50 x 64 cm. Museo de America, Madrid. CER.es (*http://ceres.mcu.es/pages/Main*). Photographed by Joaquín OTERO ÚBEDA.

The overall body of work, including these three paintings, emphasizes the racial ideologies of New Spain. However, to further understand casta paintings, we must look at the origins of the casta system. As people began to grow interested in the New World, Spaniards of high status began traveling to colonial Mexico and other Latin American countries. The curiosity that led people to come to the Americas also led them to marry Indigenous people. In turn, Indigenous people were suddenly becoming individuals of high status in Spain thanks to their spouses. For instance, Ana Maria Lorenza Garcia Sairy Tupac de Loyola, daughter of a Spanish gentleman and Inca princess, married nobleman Juan Enriquez de Borja, turning her into the first marquise of Oropesa, Spain (Dueñas-Anhalzer 33-34). Marriages between Indigenous people and Spaniards were favorable primarily when it came to acquiring land and other property in the Americas (Dueñas-Anhalzer 34). Interracial marriages such as that of Ana Maria Lorenza Garcia Sairy Tupac de Loyola, however, became unfavorable when Spain began to fear for the strength of its government, believing that incorporating minorities into high-ranking positions would weaken its power.

Interracial marriage came to be a prominent issue for Spain when the two republics of New Spain failed – the republic of the Spanish and the republic of the Indians (Dueñas-Anhalzer 34). The two republics of New Spain were created to keep Spaniards' and Indians' lives separate. Ironically, this was not the case as Blacks, Indians, and Spaniards started mixing to the point where it was exceedingly difficult to distinguish the different races. This was an issue, considering Spain saw Indians as savages and therefore did not want them influencing Spaniards. Thus, around the mid-16th century, the *casta* system was implemented in America. This system of castas racially classified individuals based on their blood lineage as a means to control individuals who were neither considered Spanish, Indian, nor Black. Due to the casta system, we also begin to see an array of names given to the different mixtures between people of different races. A number of these names were even extremely derogatory – *Mulato* derives from the Latin word mule, and *Torna Atrás* translates to "a step back." As shown in various paintings, all the casta categories that came about resulted in a hierarchy based on race which often influenced individuals' socioeconomic status. As shown in Fig. 1, *Español* and *Indio* produced a *Mestizo*, a *Mestizo* and *Español* produced a *Castizo*, *Español* and *Negro* produced a *Mulato*, etc. (Carrera).

Since Spain could not keep track of interracial individuals through the two republics, castas became a significant factor in distinguishing people's race and socioeconomic status. As previously mentioned, castas created a racial hierarchy as the crown implemented discriminatory laws such as allowing only white individuals to hold certain positions (Dueñas-Anhalzer 35). The casta system did not stop individuals from working their way

around discriminatory laws because, as author Dueñas-Anhalzer explains, the racial sentiments behind castas were primarily based on phenotypes rather than genotypes (35). This means that while the idea of castas was defined in terms of genes, people often relied on appearances when claiming to belong to a certain casta. White-passing individuals who had money were treated with the same respect as full-blooded Spaniards. Church registries often helped keep track of individuals' lineage, but even so, there are multiple accounts of people who are said to belong to different casta groups in different documents. At the end of the day, the casta system focused more on the color of people's skin and how they behaved in society. Nevertheless, *Mestizos*, *Mulatos*, Blacks, Indians, and other castas still dealt with racial discrimination. Consequently, casta paintings are not necessarily an accurate representation of real-life individuals' races, considering that race is biological and therefore cannot solely be used as a distinguishing factor. They were produced as a way of documenting cultural boundaries within different races in colonial Mexico.

While casta paintings are said to have been created for different reasons, the content of all these paintings can be narrowed down to race. As previously discussed, Spain's concern with race is what influenced castas' lifestyles. For instance, Katzew discusses a manuscript by Basaras that describes Indians as barbaric and focuses on Indians' miseries (Katzew 163-165). While the casta painting series portrays a certain pride in being of closer Spanish descent, the individuals depicted had been manipulated into thinking that the more native blood one has, the more inferior one is. This type of manipulation is evident when we translate some of the casta names and see that the Spanish government encouraged blood cleansing. For example, a Spaniard and a *Mulato*'s offspring would have been labeled as a "Torna Atrás" or a "step back" (Carrera). In other words, Spain insinuated that if a Spaniard married a person who was mostly Spaniard but had a small percentage of Black, then the full-blooded Spaniard would be taking a step backward in their lineage. Individuals in lower castas realized that the only way to be treated fairly was by adopting everything Spain had to offer.

Casta paintings are no longer produced, but some of those 18th-century views on race are still present in Latin America now. Currently, Latin America no longer operates under a casta system, but racial sentiments remain as *Mestizaje*, the mixing of races, is still a relevant topic in Latin America. The racial tensions we see in casta paintings are mirrored by the current sentiments found in Latin America. Edward Telles and Denia Garcia discuss a research study conducted in eight Latin American countries to see people's opinions on *Mestizaje*. While *Mestizaje* was discouraged through the casta system, most Latin American countries today see *Mestizaje* as an opportunity to improve the country through diversity (Telles and Garcia, 148). However, because Latin American countries no longer openly condemn *Mestizaje*, any form of racism that takes place is often overlooked, thus undermining Black and Indigenous people's struggles (Telles and Garcia 132). Additionally, some countries protect Black and Indigenous rights, but as racial tensions have decreased, other countries argue that mixing of races is an approach to getting rid of Black and Indigenous people (Telles and Garcia 132).

While the eight countries' thoughts on *Mestizaje* are a combination of in favor, against, or neutral, it is clear that these are the remaining ideas of the casta system. Today, *Mestizaje* in Latin America varies depending on the countries' "racial composition" (Telles and Garcia 133). For instance, in Mexico and Brazil – where many individuals are of mixed-race – *Mestizaje* is strongly promoted as a means of surpassing the white population, whereas in other countries such as Uruguay, "whitening" (Telles and Garcia 134) is still valued despite other Latin American countries' appreciation for *Mestizaje*. Castas have certainly made an impact in today's Latin America whether we notice it or not. As previously mentioned, some countries prefer having a primarily white population while others favor *Mestizaje* to decrease the white population. This study, however, does not represent the ideologies of every individual within these countries, of course. Whether countries do or do not prefer *Mestizaje*, the Black and Indigenous populations are still being disregarded. Racism is still evident in some parts of Latin America. Even if it is not as clear as in the casta paintings, we still see racial preferences and discriminatory actions.

Overall, it is difficult to define the meaning of casta paintings because, as Katzew explains, this is not

a "monolithic genre" (Katzew 201). While some argue that these paintings are an objective representation of colonial Mexico, others argue that they are a subjective representation of Spain's views on race. Regardless, these paintings give us insight into the casta system that has left its long-lasting imprint in Latin America. While *Mestizaje* and other effects brought on by the casta system may seem minimal today, we still see some racial preference toward the white population within some countries in Latin America. On the other hand, some countries are working toward creating a more diverse population while fighting against discriminatory laws and ideologies. Casta paintings are a piece to the puzzle that is Colonial America. Regardless of meaning, they help us understand how Latin America got to be the way it is today.

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The *Gosudar* and His Covert Court: *Sistema,* Autocracy, and Russia's Inability to Democratize

Emmalee Valentine

Any question about Russian President Vladimir Putin's style of rule can be answered by examining both Russia's past as well as the informal governmental conventions that have historically prevailed. The purpose of this article is to juxtapose the theses of two essential academics: the late historian Richard Pipes's verdict on Russian autocracy in *Russian Conservatism and Its Critics: A Study in Political Culture* (2005) and the concept of *sistema*, authored by political sociologist Alena Ledeneva in *Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance* (2013). "Why can't Russia democratize?" is an enduring question. This article will provide a thorough analysis of each individual work, and conjoin the relevant concepts presented in either title to find a possible answer to this question. The examined work of Richard Pipes will best illustrate the relevant themes of Russian history, even with details one might normally surmise as minute, such as Russia's geography and the question of property rights. *Sistema* is introduced by Alena Ledeneva as an informal governmental structure which heavily dictates the customs of ruling administrations. The conclusion that this article hopes to illustrate by bridging the theories presented in the two aforementioned titles is that Russia's inability to democratize is the consequence of both its history and the underhanded structure of its current state, which has endured throughout all forms of government — past and present alike.

Keywords: Putin, Russia, *sistema*, Russian Federation, autocracy

Introduction

From the mid-fifteenth century until as late as 1917, Russian tsars were otherwise known as the *gosudari*. In the Russian language, *gosudar* is "the personal power of a free man over an unfree one, over a slave" (Pipes 14). By this definition, not only was the tsar a king, but he was also a slave-master. While many cultures throughout history accepted the practice of slavery, it would be hard to find a country outside of Russia which also allowed its entire populace to be enslaved to the sole will of its leader. While serfdom was supposedly eradicated in 1861, this did not entirely end the enslavement of the Russian people to the will of the Russian state. Moreover, it could

be argued that not even the Bolshevik revolution or the birth of the Soviet Union ended the enslavement of the Russian people. The differences between an imperial dynasty and a communist regime are myriad; however, they could certainly be argued to have been largely superficial. The paint coating the Russian state was new, but deep within its core, the Russian people continued to lack autonomy over themselves. The state was still in full control.

The Soviet Union fell near the end of the twentieth century. At the birth of the Russian Federation, everything looked as if it would be different. Democracy was within grasp for the Russian people. And yet, looking at Russia today, one could easily conclude that Russia is not a democracy which we will define, for the purposes of this paper, as a governmental system which is ruled by its people, and in which all members of the population have the opportunity to participate in state affairs, either by becoming elected officials or by voting. Historically, Russia has failed to form a democratic system. At the beginning, this was thanks to an outright rejection of the concept of democracy. Today, however, it seems that Russia pretends to act as if it were democratic, while still refusing to actually implement an honest and true democratic system.

The question of *why* this remains to be the case in the twenty-first century is perhaps a question that is difficult to answer. Russia's behavior remains elusive and can oftentimes be difficult to interpret. However, two individuals in particular can be credited for providing separate but equally adequate explanations.

The first of the two authors considered in this article's comparison is the late historian Richard Pipes, a professor of Russian and Soviet history at Harvard University. Pipes is responsible for many publications examining Russian political behavior, though his 2006 work titled *Russian Conservatism and Its Critics: A Study in Political Culture* best answers the question raised above. In this work, Pipes examines the reason Russia has continued to choose unlimited autocracy since the Middle Ages. "It is my conviction," he writes in the introduction, "that Russian political institutions and practices across the ages engendered a singular chasm between rulers and ruled" (xv). The second individual who offers a significant breakthrough on this subject is Alena Ledeneva, a professor of Politics and Society at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies in London. Ledeneva is a renowned expert internationally on Russia's "informal governance" system. In *Can Russia Modernise?* Sistema*, Power Networks and Informal Governance,* Ledeneva outlines the concept of the Russian *sistema,* an informal system which has influenced how Russia is governed for a length of time, which long precedes Putin's presidency, and even the Soviet Union. "[*Sistema*] serves to glue society together, to distribute resources and to ensure its own reproduction. The central argument of this book," Ledeneva writes, "is that Russia cannot modernise without modernising the network-based governance patterns referred to as *sistema*" (Ledeneva 2).

The two works would not automatically be seen as complementary to one another; Richard Pipes's work is staunchly historical, and Alena Ledeneva relies on figures, surveys, and the Putin administration, which is far from being something of the past. However, they do complement one another in the context of this question alone. The answer to the question of why Russia can't democratize can be found by uniting the schools of thought from both Pipes, whose work thoroughly explains the reason for lasting autocracy in Russian governance styles, and Ledeneva, who intensely investigates the deep roots of *sistema* under which Russia seems to be eternally doom-driven.

Sowing the Seeds of Autocracy — Geography, Property & Power

The concept of *sistema* is not the subject of Pipes's work at all. Pipes seeks not to explicitly name the reason for Russia's lack of a democratic governance style, but to examine the ties between Russian autocracy and conservative thought:

> The dominant strain in Russian political thought throughout history has been a conservatism that insisted on strong, centralized authority, unrestrained either by law or parliament. Its central argument was succinctly stated in 1810-11 by Nikolai Karamzin: "Autocracy has founded and resuscitated Russia. Any change in her political constitution has led in the past and must lead in the future to her perdition." (Pipes 1)

Similar to other states in Europe and in other corners of the world, Russia has seen a handful of different governance styles. Russia was not always ruled by an imperial dynasty — it also was subject to a communist regime, and currently, functions as something entirely different. However, one thing has remained steady throughout the many different faces of the Russian state — autocracy. Pipes examines many different reasons for both the origin of Russian autocracy and the reason it stayed put throughout the extent of Russia's existence. The initial rationale can be defined by three factors: the nature by which Russia developed, its culture, and its geography (1).

European monarchies were shaped also by three different elements, which are quite different — the Roman Empire's legacy, the culture of the several tribes from which European states were formed, as well as the institution of the Catholic Church (1). Culturally, Russia was dissimilar for many reasons, not the least of which being the domination of the Mongols over Russia in its early life (11). Another large factor of its cultural difference could be found in the Orthodox religion: "The concept of 'common good' was missing from the Byzantine vocabulary. A bad, unjust ruler was, in its view, not a tyrant but God's instrument in punishing human iniquity and as such, someone who had to be unreservedly obeyed . . . to the extent that kings bore responsibility for their actions, they were accountable to God, not to man" (13).

Russia's geography played another important factor in the birth of its lasting autocratic system. Russia by and large was not guarded by natural borders such as mountains, seas or rivers, and its territory was immense (9). As a result, excessive raids were the norm – the most famous and enduring example in early Kievan Rus' history being the Mongol invasion, which led to an age of Mongol rule over Kievan Rus' until arguably as late as 1480 (Moss 67). Consequently, the resulting territorial insecurity felt by Russian rulers led to mass militarization of every institution which did exist (Pipes 10).

Pipes goes further than only examining the origins of Russian autocracy, of course — a large portion of the text is dedicated to illustrating the unique political behaviors which led to its lasting durability. Perhaps the largest contributing factor was the lack of property rights held by the serf class. This was partially due to the expansive geography and the lack of land scarcity for the early Russian peoples (10); however, the inability to own land was also due to the ruling class's determination to bind the peasantry to the land (19). Conversely, European nations even in their earliest stage granted common peoples the rights to possess private property:

> The patrimonial state defined Russian absolutism in terms very different from those familiar in the West and more akin to those observed in the Orient. Here, rulers not only were free to legislate and tax at will, as were Philip II of Spain or Louis XIV, but confronted neither private property nor established social estates, which, by their very existence, set limits to their authority. Nor did Russia's rulers have to contend with the notion of "society" as a partner or have the church require them to rule for society's benefit. (23)

Patrimonialism, furthermore, became the favored method of rule of the Russian tsars. "You have attacked both the government and me," Pipes quotes Nicholas I to have once said, "because the government and I are one and the same; although I heard that you separate me from the government, I don't accept this" (180). While forms of democratic institutions did appear to exist even during the imperial dynasty, such as the Boyar Duma, and the Senate, these were not honest methods of checks and balances, but rather blank and empty formalities which many of the participants barely bothered to earnestly participate in (20).

Russia developed heavy nationalist sentiments particularly after the emancipation of the serfs — nationalism replaced serfdom, and this only fueled the need for an autocratic system (119). After the Polish rebellion of 1863, Russia was shaken:

> [The rebellion] was interpreted not as a legitimate effort of an ancient people to recover their independence but as Europe's assault on Russia. It contributed greatly to the emergence of an extreme nationalism and to the sense that only autocracy could preserve Russia's integrity. Such was the new conservatism: nationalistic and populist, anti-Western, frightened for Russia's future and increasingly defensive. (122)

All these elements combined, of course, with the Russian state's preexisting insecurities would create a perfect storm that would only further justify Russia's supposed need for total control in the minds of its rulers.

The Clandestine Government Behind the Kremlin Curtains

Alena Ledeneva does not provide long-winded accounts of historical explanation for Russia's political behavior. However, similar to Pipes, she explains Russian political trends concisely. Ledeneva's approach can be seen as an answer to the question that Pipes is barely short of asking: the question of Russia's inability to democratize, and the reason why Russia, year after year, continues to choose autocratic rule. Ledeneva, instead of focusing on autocracy, chooses to define this trend with the concept of *sistema. Sistema* is not something which can be defined dryly. Ledeneva writes that it can be most simply assumed as a "system of governance" (19), though Russian *sistema* is much more complex. It did not begin with the birth of the Soviet Union, or with its death. Not only is it difficult to pinpoint the historical origins of *sistema*, perhaps thanks to its elusive nature, but it is also difficult to define. However, definition or no definition, insiders of the Russian state "know an elephant" when they come across one, according to the author (19). Take, for instance, the response of one anonymous insider from Ledeneva's research:

> This is not a system that you can choose to join or not – you fall into it from the moment you are born. There are of course also mechanisms to recruit to discipline and help reduce it. In the Soviet Union, all people were corporate *(korporativnye),* nuts and bolts of the same machine, but some new features emerged in the post-Soviet period. In the Soviet Union there was more or less a consolidated state, whereas now it is impossible to disentangle the state from a network of private interests. Modern clans are complex. It is not always clear who is on top. A *kompromat* attack [leak of compromising information] can come from within the same clan. Perhaps this complexity is not a new quality after all. Perhaps it was also complex in the past, only we don't know it well so the Soviet *sistema* comes across as more consistent. (19)

Sistema defines many attributes of Russian political culture. It consists of informal governance, which is a governance that is not dictated by the rule of law, or defined clearly and transparently by solid, public institutions. The practice of informal governance is not only a gatekeeper of opportunities of power (12), but it is also a "highly personalized form of checks and balances" (217) — the informal governance keeps its actors in check, while also safekeeping the raw power it provides its beneficiaries from public scrutiny. Ledeneva asserts that said informal practices are "not automatically detrimental" (11) — while they negatively affect Russia's ability to behave as a proper democracy, they do serve their own function in Russia's political and economic development. *Sistema,* for all of its faults, glues Russia together, and is not entirely negative. Perhaps it restrains Russia from finally breaking from the chains of "pre-modernism," but *sistema* does indeed serve to glue the society together, as well as "distribute resources and ensure its own reproduction" (2).

However, the existence of *sistema* does indeed serve as a large contributor to why Russia cannot function as a democracy. Without the proper existence of checks and balances, formality, and impartial law enforcement (23), the Russian people do not have adequate liberty. Unfortunately, due to the complexities of *sistema*, it is not something which can be easily shed from the Russian political machine.

The Putin administration is not the first administration to adopt *sistema* and make it its own, and it likely will not be the last. Putin is not expressly a tsar, and Russian citizens are allowed to purchase property, choose their career, and practice religion. However, the echoes of both the Soviet Union as well as the imperialist dynasty pre-1917 are loudly heard. Instead of land being a privilege largely unattainable to the common Russian citizen, wealth is a privilege. The globalization and free market have both provided new opportunities to the ruling class to remain in power — "the key difference in Putin's *sistema* is its orientation on wealth . . . the power networks that used to be aimed at obtaining privileges have become oriented towards monetary income and capital" (248). Additionally, "favors of access" play a similar role (12). Property rights supposedly do exist, though the Putinist *sistema* causes them to "remain weak" (233).

How could a government which maintains a *sistema* such as Putin's — which only offers shaky stability on property rights at best, which rules through secret power networks, underhanded deals, and fixed elections — be seen as a democracy? It cannot, because *sistema* is not something that can exist simultaneously with a democratic government. On paper, President Putin would not admit to being an authoritarian ruler, but it is clear to his own people as well as anybody who pays close attention to the Kremlin that he is nothing less than a twenty-first century tsar.

Conclusion

While Ledeneva does not write of *sistema* being expressly a feature of autocratic rule — nor would it be classified exclusively as such — examining both her illustration of *sistema* and its nature in conjunction with Pipes's examination of autocracy is largely beneficial when viewing the problem of democratic governance in the Russian state, both historically and currently. Ledeneva emphasizes the use of informal governance and power networks, and while Pipes does not explicitly mention this factor in the ruling class, he can be seen citing an example of something similar from a time as early as the imperial dynasty:

> On ascending the throne, Alexander invited for regular consultation four friends who shared his political ideals and with whom he had frequent intimate discussions as successor to the throne until his father, Paul I, dispersed them ...the four friends used to meet for supper at the imperial palace two or three times a week and then withdraw with the tsar to a nearby salon for free-ranging discussions. The group, which came to be popularly known as the Unofficial Committee . . . followed no set agenda: subjects came up at random. (Pipes 80)

Additionally, the issue of a fraudulent appearance of democracy is reviewed in both texts. Pipes's examination of the Boyar Duma and its inability to function in the manner which it is purposed (19) can be seen explained by the "gaps" which Ledeneva lists in the introduction of her work (Ledeneva 3). The lack of property rights in imperial Russia (Pipes 10) thankfully is not an issue that explicitly persists today, but as cited earlier, Putin's *sistema* does not offer Russian citizens anything better than a "weak" version of the right to own property at best (Ledeneva 133-4).

Returning to the question of democratization, both scholars answer it differently, and perhaps viewing one or the other exclusively would only provide an incomplete view of the truth. Pipes examines the autocratic roots of Russian political culture and their lasting longevity, though he spends little time if any on the application of his findings on current Russian political behavior. Ledeneva illustrates the entirely new concept of *sistema,* the messy nature of informal governance and the "modernization trap of informality" (252) — which is how she explains

the difficulties that Russia would inevitably face if it ever did truly attempt to rise above *sistema's* restrictions.

Together, the two titles give a clearer image to those asking why Russia is unable to flourish as a democratic state. The word for "state" in Russian is *gosudarstvo*. Basic, elementary understanding of the Russian language provides the insight that Russian words are often derived from roots. It is a very fitting word: the core objective of the Russian state, as portrayed time and time again, is defined no more elaborately than by the root of the word for state itself. The state has yet to exist for the sake of its people. Its people still exist for the sake of the state. Moreover, Putin, whether he would admit to it truthfully or not, does certainly fit under the definition of a *gosudar* himself. He too has failed to exist for the sake of his people. And until the Russian people can inaugurate an administration that does not enslave them to the ever-enduring *sistema*, Russia will not be able to rise to be the democracy that its people and the Western world desire it to be.

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Deliberative Efforts Toward a Green Economy: A Case Study of Canada

Kiara Yllescas

By deconstructing Canada's current system of environmental management, improvements to current policies can be made in order to reach goals which not only meet but exceed environmental expectations provided by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Canada's Changing Climate Report (CCCR) 2019 has shown the highest rates of warming ranging from 1.7 °C to 2.3 °C since their initial report in 1948. This report from 2019 indicates that Canada is experiencing global warming at twice the rate of the 0.8 °C global average (Bush and Lemmen). Canada's nationwide audits have stated goals to cut emissions, but no detailed plans, timelines, funding or expected results have been provided. No level of government in Canada is prepared to apply these actions nor adapt to the impacts of climate change. With several targets and no initiative to reach them, it is clear that Canada's system of environmental management needs improvement. Reconstruction of communicative practices and reformation of current policies can ensure sustainability across all sectors. Through communicative changes and policy reforms, effective changes to both the economy and ecology can be reached. Deliberative polling in a networked environment lays the foundation toward representing non-human actors (non-human nature and future generations), full transparency, and sustainable goals.

Keywords: green bonds, deliberative polling, sustainable goals, UNFCCC, environmental management

Bridging Traditional and Non-traditional Methods of Communication

In order to meet the UN's goals and shift to a green economy, effective processes of communication and political reform must be employed. Canada can effectively manage these new endeavours by constructing new forms of involvement for public and private sectors to ensure engagement. Through non-traditional methods of involvement, they can ensure engagement for all in order to change patterns of political participation as it is now. In order to achieve transparency with citizens, issues regarding economic activities, transition toward renewable energy sources, and managing projects should be discussed deliberately in order to meet the Paris Agreement. Canada's commitment to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 30% below its 2005 levels is highly ambitious. In order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to the level to which they have committed, it must reach every corner of the economy. To reach every corner is to transform sectors: energy supply, industry, digital,

building, transport, food consumption, and further nature based solutions. "Achieving a 1.5 °C planet will require the fastest economic transition in history. This transformation is both necessary and achievable" (Falk & Gaffney, 2020).

In *Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance*, John Dryzek describes his four pillars of deliberative democracy which we can use to analyze the ways in which Canada's environmental management lacks the necessary framework needed to reach its targets. The four pillars are (1) Legitimacy, (2) Representation, (3) Communication and Rhetoric, and (4) Pluralism and Meta-consensus. Within citizen forums, simple fiscal sampling guarantees representativeness as it is ensured that participants can represent the population equally. This approach can also be applied to the global level, where participants must be systematically chosen. The legitimacy of the collective decision lies in the results of the subject and the consequential deliberation. By applying new forms of political communication facilitated by the federal government, meaningful discourse can be coordinated in order to discuss key challenges which Canada faces. Because the environment is a non-human actor, its disturbances must be communicated through some sort of deliberation in order to reflect on the needed reforms (Bryer 509). Cooperative reformation which considers both capital and sustainability is possible, but requires collaborative efforts on behalf of the government, businesses, and citizens (Hajer 200). By acknowledging everyone's responsibility to reduce fossil fuels, Canada can start divesting from them while investing in energy-saving technologies. This is also crucial to compliance with the UNFCCC. Through the deliberative process these policies can be restated, complied with, and protected.

Raeijmaekers and Maeseele recommend an approach that focuses on critical pluralism:

> To allow a broad democratic debate on neoliberal principles, there is an urgent need for the contestation of these principles in multiple arenas. From our analysis, only the critical pluralism-approach comes forward as able to evaluate public discourse, and media discourses in specific, on the extent to which a democratic debate on these principles is encouraged, with a legitimate expression of dissensus and different alternatives. (Raeijmaekers & Maeseele)

This approach complies with essential measures that protect and place responsibility on environmental concerns. What deliberation offers is public meetings in which participants collaborate and come to a collective decision for the public good and well-being of human and non-human actors. Through this process, transparency of the nation-state's budget should be provided in order to meet the ecological and capital goals, with the intention of providing transparency in order to sustain a non-human actor's goals with this system.

Heike Graf provides a speculative observation of both human and non-human actors. The non-human environment influences communication. Non-human actors also include the environment and the unborn humans. The future of non-human actors is under a large threat which has not properly been communicated to the public. *The Environment in the Age of the Internet: Activists, Communication, and the Digital Landscape* seeks to explain that without communicating our environment (non-human), then no knowledge of dangers such as climate change, pollution, and deforestation can be made a social concern. The non-human environment's job, in effect, is to respond to the natural disturbances caused by non-human actors. Non-human actors are unable to speak for themselves and can only communicate this way. By bringing these concerns to the forefront of communication and media, it can only then become a public and social concern (Melián). "These different perspectives (or communication systems) complicate successful communication about ecological issues, since we have to consider that every observation has structural limits. Such complication also applies to any kind of scientific observation of nature. Hence the problem of social communication as such which is that of acquiring different kinds of insights" (Luhmann). "Scholars claim that a 'new vision' able to combine all of the different insights is required to change human behavior" (Graf 15). Through deliberative democracy this centralizes environmental concerns rather than downplaying them. Approaching this social structure empirically, a new style based on

the common interest which addresses climate change could improve the relationship between society and the environment.

By providing a foundation that connects the community and the economy, there is opportunity for businesses, economists, policy makers, and people from the local to the national level to speak to the collaborative process. Changes can be made by widening the gap of communication and structuring a system of participation which allows for deliberation. The only way to achieve grand scale reduction on emissions is to open the conversation to those who contribute to the economy, which is every Canadian citizen.

The push for a grassroots deliberative process offers transparency of the township, city, state or country. By providing reliable information to citizens about the economy, future projects, and current situations, mini-publics create informed and just decisions. This process promotes interest in ongoing issues. Arguments aimed at the public good and generalized interest have the power to be more persuasive than those of self-interest. This is an important characteristic to acknowledge as this method has proven efficient to climate governance.

The radical transformation perspective is incompatible with the fact that environmental protection and economic growth can be achieved simultaneously. As suggested by Dryzek and Hajer's Cooperative Reformism, this concept considers both capitalism and sustainable goals (Bryer). The shift to a more sustainable system is a collaborative effort which requires governments, businesses, and civil society to envisage policies in order to put this into effect (Hajer). By acknowledging that everyone is responsible and has the ability to reduce fossil fuels, divestments can be made from fossil fuels and put into energy saving technologies. This ensures that environmental policies are protected. Implications of this shift consider inequalities from industrial and developing countries in order to move closer to a sustainable economy. The relationship between the communicative efforts behind economic development and environmental sustainability holds visions to an economy based on the pursuit of well-being and environmental quality (Dryzek, *Politics*).

Canada's Shortcomings on Environmental Management

The Paris Agreement is the world's first comprehensive climate treaty. This agreement prides itself in its bottom-up structure where the specific climate goals are politically encouraging rather than politically bound. Canada still falls short in many sectors as it works toward a clean and green economy. The organizing committee set a goal of limiting global warming to below 2.0-1.5 °C. This goal requires a significant decrease in emissions between 2030 and 2050. The participating 196 countries agreed by consensus to this global pact. These commitments are ambitious and could also be a historical turning point although it is a non-binding contract. This agreement will not become binding until 55 parties which produce 55% of the world's greenhouse gases have ratified the agreement. Under this agreement, each country must regularly report on its contributions to mitigate global warming. One of the aims is also making finance flows consistent toward lowering greenhouse gas emissions. This principle of common respective capabilities between governments acknowledges each country's potential and duty to climate action. The Paris conference in 2015 reaffirmed the commitment for Canada to mobilize US $100 billion a year in climate finance by 2025 ("Climate Change Canada"). Environmental liabilities are stated to be the most prominent global investment risk according to the World Economic Forum (WEF) on the 2020 report. Many government organizations around the world have invested in growing the fossil fuel divestment momentum. An example of this would be investors in 2019 which represent US$11 trillion in assets from 1100 financial institutions committing to divest from fossil fuels. By working with national partners (Advisory Council on Climate Change, Low Carbon Economy Fund, and Climate Action Incentive) steps have been implemented by the green economy in order to create sustainable solutions.

In contrast, Canadian financial institutions and the federal and provincial government have not made any advances to adjust or implement changes on fossil fuel divestment. Currently, the UNFCCC states that Canada is working toward a transition to a low-carbon economy and renewable technology. In the Trudeau administration's

second mandate there were two major initiatives regarding the petroleum sector. This would be one of the first actions with environmental initiatives made on the Trudeau administration's behalf. Although Canada's climate action plan provided by the UN is ambitious, the effort and actions are clearly contradictory. The vows for 2019-2020 include the construction of the Trans Mountain pipeline, and an offer by China for an offshore oil drilling project off the coast of Newfoundland. The recent assessment showed Newfoundland's offshore potential could exceed 50 billion barrels of oil and 200 trillion cubic feet of gas. "We expect to see at least eight wells drilled in the next year and a half, and as many as 100 over the next decade," Paul Barnes with the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers says in an interview with the Chronicle Herald (Bundale). Despite opposition to take on these developments, Trudeau states: "We made a decision to move forward on the pipeline because it was in the interest of Canada to do so, because the environment and the economy need to go together. We will be continuing with the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion" ("Trudeau Extends Olive Branch"). The Trans Mountain pipeline expansion is designed to carry approximately a million barrels of oil from Alberta to the coast of British Columbia each day. The cabinet has acknowledged the potential of environmental and marine life damage. Trudeau states that the wealth created from this investment will be used into unspecified clean energy developments. The plan to invest profits from Trans Mountain has turned to an energy infrastructure project (Tasker). This claim made by Trudeau has been highly criticized by other parties as an effort to calm down the environmental and Indigenous groups who fiercely opposed the project. Among developed countries, Canada's support in transitioning to a cleaner future is weak.

The government has not committed to the Paris treaty, rather fueling the problem itself by giving over $1.3 billion to the oil industry. Where the global public falls short in Canada's environmental management is the lack of transparency proceeding with the developments. Goals and aims of projects are never discussed to the extent to which the mini-publics can refute nor agree with enough substantial evidence. Information provided by the government is simply stated as future promises with no official planning put in place. Lack of pressure from the mini-publics is due to the ambiguity from the government. Examples of ambiguous claims made by Canada was Trudeau's statement after investing in the Trans Mountain National Pipeline. Not enough information or transparency has been shared in order for the public to form a just opinion or offer any solutions to the preceding.

The projected rate of growth from both the oil and tar sand industry prove that Canada's promises to take action on industrial pollution remain unregulated by the federal government. Some examples of this include the declining of clean energy investment in 2011 as Canada's federal government failed to renew and support renewable energy. Canada's federal government has also consistently declined support for climate change research as they are no longer funding the university-based climate research in Canada ("Climate Change Canada"). Canada is prioritizing their funds for institutional investors in order to maintain a high position on the global market. Though the economy is the foundation in the capital system, many other countries have made efforts to be sustainable.

Sweden has used political participation and is one of the strongest countries to cohere to the UN's sustainable goals. Co-managing strategies in Sweden which have incorporated deliberative elements have resolved natural resource issues and raised interest and awareness on key environmental problems. The approach includes interviews which covered personal roles, motives to participate, division of responsibilities, among many other methods to decision-making procedures. Results of this prove "deliberation is a way to produce the information required to take a collectively advantageous decision" (Zachrisson 278). By combining the scientific research of the government with ecological and practical knowledge of locals, the non-human actor can then be represented equally. Though it is important to recognize the federal government's role in climate governance, individuals and communities play an important role in the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions as well. By being as locally and ecologically aware of our towns or cities and our day-to-day actions we can be representative of the environment.

The Future of Canadian Ecology Through Deliberative Processes

Citizens must address the state of affairs in the system which is heavily reliant on capital. Using deliberative processes, current hedonistic systems also have the potential to change. One of the major contributors to greenhouse gas emissions is production. Transitions to artificial intelligence in the workplace and highly automated production lines do not support the green economy's goals; the sole interest lies in profit. Canada's reliance on input from shareholders, corporations, and investors has put pressure to make technological changes like this in order to cut labor costs without considering the sustainability of the environment, which will affect Canadian citizens. There is clear atypical construction in this transition, which is not beneficial to Canadians nor to the environment. By promoting a flexible system that supports small batch production, and higher levels of product differentiation, higher levels of skills for workers can also be achieved. This would also lessen the limited growth opportunity in workplaces. Michael Piore and Charles F. Sabel see potential that is contained with recent developments to manufacturing a sphere with flexible spatialization production. This approach offers a multiskilled workforce that owes their character to artisanal skills of old methods of craft by using small production and high levels of product differentiation that would push for controlled consumption. The second industrial divide that Piore and Sabel's theory outlines extends beyond just economic factors. This would result in new modes of regulation thus causing forms of industrial labor and social organization (Piore and Sabel).

Changing the labor production of Canada could be one of the most significant ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions while also maintaining and even creating green jobs. Cap and trade systems and carbon taxes have not been effective enough on their own. Large corporations have only gotten better at finding loopholes. These practices should be penalized, and compliance measures in Canada right now are not being taken. As we have shifted into a throw-away society due to the effects of industrialization, there must be a push for a change in social structure that can only be implemented by the government. Green bonds were introduced this past decade in order to shift to cleaner technology. Broadly defined, green bonds are a fixed-income security project in order to raise capital for environmental benefits. Solutions such as green bonds and other compliance opportunities are not offered to mini-publics. Although the advantages of this investment are strong enough for individuals to benefit, this is only offered to stakeholders and institutions (Ontario Financing Authority). Stakeholders are large, profit-maximizing investors. The investments made by stakeholders place no pressure on enacting sustainable government policy. Increasing citizen stakeholders is more efficient in that both parties benefit while additionally providing the incentive to increase sustainability.

The current structure of this financial bond is a buyout which creates loopholes in order to continue unethical and unsustainable labor practices. These bonds that Canada offers, just as carbon tax, carbon transmission bonds, and cap and trade systems, are services that can be considered greenwashing. The government broadening the tax base is the primary objective in these investments. The secondary objective is to create minimal transparency with funds so as to avoid environmental responsibility. The compulsion to comply is not nearly strong enough for any of the investors to actually implement changes to current problems. They would rather give money to the government for future solutions to clean up their own transgressions.

The underlying issue with the Canadian government and their slow transition toward a green economy lies in the fact that it continues to neglect the power that its citizens can make in order to push for change. Investments, bonds, and taxes do not prove to be ethical or genuine in the engagement of green projects. Without corresponding direct beneficiaries, it is simple to make false claims. Stakeholders can blindly partake in these efforts offered legally by the government and feel ethically safe when the opposite of development is not offered by any government official or mandate to track these funds and keep progress of these projects. If individuals could issue green bonds in order to invest in Canada's transition to clean technology, this would be a much more effective push for change. A stronger sense of responsibility will be pushed on the government in order to actually construct and make changes rather than ensuring that it is one of the projects that will be

considered. The reason it has not received enough pressure is because institutions have the funds to invest in order to feel ethically responsible while still being secure that they will be compensated in the end. These offers are loopholes of compliance measures. Stated under the Green Bond Principles is voluntary transparency. Issuers may seek external review in order to promote integrity but are not expected to provide full disclosure (Green Bond Principles).

The framework can very simply be reworked through communicative processes which openly discuss budgeting for future green projects, rather than leaving the mini-publics out of the opportunity to invest. Raddi Annab explains, "Corporations have been investing and issuing green bonds to be socially responsible, but also because they recognize that it's very appealing to the young generation and it drives customer loyalty because younger generations really care about climate change" (Saldanha).

The Bank of Canada has expressed climate change presenting risks to the financial sector. Subsidies of investors and the government are a clear indicator of where the priorities lie:

- Export Development Canada (EDC) invested 12 times more in oil and gas from 2012 to 2017.
- Within the first two years of the Trudeau administration, EDC spent $22.4 billion on oil and gas investment, which is $2 billion more than was spent on these sectors during the final two years of the Harper government.
- From 2013 to 2017, EDC invested $4.4 billion in companies involved in oil sands expansion and transportation ("Climate Change Canada").

While many suggestions for local and government frameworks have been provided in order to transition to the green economy, Canada is in a fragile position amidst global competition. Solutions in order to achieve the green economy are outlined by the UNFCCC, but measures have yet to be implemented by the government. By keeping things institutional and private, it prevents citizens from taking steps toward a cleaner future as well.

Conclusion

Moving forward with social, political, and technological changes puts a strain on ethical and social responsibility on higher forms of government. Pushing for environmental responsiblility in order to pursue these projects as they were already disclosed with the public in Canada is only possible with engaged public awareness, consistent discourse, and deliberation. This ensures that plans concerning environmental and sustainable goals are met. The relationship of the public and private should be held at the forefront of the environmental movement in order for Canada to comply with the shift toward a green economy and clean future. Environmental sustainability can lead Canada to an economy which is based on the pursuit of well-being and environmental equality. It is Canada's duty to make sure that human and non-human actors are being considered in civil conversation with full disclosure of the preceding plans. Non-human actors like the environment have the ability to cause disruptions and disturbances that require immediate change to polity and social reformation. It goes without saying that this will also force complete transparency as shifts toward newer and sustainable energies, changed labor practices, and large investments need to be made in order to proceed with these actions accordingly. Concerning itself with mini and global publics is crucial to this transition. Deliberative polling processes should be implemented in order to discuss further solutions and have informational discussions with scientific research from the government of Canada, and ecological knowledge from citizens who will ultimately be directly affected by these transitions.

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Investigating Differences in Academic Intrinsic, Extrinsic, and Amotivation Among Children of Immigrant Parents

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College students in the US often experience a pressure to succeed brought on by their unique intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. However, is there a possible connection between these academic motivations and having an immigrant parent? To determine if differences exist in intrinsic, extrinsic, and amotivation among children of immigrant parents (CIPs), I employed a 28-item survey adapted from the Academic Motivation Scale (AMS). I analyzed survey data collected from 183 undergraduate students at the University of Texas at Arlington using three chi-square tests of independence comparing the three types of motivation in CIPs and non-CIPs and a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) assessing average scores across types of motivation. Results showed no relationship exists between types of academic motivation and CIP status, but extrinsic motivation scores were significantly higher across all college students. Future studies are needed to examine other factors that may influence academic motivations.

Keywords: academic motivation, intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, amotivation, children of immigrant parents (CIPs).

From my personal experience as a child of Asian immigrants in the US, there is a unique kind of academic motivation brought on by the pressure to take advantage of the academic opportunities my parents never had. Although this is not an openly discussed experience among my peers, many Asian students encounter a "model minority" stereotype that depicts Asians as hardworking, intelligent, and reserved – which can challenge well-being and limit adolescents' identity formation (Thompson et al. 108). When attempting to understand why this experience exists for myself, the common denominator among many students, regardless of ethnicity, could be having immigrant parents. There may be an untapped shared immigrant parent experience that affects college students. Parenting styles may differ based on cultural differences in the value of education, which may affect the motivations of many college students and in turn their academic performance.

In this study, I will investigate the differences in motivation in children of immigrant parents (CIPs) to determine if there are empirical data to support the possible effects of a shared experience. Through data collection, I will evaluate the relationships between whether a student is a child of an immigrant parent and their intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, and amotivation. Intrinsic motivation can be defined as a want to know,

accomplish things, and experience stimulation for personal fulfillment. Extrinsic motivation is motivation to earn an award, praise, or other external reasons. Lastly, amotivation is a complete lack of motivation to complete any task ("The AMS" 1004).

This study will contribute to the body of knowledge concerning the possible relationships between immigrant families and academic motivation. This research is of critical importance now as slightly more than half of all undergraduate college students in the United States are first-generation students, meaning that the students' parents did not have a bachelor's degree (RTI International 1). Many of these first-generation students come from immigrant families across all ethnicities. If this is more understood, then we can develop programs aimed at accounting for the lack of certain motivations in CIPs and non-CIPs.

Previous research has been conducted on academic motivation and cultural identity among CIPs. Urdan and Munoz utilized surveys, implicit association tests, and interviews with 94 college undergraduates who were either CIPs or non-CIPs to determine an association between cultural identity and academic motivation (247). Results showed that CIPs with a strong and positive cultural identity had some motivational benefits and few costs (Urdan and Munoz 247). The study provides a basis for the investigation on whether just being a CIP, regardless of the degree to which an individual identifies with it, may affect academic motivation.

Another study employed survey data and university records of 998 college undergraduates to determine possible relationships between family interdependence and academic adjustment, motivation, and achievement (Tseng 966). Across all ethnic groups, CIPs placed a greater emphasis on family interdependence, which can be defined as emotional, financial, and instrumental support to family members (Tseng 966). Furthermore, Tseng found that this increase in family interdependence was related to increased academic motivation but a decrease in achievement due to greater behavioral demands (966). Such results suggest that having an immigrant family can affect an individual's academic motivation. From these findings and the previous study, this research can determine if academic motivation is a function of immigrant parent status.

Without a doubt, parents have a significant influence on the development of their children. In an interview-based study on 451 young (ages 6-11) and diverse students, the researchers found that children from immigrant backgrounds develop their centrality (the extent to which they define themselves in terms of ethnicity) and private regard (evaluative beliefs about their ethnicity) based on their parents' racial socialization, or their parents' display of the behaviors, perceptions, values, and beliefs of their ethnic group (Gillen-O'Neel et al. 1470). Additionally, this study found that minority children reported higher levels of intrinsic motivation than their European American peers while accompanied by higher academic anxiety (Gillen-O'Neel et al. 1470). The presence of such findings in a young population may foreshadow that this identity formation and differences in intrinsic motivation may be present at an older age, as it began so early in their academic careers.

Based on the results from the Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire (MSLQ) and a collection of backgrounds and grades of 650 tenth grade students, Blom and Severiens found that there were significant differences between nonimmigrant and immigrant girls' self-regulated deep learning (complex understanding and engagement in critical thinking of knowledge) and surface learning (factual and superficial knowledge) (41). The article states that the differences in the way students learn and their underlying motivational attitudes were influenced by their backgrounds (Blom and Severiens 41). Things such as aspiring for more than their parents' social status, wanting a better job, or support of family values, all factor into the learning of an individual (Blom and Severiens 41). From this, it is reasonable to suggest that college students may exhibit the same differences in academic motivation if one or more of their parents is an immigrant.

In research conducted by Mwangi, Daoud, English, and Griffen, students' academic motivation was seen to be a function of their family's ethnicity and nativity (Mwangi et al. 479). This research also found that parental support could predict the academic goal orientations of students (Mwangi et al. 479). Although this may seem strictly related to extrinsic motivation, the researchers identified that students with immigrant parents had

internalized their parents' ideas of success in the United States (Mwangi et al. 479). In turn, these students have a higher tendency toward motivation to please their family. As evidenced by this study, the influence of parental guidance is significant as it may change the source of students' intrinsic motivation. Since this finding was seen in Black college students with immigrant parents, it can be hypothesized that intrinsic motivation scores for students with at least one immigrant parent would differ from those without immigrant parents.

To hypothesize regarding the differences in extrinsic motivation in a college-aged population, one must look at the existing research on motivations for millennials. Henstra and McGowan reviewed the personal statements of 40 graduate students in order to determine millennials' motivation to pursue a career in public services (490). From their review, some of the key motivating factors they found were salary, job security, opportunity for advancement, or flexible work hours (Henstra and McGowan 490). However, they also found equal motivations to pursue a public service career due to an attraction to public policy making, commitment to civic duty and the public interest, compassion, and self-sacrifice (Henstra and McGowan 490). From this study, it seems that these college students were motivated to attend graduate school for equal reasons of passion and practicality. Although the researchers did not collect data on immigrant parent status, this study provides evidence that many students aspire to continue school for both intrinsic and extrinsic reasons. This suggests that we may see similar motivations among the college-aged population tested in this study.

Although students may come from a family or culture which emphasizes the importance of education, this does not always result in an intrinsic motivation, but may in fact create the opposite. In their two experimental studies on Chinese students concerning their intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, Wang et al. state that emphasis on achievement and high standards imposed by Chinese parents resulted in students' relying on extrinsic motivations such as grades to maintain their interest in school (105). It is possible that immigrant parents' overemphasis on the importance of success in education creates extrinsic motivation in their child. Although this is not necessarily a negative consequence, it does show that parental influence can change the way students view their education. Although the researchers do not mention if these students had at least one immigrant parent, the possibilities are high due to their ethnicity. From this, we can hypothesize that having immigrant parents could lead to significant differences in extrinsic motivation as well.

Another age group to consider is middle school-aged children. Unrau and Schlackman investigated the effects of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on reading achievement for urban middle school students (81). In a multiple-groups structural equation modeling (SEM) analysis of ethnicity, gender, grade level, intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, and reading achievement, Asian and Hispanic students had significant intrinsic and extrinsic motivation scores for reading achievement (Unrau and Schlackman 81). Since the studies of Unrau and Schlackman and Wang et al. regarding middle school students indicate that Asians and Hispanics have both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, we can hypothesize that CIPs may have significantly different levels of these academic motivations compared to other college students (81;105). Unrau and Schlackman explain that sociocultural processes within schools may contribute to a more accurate explanation of differences in minority student performance (81). Despite a lack of indication of immigrant parent status, the possible connection to sociocultural influences and CIP status allows us to hypothesize that the academic motivations of students with immigrant parents may be significantly different than their non-CIP counterparts.

Based on the literature review and evidence shown for the possibility of CIPs to exhibit significantly different levels of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, I hypothesize that students with an immigrant parent would show significantly different scores in amotivation as well compared to their counterparts. From the ratings of 51 Chinese fifth-graders about their mothers' parenting and school motivation, Cheung and McBride-Chang came to the conclusion that repeated comparison of their own children's examination results with those of their better-performing classmates was associated with amotivation and extrinsic motivation (1). In contrast, practices such as parental involvement and vigilance over schoolwork were related to children's intrinsic motivation to learn in

school (Cheung and McBride-Chang 1). This study provides evidence that parenting affects motivation levels in students. It is not explicitly mentioned if the students had at least one immigrant parent, but the non-American influenced ideals projected onto the Chinese children can be compared to the CIP parenting style. From this, it can be assumed that there will be significant differences in the amotivation of students with immigrant parents.

The participants of the study were a sample of 183 undergraduate students (39 males, 144 females) from the University of Texas at Arlington recruited through SONA, the Student Research Participation website. Participants voluntarily signed up to partake in the study after reading a brief description, then proceeded to answer the questions provided. All responses were de-identified to maintain anonymity. Neither gender, race, ethnicity, classification, nor CIP status were factored into participant selection, and those who completed the survey received 0.50 SONA credits as compensation for their efforts.

In an online version of the survey, participants first completed an informed consent page where they were led to believe the study was about the processes underlying why undergraduate students chose to attend college. However, in the debrief it was explained that the true purpose of the study was to evaluate relationships between academic intrinsic, extrinsic, and amotivation and whether a student is a child of an immigrant parent. The true purpose of the study was withheld so that participants' responses to the survey questions were spontaneous and not influenced by having this information.

Following the informed consent page, prompts guided participants to fill out demographic questions including gender (Male, Female), race/ethnicity (White, Black or African American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, Other), classification (Freshman, Sophomore, Junior, Senior), and whether one or more of the student's biological parents is an immigrant (Yes, Maybe, No).

Then, the participants completed questions measuring academic intrinsic, extrinsic, and amotivation adapted from the Academic Motivation Scale (AMS) ("AMS-C 28" 1). The scale is originally composed of 28-item seven-point Likert scales measuring intrinsic, extrinsic, and amotivation; it has high internal and external consistency and is a widely-used measure for motivation (Javaeed et al. 1). In this study, all 28 questions were included in the survey.

Each question had a statement for the participant to answer on a Likert scale from 1 ("Does Not Correspond at All") to 7 ("Corresponds Exactly"). For example, questions 2, 9, 16, and 23 measured the intrinsic motivation "to know." Question 2 was, "Because I experience pleasure and satisfaction while learning new things." Question 9 was, "For the pleasure I experience when I discover new things never seen before." Question 16 was, "For the pleasure that I experience in broadening my knowledge about subjects which appeal to me." Question 23 was, "Because my studies allow me to continue to learn about many things that interest me."

Due to the large required sample size and the extension of online instruction into the Spring 2021 semester, the study took place entirely online. The SONA website directed participants to QuestionPro. After completing the survey questions, a debriefing statement appeared, at which point the participants had the opportunity to opt-out of allowing the use of their data once they learned of the study's true purpose. If participants indicated their consent to the use of their data, responses were recorded anonymously and stored in QuestionPro, following which the participants were dismissed. If participants chose to withdraw their data, the survey was automatically terminated and all responses were deleted. There were no penalties or negative consequences for them if they withdrew from the study. Even if they withdrew from the study, they were still entitled to 0.50 SONA credits. Participation took approximately 5 minutes; all participants received compensation in the form of 0.50 SONA credits, which were automatically delivered upon completion. The data from all participants were then compiled and entered into SPSS for testing. IBM SPSS Release 27.0.0.0 was used to analyze the data collected.

A total of 183 undergraduate students were included in this study and, among them, 144 (78.7%) were females, and 39 (21.3%) were males. Student ethnicities varied, with 75 (41%) White, 47 (25.7%) Asian, 31 (16.9%) Other, 23 (12.6%) Black, and 7 (3.8%) American Indian or Alaskan Native. There were 81 (44.3%) Freshman in the

sample, 45 (24.6%) Sophomores, 35 (19.1%) Juniors, and 22 (12%) Seniors. When asked if one or more of their biological parents are immigrants, student responses were relatively equal, with 89 (48.6%) students answering "Yes", 6 (3.3%) answering "Maybe", and 88 (48.1%) answering "No".

To test the hypothesis that differences in intrinsic motivation exists for students with differing immigrant parent status (Yes, $\mu = 4.27$, $\sigma = 1.23$, Maybe, $\mu = 4.43$, $\sigma = 1.35$, No, $\mu = 4.32$, $\sigma = 1.26$), a chi-square test of independence was used. A significant difference was not found, $\chi 2$ (116, N = 183) = 94.03, p = 0.93, V = 0.51. This does not support the hypothesis that differences in intrinsic motivation exist for students with differing immigrant parent status (see Figure 1).



Figure 1.

To test the hypothesis that differences in extrinsic motivation exists for students with differing immigrant parent status (Yes, $\mu = 5.49$, $\sigma = 0.87$, Maybe, $\mu = 5.10$, $\sigma = 0.76$, No, $\mu = 5.14$, $\sigma = 1.10$), a chi-square test of independence was used. A significant difference was not found, $\chi 2$ (98, N = 183) = 81.17, p = 0.89, V = 0.47. This does not support the hypothesis that differences in extrinsic motivation exist for students with differing immigrant parent status (see Figure 2).



Figure 2.

To test the hypothesis that differences in amotivation exists for students with differing immigrant parent status (Yes, $\mu = 2.32$, $\sigma = 1.40$, Maybe, $\mu = 2.46$, $\sigma = 1.04$, No, $\mu = 2.00$, $\sigma = 1.12$), a chi-square test of independence was used. A significant difference was not found, $\chi 2$ (42, N = 183) = 38.33, p = 0.63, V = 0.32. This does not

support the hypothesis that differences in amotivation exist for students with differing immigrant parent status (see Figure 3).



Figure 3.

To assess differences in average academic motivation scores across types of motivation (intrinsic, extrinsic, or amotivation), a one-way randomized analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used. Significant differences were revealed by the ANOVA, F (2, 6) = 194.44, MSE = 0.04, p ≈ 0.00, $\eta 2$= 0.99. This supports the hypothesis that average academic motivation scores differ based on the type of motivation. Bonferroni post-hocs showed that specifically, average academic motivation scores for extrinsic motivation (M = 5.24, SE = 0.11) were significantly higher than those for intrinsic motivation (M = 4.34, SE = 0.11) and amotivation (M = 2.26, SE = 0.11). Also, average academic motivation scores for intrinsic motivation were significantly higher than those for amotivation. This suggests that for this sample, academic motivation scores were significantly affected by type of motivation (see Figure 4).



Figure 4.

The goal of this study was to bridge the gap between types of motivations in CIPs to develop a more accurate understanding of how the immigrant parent experience may influence academic success. The current sample of college students and how they compare to relevant literature may help in understanding how differences in types of motivation contribute to students' perspectives on education, and how that affects their performance in school.

The sample we collected supported none of our three hypotheses. However, significance was found for

motivation scores based on the type of motivation. The significance for the comparison of average motivation scores across types suggests that college students have significantly different levels of intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, and amotivation in regard to academics. More specifically, the sampled college students have significantly higher extrinsic motivation scores in comparison to intrinsic motivation and amotivation scores. This supports previous research that students have similar reasons and motivations for attending college (Henstra and McGowan 490).

In this study, data collection involved self-report surveys from college students that were recruited through UTA's online participant pool, SONA. As all data were collected from college students, the age range and education level were limited for this study. Although beneficial for applying this information to college populations, this limits the ability to apply this research to the general population. The survey aspect also limited the study in that participants may have altered their true answers to socially desirable ones due to the social desirability bias, thus skewing the data and the results obtained. The online format of the survey also potentially limited the accuracy of the data received, as a lack of supervision while completing the survey could have contributed to participants quickly reading through the survey and not giving their true answers. This is evidenced as the estimated amount of time to complete the survey was 30 minutes, but the actual average completion time was 5 minutes, which is not sufficient time to answer 28 Likert scale questions accurately.

For all hypotheses, the current sample appears to be significantly inconsistent with the expectations based on previous research. This implies that extrinsic, intrinsic, and amotivation may not be interconnected with immigrant parent status, and this study can serve as the foundation for further research. In the future, correlational research can be conducted on these variables to see if there is a relationship between one independent variable and academic performance, whether the student is an immigrant, or whether family members other than parents were immigrants. From this, researchers can explore using analysis of variance tests to experiment with multiple variables simultaneously.

To account for the demographic and age limitations of this study, future studies may advertise the survey in off-campus areas with varying demographics such as local dining areas, libraries, and coffee shops. The social desirability bias can be accounted for by assuring the participant that their answers will be kept confidential before they complete the survey, which may increase the likelihood of the participant responding truthfully. Also, offering monetary compensation or converting the online survey into a paper form with researcher supervision during completion can increase the accuracy of survey answers. Attention check questions inserted into the survey could also be a useful tool in determining which participants took a reasonable amount of time to complete the survey accurately. Additionally, the survey data collected in this study regarding participants' gender, ethnicity, and classification can be used for further analysis in possible reasons behind differing academic motivations.

Overall, this study aimed to examine how academic extrinsic, intrinsic, and amotivation in college students could be a function of immigrant parent status. Significance was not found for all types of motivation for students who do have, might have, or do not have immigrant parents, but differences were found in the average scores of different types of motivation across all college students sampled. This research contributes to the body of knowledge concerning types of motivations in college students and provides a basis for further study concerning possible connections to academic motivations such as immigrant parent status, gender, ethnicity, classification, and more. From this, researchers can determine what other internal or external factors contribute to students' academic motivations.

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Power in International Human Rights

Gage Martinez

There are immediate difficulties presented by human rights internationally, such as how to conceptualize and enforce them. Upon both a conceptual analysis of human rights and a review of their usage in practical application, the noble picture painted by human rights is unfortunately sullied. By using a three-dimensional view of power, I argue that the very concept of human rights is warped by power relations and ultimately reflective of the imbalances between nations. Furthermore, I reveal a distinction between the influence of political interests and of business interests in the application of human rights. Ultimately, even human rights, a concept that is designed to be equal, all too often becomes a tool to produce inequalities and domination.

Keywords: human rights, power, international law, rights, ethics, philosophy

Following World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 codified human rights across the globe. The legacy of human rights in international law, however, raises many doubts as to the true universality of its application. At the end of the day, even what are supposed to be the most equal, fundamental rights are affected by power relations. There are obvious biases on the surface of international human rights, namely selective enforcement, which is a problem itself, but it can also be analyzed to show a deeper underlying problem. Steven Lukes' "three-dimensional power" is indispensable in revealing this. Under a three-dimensional conception of power, one must not only look at which groups are accused of human rights violations and which groups are not, but also look at the power structures that determine which human rights are protected in the first place.

Let's begin with an overview of Lukes' three-dimensional power. Power is sectioned into three different tiers with increasingly subtle influence. The first dimension is the obvious sense of power; there is a clear situation in which A can force B to do something through observable decisions (Lukes 17). Second dimensional power expands to take into account non-decision making as well; what is both done and not done (in other words, what is intentionally ignored) can be demonstrations of power (Lukes 22). This second dimension of power in particular describes the manipulation of what issues are considered, by giving them attention and credence or not. However, both decisions and non-decisions are taken to be conscious choices and both first and second dimensional power only looks at observable conflict. The third dimension of power is the manipulation of preference so as to never allow certain issues to be considered in the first place (or only allow them to be considered in particular ways). This can be exercised through societal norms, economic relations, or historical circumstances rather than the

decisions of individual agents (Lukes 28). There are more aspects of each dimension, but these are the relevant senses for this discussion.

Historically, human rights only arose in the form we understand around the mid-20th century. In a very reductive way, they could be summarized as natural rights' application to international law. This means that human rights are the fundamental rights afforded to all people and are inalienable. To get a sense for it, here are some rights that were listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948: the right to life, liberty, security, freedom of movement, work, governmental representation, free education, and health. To this day, there is much debate over which rights are human rights as well as the breadth to which they extend.

Human rights have served primarily to give a foundation for international law. Subsequently there is a large body of law dealing directly with human rights and how they are upheld by various international institutions through declarations and conventions. The difference between these two concepts lies in the degree to which they are binding. Declarations, like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, have no enforcement power but are frequently used as a guide by all nations to make claims about human rights. The degree to which declarations are respected by a nation varies, mostly in accordance with how well the nation can get away with violating them. Conventions are the legally binding documents that are much more tightly written and focus on specific rights, such as freedom from torture or slavery. Most are under the purview of the UN, and in the rare case they actually go into effect, the International Court of Justice has jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction is an important one, particularly regarding universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction claims that any court can prosecute violations of international law; for example Nigeria's court could prosecute Israeli leaders for human rights violations if there was universal jurisdiction. We will return to universal jurisdiction when analyzing power.

It should not come as a great surprise that there are biases in the application of international law, particularly when it comes to human rights. If one looks, it is easy to find clear discrepancies in who gets punished for human rights violations and who does not. These will be demonstrations of the second dimension of power in play. The primary Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) in matters of international human rights is the Human Rights Watch (HRW). HRW acts as a sort of beacon that illuminates human rights violations. It has no power of enforcement itself, but nations around the world look to HRW for information regarding the abuses of human rights that occur around the globe. The funding of HRW should hint at what gets highlighted and what does not. In 2009, out of the $44 million in public donations they received, nearly 75% of their donations came from North America, nearly 25% from Western Europe, with the remaining 1% being from the rest of the world. Perhaps as a result of this, the HRW has been accused of "[furthering] capitalist values and [discrediting] governments seeking socialist alternatives" (Leech). A shining example is their claim that Venezuela under Hugo Chavez was "the most abusive nation" in Latin America, releasing an extensive report greatly overstating the human rights abuses. Colombia, on the other hand, has such a gross record that there is no conceivable competition between them and Venezuela under Chavez. There is little doubt that this helped lead to the sanctions that have ravaged Venezuela since then.

Perhaps the worse issue is when human rights violations are recognized but conveniently ignored. There is a saddeningly large pool of examples to pull from. Saudi Arabia has a notably poor history of human rights overall, but there is a fine example from recent memory. I am referring to the assassination of the journalist and outspoken critic of the Saudi royal family, Jamal Khashoggi, by the Saudi government. The response of the international community was that of nearly universal condemnation, and yet there were no attempts to put any international law into effect. One would expect that openly assassinating dissidents would motivate embargoes, sanctions, or at least some form of indirect punishment. The actual result is to the contrary. The Trump administration began sharing sensitive nuclear data with Saudi Arabia just sixteen days after the assassination; furthermore, President Trump vetoed three bills aimed at suspending an $8.1 billion arms deal with them. Canada's government stated that it would suspend its pending $13 billion deal, but has since proceeded with it.

Human rights abuses are willingly ignored when it is in the interest of powerful nations to do so, as with the Saudi arms deal and countless others, and are exaggerated when a nation falls out of line with the Western hegemon, as with Venezuela. To be clear, this is not just in the case of the power of western nations. Other nations with power have exercised human rights in this manner as well, as seen in the UN during the Cold War for example. During the 1970s and 80s, Israel, Chile, and apartheid South Africa gained their rightful status as pariah states. In an analysis of time spent in the UN General Assembly from 1955 to 1988 discussing human rights, these three states virtually dominated discussion. Almost entirely absent from the discussion were the Soviet allied nations, such as Poland and Afghanistan. Similarly absent was any discussion of the atrocities being committed in East Timor by Indonesia, which was backed by western power, as well as other western allied regimes. The force with more power and influence at the UN at the time, be it US or Soviet allies, determined the human rights abuses which were brought into focus. And indeed the US and USSR in particular were "among the most biased of all countries in the United Nations when it [came] to human rights" (Donnelly 299). And accordingly, those nations which had little power but great prestige, such as the Netherlands, showed a much more even record in addressing human rights.

When it comes to powerful nations, it is clear that the usage of human rights either in rhetoric or enforcement is more a tool for national interests than any actual commitment to the rights themselves. Reading an address by the former Secretary of State under the Clinton administration, Madeleine Albright, highlights this in a stark manner. She lambasts Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq for refusing to "sell oil to buy food" (Albright 599). She continues to criticize the regime for investing in "residential and infrastructure projects that benefit a very few." This is all part of a call to enforce international human rights law. And indeed, in her view international law was designed to "one day defeat communism and promote democratic values and respect for human rights around the world." It would appear that Iraq only came under fire from the Clinton administration as a result of being a target of US power, not because of any legitimate reverence for human rights.

Thus far these have all been demonstrations of second dimensional power. Third dimensional power, however, is even more manipulative. The third dimension of power allows those in power to determine what rights are human rights at all. This is a subtle, but massively important ability. There is a hint given in Albright's line about "democratic values." This is significant because it is not just making a claim about which nation violated human rights or not, it makes a fundamental value judgment about rights themselves. Noam Chomsky reveals a way to decode this. "Democracy has an official meaning which is something like [the public running their own affairs]," but the meaning that is commonly used is quite different. "Something is democracy if it is run by the business classes" (Chomsky 66). The idea behind this is that, in rhetoric, the West is synonymous with democracy, and it is democracy that economically strong western nations spread throughout the world. That is an idealistic portrayal of international affairs, to say the least. A more realistic idea is that these nations are, due to their economic systems, dominated by business interests, and therefore those interests extend to international policy. What is being spread is not democracy, but economic power.

There have only been a handful of nations that have enacted universal jurisdiction, and the list says a lot. It is almost solely composed of the economically dominant western nations. One notable exception is Malaysia, who tried the architects of the Iraq war *in absentia* and convicted many of them. They then referred their decision to the International Court of Justice where it was completely ignored. Malaysia's attempt to hold George W. Bush and Tony Blair accountable for their real war crimes was an almost comically vain effort; that should say something about the power of western nations internationally.

It is clear that the bias in the definition of human rights has its underpinnings in economic power, but how is that manifested? First we must consider the Second Bill of Rights, proposed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1944. It enumerated economic rights, such as the right to employment, to housing, to healthcare, to education and more. Those rights are all but alien to an American now. It is a generalization, but the extent to which economic

and social rights are recognized as human rights largely depends on the strength of the "democracy." Democracy here means, as Chomsky put it, a government "run by the business class." This is reflected in international policy as well. The US, along with most western nations, are concerned primarily with promoting "civil and political rights," and refuse to recognize the "requirement of governments to guarantee . . . social and economic rights" (Leech). As discussed before, there is little concern with civil and political rights either, and when there is, there is bias towards certain elements over others: for example, racial discrimination more than political censorship (Donnelly 285). The mere fact that economic and social rights, despite being more fundamental than civil and political ones, are not often elevated to the level of human rights is a haunting exercise of third dimensional power. If the right to healthcare were taken as seriously as, say, freedom from racial discrimination, it is not hard to imagine what sort of reaction the international community would have to the US medical system. Similarly, if the right to employment was a serious international concern, virtually every nation on the planet, particularly the powerful capitalist nations, would be horrific violators of human rights. In the realm of economic rights the powerful nations would be as guilty as any other nation. In terms of civil and political rights, yes, powerful nations often ignore their own violations yet punish those same violations in other countries. However the less powerful nations have much worse records on those rights. The problem is not that the less powerful nations are being held accountable, but that they are being held accountable unequally. For social and economic rights, no one is being held accountable at all on an international scale. That is third dimensional power.

This three-dimensional approach to power is important when considering international politics. The differences between the second and third dimensions can lead one to very different conclusions. In the second dimension, power is exerted by powerful political entities in matters of civil or political rights. The conflict is direct, though it has its subversions. The interests violated are, accordingly, political or civil ones. The third dimension changes the dynamic. Power is exerted by business interests in matters of social and economic rights. And if social and economic rights are wholesale ignored or denied, there is no justice involving them. Furthermore, these business interests drive most political interests, at least for powerful capitalist nations such as the US. In the third dimension as well, it is the general populace who are having power exerted on them by the dominant business class, instead of one state by another in second dimensional power.

The obvious conclusion to be drawn here is the recognition of the absurd power of business interests, as well as a need for increased awareness of economic rights. Power operates in insidious ways; its strength comes from its secrecy. Once revealed, however, systems and attitudes can change with surprising rapidity. Though that itself is the challenge: if this malignant influence on human rights is shown, toppling it should prove to be a doable task.

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Public Opinion, Propaganda, Conspiracy Theories, and Education: An Interview with Dr. Andrew M. Clark

Dr. Yubraj Aryal

***Dr. Andrew M. Clark**, Associate Director of the Center for Research on Teaching and Learning Excellence (CRTLE) and Associate Professor in the Department of Communication at UTA, was interviewed by* Global Insight *Executive Editor, Dr. Yubraj Aryal.*

Y. A.: By drawing on your many decades of combined experience with communication students, observing their maturation into communicative practice in academic contexts, could you tell me some of the essential values of communication education?

A. C.: We offer our students opportunities in Communication Studies and in the Mass Communication areas such as Advertising, Public Relations, Broadcasting, Journalism and Communication Technology. What we do is empower our students to use a variety of tools to both evaluate effective communicative practices and to engage in effective communicative practices in many different contexts and across many different platforms. We help our students to understand their audience and to develop robust content that reaches that audience on a variety of levels. Our students go into careers such as sales, training and development, research, journalism, reporting, videography and editing, web design, social media marketing and so much more. I hope that as they embark on their careers, they do so being proficient with the needed technical skills, but also having developed valuable life skills that make them not only better communicators, but better people.

Y. A.: After the recent explosion of conspiracy theories, what kind of tension are you experiencing in the teaching of the liberal arts education and research?

A. C.: There are plenty of hot button issues and plenty of opinions about those issues. On a college campus they can be about major issues such as conspiracy theories about COVID and about vaccinations, but there are also campus conspiracy theories among students such as about parking on campus. They are obviously extremes on a spectrum, but the lessons are similar. When I teach broadcast news my concern is that students be able to produce a news story that is balanced and enables both perspectives. This involves research, writing, and editing among other skills. I know that I have students in my class that have strong opinions and the challenge is to get

them to write in such a way that they're reporting the facts of the story without injecting their own opinion into it. It is hard to put together a story when you feel strongly about an issue. It is hard to ensure that differing sides of the equation are represented and where the goal is not to produce something that aligns with your ideas, but that lets the viewer make their decision based on the information you present. These are life lessons as well.

Y. A.: We're living in an age where public opinions have completely swerved either too far-right or too far-left. How do you want to encourage our undergraduates to form only evidence-based independent opinions/knowledge about the world we live in?

A. C.: It's hard because we all have opinions shaped by our background, our culture, our beliefs, and so on. What I think the challenge is, is to understand each other and instead of judging each other because you think differently from me but try and understand why you think the way that you do. We label people and if you believe one thing you're labeled this and if you believe something else you're labeled that, and labeling can be very destructive. It also strips us of our individuality and instead lumps us as part of a group. It takes time to learn about someone and to try and understand them, even a little. I think as educators we can develop lessons and assignments that teach how to sort fact from fiction, and how to evaluate a message. However, I think even more important is to find ways to teach respect and to model that behavior ourselves by what we say and do. We must develop lessons that give students the opportunity to work with people different from themselves and encourage respect for other people even if we do not always agree.

Y. A.: Since you also co-direct the CRTLE at UTA, how does your Center benefit our undergraduates?

A. C.: CRTLE's primary focus is on faculty with some programs for graduate students. However, undergraduate students benefit because, as we help faculty develop and become successful in their teaching, then students reap the benefits in the classes that they take. In short, I hope that faculty success leads to student success.

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Elizabeth Kilkenny obtained a BBA in International Business (Russian) from UT Arlington on scholarship. She volunteered in Russia with Allies in Youth Development and was a member of the Russian Culture Society. Elizabeth pivoted to working as a Cable Installer, then as a Software Engineer, before being awarded an Erasmus Mundus Scholarship for her Master in Security, Intelligence, and Strategic Studies from the University of Glasgow, Dublin City University, and Univerzita Karlova. During this period, she interned as a Visiting Researcher at ETH Zürich's Center for Security Studies, and began training aerial circus.

Elizabeth spoke at BSides Las Vegas 2019 – 'Satellite Vulnerabilities 101' – and subsequently joined Aerospace Village as a Core Volunteer. Nowadays, Elizabeth is pursuing a Computer Science Master at UT Austin, and is a Security Consultant. In her free time she continues to improve her research, hacking, and circus skills, and spends time with her spouse and cats.

Gage Martinez

Gage Martinez is a senior at The University of Texas at Arlington pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy with minors in History and English. He is currently developing an undergraduate thesis investigating problems in the application of normative ethical theories. Independently he enjoys studying the Japanese language and culture, various volunteer work, and fishkeeping. After graduation he plans on participating in the National Civilian Community Corps (NCCC) AmeriCorp program.

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Natasha Pooran received an Honors Bachelor of Science in Psychology and a Minor in Neuroscience from The University of Texas at Arlington in May of 2021. Her undergraduate research experience included being a Research Assistant to Dr. Jared Kenworthy and Dr. Paul Paulus for 2 years and completing an Honors thesis during her senior year. Her current research interests include exploring the influence of intra-individual differences on education and mental disorders in under-served minority populations. Currently, Natasha is gaining clinical and research experience as a psych technician at a nonprofit mental health clinic called The Telos Project in Fort Worth, Texas. She plans to apply to Clinical Psychology Ph.D. programs in the Fall. In her free time, she loves volunteering with Crisis Text Line and spending time with family and friends.

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Emmalee Valentine is an undergraduate student at The University of Texas at Arlington. She is currently pursuing an Honors Bachelor of Arts in History and a Bachelor of Arts in Critical Languages and International Studies, with a specialization in Russian. She is also pursuing a minor in Pre-Law, as one of the 2021-2022 recipients of the Wayne Watts Scholarship For Aspiring Lawyers. She is a member of the Phi Kappa Phi Honors Society, and is currently serving as the President of the Russian Culture Society. In her free time, she enjoys horseback riding, sketching, reading, and spending time with family

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Kiara Yllescas has a BA in English and Critical Communications with a Spanish Minor and Digital Media Concentration from Wilfrid Laurier University. During her third year of University her independent study with Dr. Jeremy Hunsinger on Digital Environmentalism led her to her current area of research: Sustainable Policy. Her undergraduate research includes assisting Dr. Erich Foxtree with his research on Ancient Mayan Iconography in Guatemala. Her advocacy includes Climate Justice Laurier as well as Board of Directors for Laurier Students' Public Interest Research Group. She enjoys crocheting, designing, and working on her small business. Her plans are to pursue a graduate degree in Sustainable Policy.

Susana Escobar Zelaya

Susana Escobar Zelaya was born in El Salvador and raised in Irving, Texas. As a first-generation college student, Susana is pursuing an Honors Bachelor of Fine Arts in Art Education at The University of Texas at Arlington, with an expected graduation date in Spring 2022. Her undergraduate research includes exploring ways of incorporating sustainable practices into the art classroom and applying them to artmaking. She is an active member and officer of the Art Educators Association (AEA) at UTA. Susana is also an Art Guard for The Warehouse gallery in Dallas. In her free time, she enjoys visiting art exhibitions, gardening, and making art.

Interviewee

Dr. Andrew M. Clark

Dr. Andrew Clark is an Associate Professor in the Department of Communication specializing in broadcasting. He is also the QEP Director for the university, and Associate Director of the Center for Research on Teaching and Learning Excellence, Office of the Provost. He completed his M.A. and Ph.D. at the University of Florida. A native of New Zealand, Dr. Clark worked professionally as a radio broadcaster in New Zealand, England, the Isle of Man, and the United States, and in television in Indiana, before entering the world of academia. He is currently Vice Chair of the International Division, and past Chair of the Radio and Audio Media Division, of the Broadcast Education Association. He is also currently President of the Texas Association of Broadcast Educators. He has won awards for both his teaching and research and has presented numerous articles at conferences around the United States and globally. His research has been published in journals such as *International Communication Gazette*, *Journal of Radio and Audio Media* (formerly *Journal of Radio Studies*), *American Journalism*, *Digital Journalism*, the *Journal of Middle East Media*, and the *Athens Journal of Mass Media and Communications*.

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Yumi Ohira currently serves as the Digital Publishing & Repository Librarian at The University of Texas at Arlington Libraries, which she joined in April 2019. Her portfolio includes matters related to scholarly communications and open access. Previously, Ohira worked at Fort Hays State University, Kansas, as Digital Curation Librarian, then at The University of Nebraska at Omaha as Digital Initiatives Librarian.

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